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Preface 
The process of writing this thesis has at times been frustrating and tiring. But it has always 
been rewarding. Somewhat similar to King Hussein of Jordan I have always recovered after 
times of doubt and confusion, albeit for different reasons. Without the help, advice and 
encouraging words from a whole lot of people, I am not so sure I would have. I apologize to 
those I have forgotten here.  
First of all, I am profoundly grateful to my supervisor Professor Hilde Henriksen Waage. Her 
revisions, recommendations, comments and corrections have guided this thesis from a 
confusing mess into a hopefully understandable study. Helge Jensehaugen deserves special 
thanks for his many valuable and constructive comments. I would also like to express my 
thanks to the students under Professor Waage’s guidance for their many comments on chapter 
drafts of dubious quality throughout these two years. And last, without the help from the staff 
at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, I would either have 
drowned in the massive ocean of source documents, or not jumped in at all.   
Second, I am forever grateful to my parents for being supportive of this project and for always 
taking time to read my drafts. And to my brother, sisters and the rest of my family for 
cheering me up and onwards; thank you. I would also like to thank Alvilde for her 
unconditional supportive encouragement of this endeavor. And for listening to me ramble on 
about the Middle East at odd hours. 
Last, but by no means least, I am truly thankful to all of my fellow students at the third floor 
of Niels Treschow building at the University of Oslo. They have made these two years as 
joyful as only students of history knows how. They deserve special thanks for the many long 
lunches and football practices. But most importantly for enabling me to take my mind off the 
thesis and just have a good time with friendly people. To my other friends I apologize for my 
long absence. I am now ready to make amends. 
 
Oslo, May 10, 2015.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In June 1967, Jordan joined the Arab side of the Six-Day War against Israel. King Hussein of 
Jordan saw no other option than to join the rising tide of radical Arab nationalism. After years 
of strenuous effort to insulate King Hussein from the influence of radical Arab states, United 
States President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Middle East policy had failed to fulfill its primary 
objective: maintaining a stable and peaceful status quo in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
American relationship with the young King Hussein in Jordan had long since been aimed to 
preserve some moderation in the conflict, but it was spawned from the perceived necessity to 
prevent the Soviet Union from gaining access to the Middle East’s economic and geographic 
assets. Like his predecessors, President Johnson’s Middle East policy was originally aimed to 
promote American national interests in the region’s geopolitical values and its vast reserves of 
natural resources.
1
 
Johnson’s domestic popularity was wearing thin by the deteriorating campaign in Vietnam 
that took precedence in his foreign policy.
2
 In the Middle East, however, Israel evoked strong 
feelings of sympathy and generated support on the American domestic scene. Israel served as 
a platform on which Johnson could strengthen his popularity and support for other foreign and 
domestic policies. Johnson’s Middle East policy was therefore balanced on his personal and 
his electorate’s sympathy for Israel’s security, and the strategic necessity to prevent the spread 
of Soviet influence in the Arab states. As the tensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict were rising, 
the Johnson administration came to realize that King Hussein’s moderate regime not only 
prevented Soviet influence: It also safeguarded Israel’s security. In Jordan, President Johnson 
found a partner who supported two key elements of American national interests.  
The guiding research question of this thesis is, why and how was the US-Jordan relationship 
affected by the American sympathy for Israel during 1964–1968? Two interrelated questions 
arise from the foregoing: Why did the Johnson Administration not strengthen King Hussein to 
withstand the Arab nationalism’s calls for war in June 1967? And which political concerns 
influenced the nature of the US-Jordan relationship? 
                                                 
1
 This study takes for granted the general consensus among knowledgeable scholars of the field that 1) 
containment of the Soviet Union, 2) oil interests and 3) domestic sympathy for Israel, constituted American 
national interests in the Middle East. William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2005). 11–15. 
2
 Arlene Lazarowitz, "Different Approaches to a Regional Search for Balance: The Johnson Administration, the 
State Department, and the Middle East, 1964–1967," Diplomatic History 32, no. 1 (2008). 28; Dean Rusk, As I 
Saw It: A Secretary of State's Memoirs (London: Tauris, 1991). 384–387. 
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This thesis studies the foundation, dynamics and development of the United States-Jordan 
relationship during 1964–1968. It studies why and how, and from where the relationship was 
changed and challenged. While not a comprehensive examination of US Middle East policy, 
this study investigates and examines the complexities of American Middle East policy toward 
a recipient which, unlike most Middle East states, accepted the United States’ close ties to 
Israel. In that respect, this analysis offers an outlook on American Middle East policy which 
has not yet been thoroughly examined. The study is intended to empirically and 
chronologically illustrate how Israel participated in shaping the complex nature of the 
American understanding of Jordan, and what consequences this had for the Johnson 
administration’s relationship with King Hussein. 
Pillars of Policy: American Interest in the Middle East 
The Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and the desire to stop the spread of 
communism permeated American foreign policy in the post-World War Two era. The Middle 
East’s geographic location posed as important strategic benefits in a potential global war 
against the Soviet Union, and access to three continents was a tempting asset for American 
military planners. These concerns constituted the American geopolitical interest in the Middle 
East. Moreover, as demonstrated by two world wars, oil was essential for battlefield victories. 
The ongoing Cold War made it important to secure oil resources and the military edge it 
symbolized. The Arab states’ oil and the vast income it provided were also essential in the 
effort to rebuild the economies of Western Europe. Oil thus constituted American economic 
interest in the region.
3
 American strategic interests in the Middle East encompassed these 
economic and geopolitical concerns. 
Since its establishment in 1948, Americans had been highly sympathetic to the Jewish state of 
Israel. The revelation of the Holocaust and the terror the Jews had endured in Europe had 
accelerated American support for Jewish nationalism. Moreover, the Jewish settling of the 
biblical land in Palestine evoked feelings of prophetical dimensions among Jews, Christians 
and the general public in America. Israel occupied a prominent position in the minds of both 
the elected officials and the electorate. Israel had primacy in the frame of reference in which 
Americans viewed the Middle East. Arabs and Palestinians hardly figured in the American 
                                                 
3
 Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2005). 7. 
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understanding of the region, and when they did it was as Israel’s adversaries.4 The inherent 
sympathy for Israel thus constituted the American domestic interests in the Middle East. 
The Arab states on the one hand ensured American strategic interests. Israel provided 
domestic support on the other hand. Preserving economic and geopolitical interests thus 
implied a vital element of pro-Arab relations, whereas domestic concerns often called for a 
pro-Israel policy.
5
 In that respect Jordan was in a peculiar position. King Hussein was 
suspicious of Soviet influence, and he was moderate toward Israel. In Jordan, the Johnson 
administration could pursue strategic containment of Soviet influence and protect Israel’s 
security. By supporting Jordan the Johnson administration could also present an image of 
impartiality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While enabling the administration to maintain a close 
relationship with Israel, such impartiality also stabilized the region, made the Arab states less 
receptive to Soviet overtures, and secured a steady flow of oil to America’s allies.6 However, 
Johnson’s presidency coincided with increased tensions and eventually war in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and Johnson faced the daunting challenge of how to bridge conflicting national 
interests.
7
  
Decision-making: Theoretical Perspectives  
In the American government, the secretary of state and the president set the ground rules for 
foreign policy. There are several theories on how such rules are laid out. The rational-actor 
model holds that the president and secretary of state always act to promote and advance 
national interest in foreign policy. A former national security advisor to presidents Nixon and 
Carter, and later scholar of the Middle East, William B. Quandt, points to the consistent line 
of American Middle East policy after 1967 as possible evidence of rational actors in the Oval 
Office.
8
 A second model, the bureaucratic theory, assigns the competition between rivaling 
institutions higher importance than single rational actors. The views of the State Department, 
the Department of Defense, the White House, the CIA and the National Security Council 
(NSC) competed for President Johnson’s attention and endorsement. This study has found 
                                                 
4
 Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000). 1–8. Throughout this thesis, the term ‘Palestinian’ refers to the Arab 
population of Mandatory Palestine and the refugees who fled to Jordan after Israel’s creation in 1948. 
5
 Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that Johnson, for his support of the Civil 
Rights movement, faced continuous domestic opposition from his Republican counterparts. Israel was by no 
means his sole domestic concerns. See for example Bruce J. Dierenfield, The Civil Rights Movement, Rev. ed. 
(Harlow: Longman, 2008). 93–95, 110–111, 119–123. 
6
 Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire. 19, 28, 47–50. 
7
 Quandt, Peace Process. 13–14. 
8
 Ibid. 7. 
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several instances of competing and conflicting advice, making the bureaucratic model largely 
applicable. However, it was always the President who finally decided which advice to follow. 
Bureaucrats could only submit suggestions and recommendations.
9
  
Yet another theory is that domestic considerations dictate the outcome of foreign policy. The 
domestic political scene in America is highly entangled in foreign policy, especially when it 
comes to Middle East policy. Congress wields control over the budget, and congressional 
support is necessary to continue foreign aid programs. Domestic lobbies are able to affect 
legislators to advance their views, and political parties are not always in accord as to what 
constitutes national interests, or how they are best preserved. Since Israel occupied such a 
prominent position in the American understanding of the Middle East and the Arab states did 
not, adopting a pro-Israel policy generated popularity for the administration. Going in the 
opposite direction implied criticism from domestic interest groups and political parties in their 
competition for the electorate’s support.10 
Since 1964 Jordan and Israel were on opposite sides of an increasingly explosive conflict. The 
US could not support one side without alienating the other. The bureaucratic model assigns 
the State Department, the CIA, the NSC and other government institutions a higher degree of 
importance than the president in policy formulation, but all these institutions tended to view 
the Soviet Union’s influence as the most important threat to American national interests. The 
obvious way to face that challenge would be to support Arab states, the largest constellation 
of states in the region. However, even a quick glance at Johnson’s Middle East policy reveals 
that it was never essentially pro-Arab. The domestic model, although it emphasizes the 
American sympathy and support to Israel, fails to explain that several Arab states also 
received military and economic support from the US.
11
 This study is not wedded to any one 
theory, but will rather use elements of all three to illustrate the various considerations Johnson 
had to take into account, and which advice the president chose to act upon. 
Thus, for this study, President Johnson is assumed to be the rational actor who acted upon 
advice from bureaucrats of competing agencies. However, the president was keenly aware of 
domestic sentiments and restraints. Being the undisputed leader of the executive branch, 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. 7–8. 
10
 Ibid. 7–8. 
11
 The Eisenhower Doctrine is likely the most clear-cut manifestation of American support to the Arab states. 
Under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower the US dispensed “tens of millions of dollars in economic and 
military aid” to the Arab states. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire. 42–43. 
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Johnson nonetheless had the final word in policy formulation, and Johnson laid out the 
Middle East policy based on his perception of the Middle East. This does not mean that 
Johnson can be blamed or held responsible for the outcome of foreign policy or for events 
which emanated in the Middle East during his presidency. Rather, this thesis will show how 
Johnson, presumably to the best of his ability and understanding of the Middle East, tried to 
maneuver between vast amounts of recommendations and advice to formulate a policy which 
he believed to be best suited to promote American national interests as these came under 
increasing pressure. His policy was nonetheless a result of deliberate decisions. 
The Johnson Administration and the Middle East 
Lyndon B. Johnson had been a staunch supporter of Israel since his days as Senate majority 
leader during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency. Upon John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 
1963, Johnson told Israeli officials, “You have lost a great friend … but you have found a 
better one.”12 Personally, Johnson took great interest in the well-being of Israel. Palestinians 
and Arabs did not factor in Johnson’s perception of the Middle East, but Israelis vividly did, 
and Israel’s interests were always at the core of Johnson’s Middle East policy. The Middle 
East mindset Johnson brought into the Oval Office was one wherein Israel was the center of 
attention. His views were largely shaped and upheld by his pro-Israel advisors, who all shared 
the common American mindset about Arabs and the Middle East. Due to the absence of Arab 
states and the Palestinians in the administration’s minds, Johnson never really addressed the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as one between Israel and Palestinians. He was therefore inclined to 
believe moderate states such as Jordan acted upon pressure from other Arab states, and failed 
to contemplate that King Hussein was forced to consider the demands of his large Palestinian 
population.
13
 
There were rarely disputes over the basic fact that Israel was America’s most important and 
most trusted partner in the Middle East. The largely uniform pro-Israel environment of 
Johnson’s inner circle of advisors did, however, realize the dangers of publicly declaring its 
position, but for reasons other than taking on true evenhandedness in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The real reason for the seemingly impartial policy was fear of making the Arab states side 
with the Soviet Union, giving communism access to the geopolitical and economic resources 
in the Middle East. An evenhanded approach enabled the Johnson administration to preserve 
                                                 
12
 Douglas Little, "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-68," International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (1993). 573.  
13
 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine. 109–115. 
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its strategic interests in the Arab world while simultaneously developing close ties to Israel. 
This was the policy of strategic impartiality. Under a veil of impartiality Johnson concealed 
that Israel’s interests were always at the core of his administration’s Middle East policy. 
Depending on the events in Middle East, Johnson’s image of impartiality could be 
strengthened or threatened, and there were supporters of both extremes in Johnson’s 
administration. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was Johnson’s most important foreign policy 
advisor and although Rusk’s mindset about the Middle East was equally Israel-centered, he 
realized the dangers of openly adopting a pro-Israel policy. Rusk’s State Department often 
came out siding with the Arab states at times of disputes with the White House. The State 
Department enjoyed wide mandates, and the secretary of state was willingly accepted in 
Johnson’s inner circle of advisors.14  
The White House’s primary institution for formulating foreign policy was the National 
Security Council (NSC), which was comprised of “senior national security advisors and 
cabinet officials.”15 The NSC advised Johnson to act in the interest of national security. This, 
more often than not, “may fly in the face of the President’s own feelings about Israel.”16 To 
many of the NSC advisers, the criticality of denying the Soviet Union an entrance to the 
Middle East outweighed domestic considerations. The same was often true for the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department’s Office for Near East Affairs (NEA). 
Both tended to view Soviet influence as the most pressing threat to American interests in the 
Middle East. It was against the domestic interests of the White House that the advice from 
these agencies was weighed and often found too light.
17
  
President Johnson was surrounded by a group of close advisors, some in unofficial capacity, 
and all tended to view Israel with a similar degree of sympathy. Some were clearly opposed to 
foreign concerns when it went against the President’s feelings about Israel, and others were 
willing to reject domestic concerns. Few managed to incorporate challenging views in their 
recommendations to Johnson, but such key pragmatists occupied important seats around 
                                                 
14
 Zara Steiner, "Decision-Making in American and British Foreign Policy: An Open and Shut Case," Review of 
International Studies 13, no. 1 (1987). 7. 
15
 The White House, the Administration, “National Security Council”, accessed March 26, 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc.  
16
 Saunders to Rostow, May 31, 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS 1964–1968), Vol. 
XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War 1967, Document 114. 
17
 Historian Zara Steiner argues that the formulation of foreign policy as early as Eisenhower’s presidency had 
begun to shift from the State Department to the White House’s National Security Council and that “admission 
[to the NSC] came to be restricted to those who would say what the President hoped to hear”. Steiner, "Decision-
Making in American and British Foreign Policy." 7. 
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Johnson’s table. Foremost among these men were the staff members of the NSC and 
Johnson’s special advisors for national security affairs, Robert W. Komer, McGeorge Bundy 
and Walt Rostow. Though all three shared the President’s sympathies for Israel and 
appreciated how domestic popularity often hinged on the pro-Israel element of the Middle 
East policy, they were seldom willing to reject strategic concerns when such interests were 
pressured by domestic sentiment. The special advisors served as intermediaries between the 
President and Rusk’s State Department, and thus they managed to assess both domestic and 
foreign interests in their recommendations to Johnson.
18
 
Historiography and Literature 
There are countless literary works covering the topic of American Middle East policy during 
the Cold War. The opening of previously closed archives in USA, Britain and Israel during 
the 1980s and 1990s made new source material available for historians. The new archival 
material spurred an interest in reexamination of the earlier accounts, thus marking the 
beginning of revisionist Middle East history. The traditional historiography of the Middle 
East can be briefly summed up as follows: The Arab states have pointed to the lack of great-
power support and other external factors to explain their defeats and struggles.
19
 The Israelis 
have heavily emphasized their heroic struggle against a unified and intransigent Arab enemy 
which has always wanted to destroy Israel.
20
 Drawing on new source material, these 
traditional explanations have been modified during the last two to three decades. 
Despite revision and rewriting, accounts of great-power influence still remain a prominent 
feature of Middle East historiography. However, modern historiography of the Cold War has 
revised traditional accounts of the superpowers’ global involvement. This involvement 
stemmed not only from their competition for spheres of influence, but also from being invited 
into competition by regional actors. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis claims that 
“peripheries [manipulate] centers rather than the other way around.”21 This has had 
consequences for the understanding of Jordan’s relationship with the superpowers as well. 
                                                 
18
 Rusk was impressed with the special advisor’s ability to assess challenging views: “We worked so closely 
together that I regarded the National Security staff at the White House as almost another wing of the State 
Department.” Rusk, As I Saw It.. 452. 
19
 Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, "Introduction," in The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, ed. 
Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 4. 
20
 Avi Shlaim, "Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948," in The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, 
ed. Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 79. 
21
 John Lewis Gaddis, "On Starting All over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War," in 
Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 
2000). 31. 
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Whereas the traditionalist outlook on Jordan in the Cold War era claimed that Jordan was 
“merely responding to pressures emanating from Washington and Moscow, rather than 
shaping its own destiny”, the revised thesis is that “the Jordanian regime used external 
support to construct a durable policy capable of withstanding the challenges of radical pan-
Arabism, the Arab-Israeli conflict and internal opposition.”22  
Due to easy accessibility to primary sources, the US-Israel relationship has been studied by 
countless authors in even larger numbers of books and articles. American relations toward 
Jordan have on the other hand received little attention in the modern historiography of the 
Middle East. Professor in history Douglas Little’s “A puppet in search of a Puppeteer?” 
(1995), and university lecturer in history Zach Levey’s “United States Arms sales policy 
toward Jordan 1963–1968” (2006) stand out as important works. These journal articles 
address King Hussein’s maneuvering in direction of tighter alignment with the US and the 
motivation behind the American arms sales to Jordan, respectively. Both articles have focused 
rather narrowly on their subjects, and neither piece addresses how the American policy 
toward Jordan was influenced by Israel at necessary length. The same is true for historian 
Lawrence Tal’s “Jordan” in The Cold War in the Middle East (1997) edited by Middle East 
historian and professor Avi Shlaim and political scientist Yezid Sayigh. Tal studies how 
Jordan played the Cold War game to its own benefit, but he deals only episodically with the 
Six-Day War and does not investigate how Israel participated in shaping America’s 
understanding of Jordan.
23
  
Nonetheless, Jordan has been the focus of several studies, albeit to various extents. Lion of 
Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (2007) by Avi Shlaim is a thorough and 
well-documented study of King Hussein’s reign in Jordan. Lion of Jordan sheds light on the 
Jordanian assessments on the Middle East conflicts and how the king responded to those 
conflicts. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (2000), also written by Avi Shlaim, 
examines Israeli policy toward Jordan and Israel’s assessments of King Hussein, both of 
which were closely intertwined with the American perception of Jordan. The 1967 Arab-
Israeli War: Origins and Consequences (2012) edited by Avi Shlaim and historian Wm. 
                                                 
22
 Lawrence Tal, "Jordan," in The Cold War in the Middle East, ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1997).102. 
23
 Douglas Little, "A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein, and Jordan, 1953-
1970," The International History Review 17, no. 3 (1995); Zach Levey, "United States Arms Policy toward 
Jordan, 1963–68," Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 3 (2006); Lawrence Tal, "Jordan," in The Cold War 
in the Middle East, ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). 
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Roger Louis deals with all the participants’ strategies and conduct of the Six-Day War in 
1967 and helps examine the intricacies of the inter-Arab rivalry and how it affected King 
Hussein’s policymaking.24  
Important works on American Middle East policy include Douglas Little’s American 
Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (2008). American 
Orientalism explores the various pillars of American Middle East policies and their 
significance. Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (2005) 
by diplomatic historian Peter L. Hahn examines how the events in the Middle East have 
affected US foreign policy. Former CIA analyst Kathleen Christison’s Perceptions of 
Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (2000) is an example of how the role 
and influence of the great powers have also undergone revision. Perceptions of Palestine 
examines the lack of significance that Arabs had in US policymakers’ minds and the 
equivalent prominent position had by Israelis.
25
 All these works are extensive, but few have 
linked the American understanding of Jordan to the close US-Israel relationship. This study 
will fill some of the gap in the literature by exploring how Israel took part in shaping and 
influencing the Johnson administration’s perception of King Hussein and Jordan.  
Sources 
The source material for this study is a combination of the aforementioned literature and 
declassified documents from the Johnson administration. The majority of the primary source 
material is found in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). The FRUS volumes 
contain “documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense as well as 
other agencies.”26 The Office of the Historian at the United States Department of State has 
“included documentation that illuminates the formulation of foreign policy and the 
repercussions of their effects.”27 The FRUS documents make up the bulk of the source 
material for this study. Important documents in the FRUS series are memoranda of 
conversations as well as minutes of meetings from the top level of the American government. 
                                                 
24
 Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (London: Allen Lane, 2007); Avi 
Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000); Wm Roger Louis and Avi 
(eds.) Shlaim, The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
25
 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Peter L. Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the 
Middle East since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005); Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of 
Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
26
 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “About the Foreign Relations of the United States Series,” 
accessed October 31, 2013. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-frus.  
27
 Ibid. 
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Although the two FRUS volumes relevant for this thesis are available online, some documents 
are not printed. 
At the United States National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, 
Maryland (NARA), several more documents have been studied for this thesis. All researched 
documents in College Park were from the State Department’s Record Group 59, Central 
Foreign Policy Files 1964–1966 and 1967–1969. Several hundred telegrams between the US 
embassies in the Middle East and the State Department helped shed light on which 
information was passed to the upper levels of government and on how the top level was 
informed of developments in Jordan, Israel and the wider Middle East. In analyzing the 
American policy during Johnson’s presidency, these documents offer an unaltered, unfiltered 
and somewhat personal consideration of the situation. Researchers can easily follow how 
events and situations were discussed between embassies and then, via the State Department’s 
reply, trace the effect of their recommendations. Several documents were sent hastily, 
especially during the Six-Day War in June 1967, and these telegrams, airgrams and situation 
reports offer largely unaltered information of the events they are discussing. 
Access to Jordanian archives is difficult to acquire. Some scholars even question if there is 
anything of significance in them, if the sources still exist. In any case, Jordanian sources are 
likely to be in Arabic, a language this author has not mastered and which would demand 
extensive effort to translate. Where understanding Jordanian assessments and perceptions is 
necessary, this study has utilized the literary works on King Hussein’s regime as well as the 
US Embassy in Amman’s many telegrams and airgrams. Since this study concentrates on the 
American assessments of Jordan, less significance is attached to the Jordanian perception of 
the events. American policymakers reported events as they perceived them, and how this 
perception affected the higher levels of the US government is the key focus for this study. The 
literature serves as the basis for understanding the longer lines, ambitions and assessments of 
American Middle East policy, whereas the primary source material will reveal how this policy 
affected, and was affected by events in Jordan and the Middle East.  
Source Problems 
In all historical narratives, a source’s significance is weighed against other sources, the 
historiography and common knowledge to determine its truthfulness. To ensure truthfulness, 
authors have to consider sources that do not support the hypothesis, but for the sake of 
readability and understandability of the narrative a selection must be imposed. Assessing 
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every single source and weighing its significance against all other sources would lead to 
thousands of pages only to describe the simplest event or decision-making process. For 
practical reasons, some sources must be judged as more important and some as less important, 
but the selection must be made truthfully to the best of the historian’s ability. Also, for the 
sake of readability and delimitation of material, historical narratives often simplify the 
retelling of decision-making processes. The use of terms such as ‘Washington’s view,’ ‘in the 
view of the State Department’ and ‘the views held in the administration’ adds up to a 
readable, understandable and, to the extent possible, comprehensive character of the narrative. 
This rarely, if ever, implies that every official in every office of the State Department, the 
CIA, the NSC, the White House or the administration held the same views. The problem of 
whose views were advanced is even more acute when analyzing specific primary source 
documents. Telegrams from the State Department often carry Secretary Rusk’s name at the 
end, indicating that every telegram was read and authorized by the secretary of state. 
Regarding the amount of documents, Rusk himself said that he saw less than one percent of 
the more than two million telegrams that were sent during his tenure.
28
 The day-to-day 
maneuvering of policy was delegated to hundreds of officials in the State Department and 
they did a remarkable job: Rusk said that “I can recall only 4 or 5 [telegrams] that had to be 
called back and rewritten because their authors missed the point of policy the president and I 
expected them to follow.”29 It is nonetheless reasonable to believe that Rusk, and at some 
occasions the president, read and approved documents which affected important issues of 
policy before they were sent. Memoranda from the FRUS volumes carry the same 
discrepancy: A signature does not necessarily imply approval or authorship, and the 
truthfulness might be compromised by the note taker and his or her personal perceptions. It is 
when faced with the actual decisions and events that historians can make a truthful and 
calculated estimation as to which documents and recommendations had effect on decision-
makers, and which ones did not. 
These problems are, of course, true for all historical writing, and the same problems are 
shared by all authors of all documents, journal articles and books that have been researched 
for this study. It therefore feels necessary to emphasize that this thesis is an imposed 
narrative. It was not inherent in the source material. It was not unveiled or uncovered in the 
folders and boxes of the National Archives building at College Park, or from the variety of 
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FRUS documents. The sources point in all sorts of directions, and it is this author who has 
analyzed them to tell a narrative of American policy toward Jordan during 1964–1968. The 
sources in themselves do not. The researched documents were for the most part from the top 
level of the American government, and although it might not be an exhaustive investigation of 
all relevant sources, they are sufficient to justify the conclusion.  
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Chapter 2: Jordan, a Life on the Line 
Between the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948 and Lyndon Baines Johnson’s ascendancy to the 
presidency of the United States in 1963, the Middle East witnessed the creation of Israel and 
the collapse of Britain’s hegemony in the region. In the vacuum of Britain’s retreat, USA 
entered the Middle East scene. Closely linked to these external changes was the rise of Arab 
nationalism, the rivalry between the Arab states, the Arab-Israeli dispute and the question of 
the Palestinian refugees. When Hussein bin Talal, then only eighteen years old, was crowned 
king of Jordan in May 1953, he had to face these foreign and domestic challenges, which as 
events unfolded illustrated that his reign depended largely on his personal handling of them. 
The delicate maneuvering between the many potential, but potent threats to his regime led 
King Hussein to seek a closer relationship with the United States.
30
  
Deeply influenced by the proud legacy of his family, which claimed to descend from the 
Islamic prophet Mohammed, King Hussein’s guiding principle was protecting the interests of 
his Hashemite family dynasty.
31
 The young King’s first decade in power was more of a steep 
learning curve than a calculated course of action, and a striking feature of King Hussein’s 
early reign is the lack of a consistent policy. King Hussein changed his policies several times 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. In foreign policy he sided with the Arab states and Arab 
nationalism, with Britain, the Arab states once more and Britain again before he eventually 
partnered with the US. In domestic policy King Hussein supported liberalization and was 
personally nationalistic in his aspirations before he took an authoritarian and conservative 
line. Nationalism and foreign support is necessarily mutually exclusive, but the king tried to 
find a middle ground. In his search for a middle ground, King Hussein learned how to use the 
Cold War to consolidate his regime and build a “durable state.”32 
Why did King Hussein eventually move in the direction of a partnership with the United 
States? And how did King Hussein’s search for a middle ground between nationalism and 
foreign support affect Jordan’s position in the Arab world?  
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King Abdullah’s Legacy: Jordan in the Arab World 
In the so-called McMahon-Hussein correspondence (1915–1916), Britain promised Sharif 
Hussein of Mecca that he would rule a united Arab nation in return for his efforts in leading 
the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.
33
 By the end of the war, 
however, Britain’s pen had been diligently used on the Middle East map. An agreement with 
France in 1916 declared that Syria and Lebanon were in the French sphere of influence, while 
Transjordan and Palestine were under British supervision.
34
 In 1917 Britain further 
complicated their promise to Sharif Hussein by declaring that Palestine, part of the land which 
had been promised to him, was to be the national home of Jews.
35
 Two of Sharif Hussein’s 
sons, Faisal and Abdullah, were appointed to serve under British supervision as kings of the 
British mandates in Iraq and Transjordan.
36
 
Ever since it’s unusual inception in April 1921, Mandatory Transjordan had been an artificial 
creation.
37
 Transjordan made no sense in terms of historical unity, and the land lacked all 
significant natural resources. The barren desert land and its nomadic peoples were held 
together only by British subsidies and the British-commanded army. When Transjordan was 
awarded independence in 1946, King Abdullah changed the name of the land to the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. True independence was, however, not yet granted, and Jordan 
was completely dependent on British subsidies.
38
 The army was the key to Jordan’s survival, 
but the Arab Legion, as the army often was called, was Arab only in name, and it was under 
the near-complete command of British officers.
39
  
King Abdullah had explored ways to enlarge his kingdom ever since he had been appointed to 
rule Transjordan. He sought a land more similar to what had been promised to his father, and 
he nursed his father’s ambition to assert the Hashemite family as leaders of the Arab world. 
Arab nationalism was emerging in the Middle East, and its prime objective was unification of 
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all Arabs in an unspecified Arabia. King Abdullah wanted to spearhead this nationalism by 
realizing his Greater Syria scheme, a territorial ambition which implied Hashemite rule over 
Jordan, Syria, and Palestine.
40
 However, by the mid-1940s only Mandatory Palestine was 
within King Abdullah’s reach. The king’s dreams of territorial expansion were reduced to a 
scheme which only included Jordan and Palestine, and he found that Britain supported his 
ambitions to seek realization of Greater Transjordan.
41
 The reason was largely because 
Britain’s control over Palestine had become troubled by ever-deteriorating relations between 
local Palestinians and Jewish immigrants who began targeting the British care-takers.
42
  
In 1947, Britain announced its withdrawal from Palestine and assigned its problems to the 
United Nations (UN). King Abdullah now saw an opportunity to implement his plans for 
Greater Transjordan, and he had no qualms in depriving the Palestinians of the statehood that 
was outlined in the UN Partition Plan for Palestine in 1947.
43
 To incorporate as much territory 
as possible, King Abdullah understood that he needed consent from the large and politically 
forceful Zionists who also had been proposed to rule sovereign parts of Mandatory Palestine. 
The Arab states opposed the UN partition plan and viewed a Jewish state in their 
neighborhood as completely unacceptable. King Abdullah was nonetheless focused on 
completing his territorial ambitions and secretly engaged in talks with the Zionists. In early 
May 1948 the Zionists made it unmistakably clear that they did not want to become part of a 
Greater Transjordan under King Abdullah’s rule, but the king was set on territorial expansion. 
King Abdullah settled for the conquest of the parts of Palestine which were designated to 
become the Palestinian state, and he scored Zionist approval for his plans as long as he 
avoided the areas designated to become Israel.
44
 
Against the massive Arab opposition against the Jewish state the UN had proposed, King 
Abdullah took a radically different approach than his fellow Arab statesmen. The Arab states 
collectively declared that they would use military means to resist the establishment of a 
Jewish state. They agreed to unite their armies and planned to crush the Jewish state and 
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liberate Palestine from British imperialism and Zionist aspirations. Apart from agreeing that a 
Jewish state was unacceptable, the Arab coalition disagreed on everything else. In public, the 
Arab leaders outbid each other in the condemnation of the UN’s decision, a Jewish state, and 
all of its supporters. In private, however, the Arab coalition could not agree on how the 
campaign would be carried out, the administration of supply lines or even who would 
command the attacks.
45
  
The reason for the Arab coalition’s lack of unity lay in part with the Arab leader’s intense 
suspicion of King Abdullah. They questioned whether the king was true to the campaign or 
whether he would exploit the situation to seek territorial expansion. Constantly in fear of 
being left in the dark or at least to check King Abdullah’s room for maneuver, the Arab 
leaders would rather see the whole of Palestine become Israel than see King Abdullah expand 
his kingdom.
46
 The result was “one of the most divided, disorganized and ramshackle 
coalitions in the entire history of warfare.”47 Egypt and Saudi Arabia gambled that King 
Abdullah would not risk betraying the Arab cause by using the coalition to pursue his 
personal ambitions. They put their faith in King Abdullah’s loyalty and made him 
Commander in Chief of the Arab coalition.
48
 Their gamble failed miserably. King Abdullah’s 
sights were dead set on territorial enlargement, and he made last minute changes to the battle 
plans in order to prevent the other Arab armies from interfering with his plans to present the 
annexation of the West Bank of the Jordan River as a fait accompli.
49
  
By the end of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, King Abdullah had captured the West Bank and 
Old City of Jerusalem, but he held his army away from the areas designated to the Jewish 
state. Abdullah had honored his agreement with the Zionists, and he claimed to have fulfilled 
his duties as leader of the Arab coalition. In King Abdullah’s view, holding the West Bank 
was better than allowing it to befall the Jewish state. However, neither Arab leaders nor 
Palestinians accepted King Abdullah’s reasoning, and he was blamed for the Arab defeat and 
the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. By the Palestinian refugees and his 
fellow Arab statesmen, King Abdullah was portrayed as a villain who had conspired with the 
enemy to enlarge his kingdom at their expense.
50
 In reality all the Arab states had gone to war 
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for their own national interests, but by singling out Jordan as the real reason for the Arab 
defeat, the other Arab states absolved their records and used the excuse to scapegoat Jordan.
51
 
Consequently, King Abdullah and Jordan were isolated from the Arab world. King Abdullah 
had accomplished his dream of territorial expansion, but it was far less territory than he 
originally had envisaged, and it had come with a costly price. Large numbers of Palestinian 
refugees gave a massive upsurge in Jordan’s population, and they naturally felt dissociated 
with their new ruler.
52
 
The numerous Palestinians in Jordan posed a challenge to King Abdullah’s regime. The 
Palestinians found Egypt and Syria’s aggressive propaganda more appealing than the 
Jordanian citizenship King Abdullah extended to them. King Abdullah was aware of the 
developments, and he wanted a settlement with Israel to secure the West Bank as Jordanian 
territory. However, he backed down when rumors of plots and unrest reached alarming levels. 
Palestinian nationalists felt that if they could not return to their homes, they would not live in 
a kingdom where King Abdullah was ruler. They decided to act. On July 20, 1951, King 
Abdullah was shot dead by a Palestinian nationalist.
53
 The king left behind a deeply troubled 
country completely dependent on foreign support, with damaged relations with the Arab 
states and a population wherein large parts had no trust in the royal family. Few had faith in 
Jordan’s survival.54 
King Hussein bin Talal 
Hussein bin Talal was only eighteen when he formally ascended to the throne of Jordan on 
May 2, 1953.
55
 King Hussein was deeply influenced by his grandfather’s belief that Arabs had 
to become masters of their own fate and detach from Britain’s imperialism, and was inclined 
to side with Arab nationalism. Besides, having witnessed King Abdullah’s assassination, the 
worst case outcome if he diverted too far from his population’s wishes had been vividly 
imprinted in Hussein’s mind. The large Palestinian population in Jordan would forever affect 
King Hussein’s policies, and perhaps due to having witnessed the assassination, he was 
during his first years at the throne far more of an Arab nationalist than King Abdullah. 
Hussein’s top priority was to end Jordan’s isolation in the Arab world, and his nationalist 
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sympathies went a long way in reducing the Arab suspicion fueled by the actions of King 
Abdullah.
56
  
Jordan’s attempt to realign with the Arab world, and King Hussein’s interest in Arab 
nationalism spurred grave concerns in the minds of British policymakers who kept the 
Jordanian state afloat. Britain’s hegemony in the Middle East had come under increasing 
pressure from the rising power of pan-Arabism, a supra-national and anti-imperialist Arab 
nationalism. It was perceived in Britain and America as a threat to Western interests in the 
Middle East.
57
 If the so-called radical Arab nationalism was not checked, it could lead to the 
loss of Britain’s influence in the Middle East and the loss of the Suez Canal in particular. 
British fear of radical Arab nationalism was further accelerated when Gamal Abdel Nasser in 
1954 emerged as the leader after Egypt’s revolution. Under Nasser’s leadership, Egypt soon 
embarked on a radical anti-imperialist campaign. To Britain and America, Nasser’s rhetoric 
and popularity among all Arabs potentially threatened their interests in the rest of the Middle 
East.
58
 
Along with the vivid lesson that King Abdullah’s tolerance of Israel eventually cost him his 
life, King Hussein saw another reason to realign Jordan with the Arab world rather than reach 
accommodation with Israel. The 1948 war and the consequent Palestinian refugee problem 
had generated an immensely difficult problem that transpired both domestic and foreign 
policy. Most of the refugees ended up in camps where they took action against Israel by their 
own means. The majority of the Palestinians who crossed the border into Israel did so to 
search for their lost possessions, their relatives, and to tend their fields, and only a small 
minority of the infiltrations was politically motivated sabotage raids against Israel.
59
 
However, Israel claimed cross-border incursions were financed and motivated by Arab 
leaders in an undeclared guerilla war, and they answered every incursion with military 
retaliation.
60
  
King Hussein realized that Israel’s retaliations caused “a great deal of difficulty in terms of 
the internal scene in Jordan.”61 In fear of provoking an attack, the king could not crack down 
on the Israeli reprisals, nor could he openly endorse the infiltrators. Most notably, Nasser 
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criticized King Hussein for being unable to protect his people, and Nasser’s rhetoric became 
widely popular among the Palestinians in Jordan. Since the army was under British command, 
its ineffectiveness in protecting villagers in the border areas nourished a growing mistrust of 
Britain among Palestinians and Jordanians alike. More importantly, the king’s continued 
reliance on Britain also spurred a growing mistrust of him as well. When Nasser portrayed 
King Hussein as nothing more than a tool of the imperialists the king grew displeased that the 
Palestinians “treated whatever was said there [in Egypt] as the gospel truth.”62 Moreover, 
Nasser had successfully propagated the Egyptian revolution as the manifestation of Arab 
nationalism. Nasser had assumed leadership in the Arab rivalry, and his condemnation of 
Hussein discredited the king’s efforts to construct his own reputation as an Arab nationalist. 
For the time being, King Hussein’s best possible solution was to allow the British commander 
in chief of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb, to adopt strict measures to curb cross-border 
infiltrations.
63
 
After a particularly violent Israeli reprisal against the West Bank village of Qibya on October 
15, 1953, which resulted in nearly seventy fatalities and the complete destruction of the 
village, King Hussein’s nationalist aspirations were accelerated.64 In response to the raid, 
Hussein appointed the nationalist Fawzi al-Mulki to the post of prime minister. Mulki 
explored options to replace Britain as Jordan’s financial sponsor, and upon Mulki’s request 
the Arab League assumed the responsibility of rebuilding Qibya and financing and arming the 
border villages, and granted two million pounds to the Jordanian National Guard.
65
 Thus, the 
first seeds of an Arab option were planted. The Arab option presented a way for Jordan to 
extricate from Britain, but it also gave the opposition increased momentum in its criticism of 
Jordan’s continued reliance on Britain.66  
It was a definitive step toward Arab realignment, but shortly after the appointment of Mulki 
as prime minister, King Hussein became alarmed by the pace of events and changed his mind. 
He felt that British support after all was the best available option at the time. Concerned that 
Nasser might gain entry to Jordan’s political scene via Arab aid, Hussein concluded that such 
aid was a potential threat. King Hussein dismissed Mulki and disbanded the parliament in 
May 1954. He was willing to take drastic steps in the Arab direction even in fear of cancelled 
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British support, but he would not allow the opposition to be in government when he disagreed 
with its demands. King Hussein’s political aspirations had shifted from nationalist to 
authoritarian for the first time.
67
 
The Consolidation of an Opposition 
During 1955, King Hussein’s priorities shifted several times in his search for a middle ground 
between nationalism and foreign support. It was during the Baghdad Pact Crisis in 1955 that 
Hussein first felt the dangerous forces of the strong Arab nationalism.
68
 The Baghdad Pact 
was a British attempt to make the Arab states side with the West in the Cold War. It was 
conceived in a hostile environment of anti-imperialism in the Arab world, and it faced 
opposition from the very beginning. Nasser denounced the pact as a British plot to thwart his 
leadership in the Arab world.
69
 Unimpressed with Britain’s Cold War reasoning, Nasser 
asserted that the Arab states’ foremost enemy was Israel and not the distant Soviet Union. His 
rhetoric was already popular in Jordan, and by officially stating support for the Palestinians, 
his popularity on the West Bank was further accelerated. Nasser’s arguments were also 
increasingly popular among a growing number of Jordanian nationalists who wanted to end 
Jordan’s relationship with Britain.70 
From a British vantage point, Jordan’s dynastic links with Iraq, which was the only Arab state 
in the Baghdad Pact, and the close ties to Britain, made Jordan a natural choice for 
participation in the pact. However, King Hussein’s first instinct was to side with Nasser. The 
king was faced with Israeli retaliations on a regular basis and felt that a security pact directed 
against the Soviet Union was out of touch with Jordan’s security concerns.71 Hussein found 
greater promise in Nasser’s appeal for a joint Arab security pact directed against Israel. 
Besides, Hussein was now wholeheartedly committed to increasing the number of Jordanian 
officers in the Arab Legion.
72
 In 1955 King Hussein’s most promising option for increasing 
the number of Arab officers was a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty that had become 
subject to mounting opposition among Jordanian nationalists.
73
 Britain declared it would only 
revise the increasingly unpopular treaty and reconsider the number of Arab officers if Jordan 
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joined the Baghdad Pact. This meant replacing the existing treaty with yet another one with 
Britain, something the king’s few Arab officers disapproved of. They sought an abrogation of 
the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and a termination of British influence in Jordan.
74
  
In November 1955, Nasser welcomed the Soviet Union into the Middle East by purchasing 
arms from the Czech Republic. Once the Soviet Union entered the scene, Britain was 
desperate to secure Jordan in the Western camp. Boosted by self-confidence, Nasser launched 
an intense propaganda campaign against King Hussein. He appealed to the Jordanian people 
and stated that if Hussein were to join the Baghdad Pact, the king would “seal his own fate.”75 
Hussein was impressed with Nasser’s success in securing weapons from the Soviet Union, but 
he was troubled by Nasser’s rhetoric and the Egyptian leader’s popularity among Jordanians. 
The Jordanian people were widely supportive of Nasser and had become immensely critical 
of Hussein. Gradually, King Hussein started to feel that Nasser’s influence posed a threat to 
his own authority. In spite of the king’s qualms about Nasser, but in light of Britain’s refusal 
to revise the Anglo-Jordanian defense treaty, the king gave in to public demands and 
abstained from joining the Baghdad Pact.
76
  
In response, Britain sent a persuasive delegation in a final attempt to make Jordan accede to 
the pact. When promised an increase of economic subsidies and a revision of the defense 
treaty, the king changed his mind and agreed to join. Upon learning of King Hussein’s 
decision, the public opposition became intense and forceful, sending jitters through the 
Jordanian government. In fear of the powerful opposition, Prime Minister Said Mufti resigned 
on December 13, 1955. King Hussein was nonetheless determined that Jordan would join the 
pact, if only for a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. Moreover, he saw continued ties 
with Britain as a source of support against the forceful opposition. The new prime minister, 
Hazza’ al-Majali who was appointed on December 15, 1955, shared the king’s growing 
concerns over Nasser and supported continued close ties with Britain. With Jordan’s 
ascension to the pact now imminent, the opposition rallied against Hussein. Violent riots took 
place all over Jordan, and the king’s popularity reached a new low when the army killed 
demonstrators in an attempt to restore order. It became evident that Hussein’s personal 
ambitions were completely out of touch with the interests of his people. Startled by the 
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opposition’s force and the casualties of the riots, Majali resigned after only five days in office 
and King Hussein eventually abstained from joining the Baghdad Pact.
77
  
Fumbling for a Middle Ground 
What began as an attempt to give King Hussein credence as an Arab nationalist had ended in 
the near collapse of his regime. Hussein’s reputation as a nationalist had been badly bruised 
by the Baghdad Pact crisis, and he desperately needed to reassert his authority. When the 
British Commander in chief of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb in 1956 handed Hussein a 
paper with the names of nationalist officers he wanted fired, the opportunity to prove his 
worth had come. The king was acquainted with several of the officers and was outraged by 
Glubb’s singlehanded policy.78 Hussein for a long time had tried to Arabize his army, but 
Britain had turned him down every time. Firing several of the few Arab officers was out of 
touch with King Hussein’s nationalist aspirations, and he decided to take drastic actions. He 
called upon some of his most trusted Arab officers and asked if they were ready to assume 
responsibility for the army. They all answered positively. On March 1, 1956 Hussein used the 
lack of ammunition and the British officers’ inability to protect civilians as a pretext to fire 
Glubb, who was ordered to leave the country by early morning the next day.
79
  
Britain campaigned to make King Hussein change his mind and stated that the dismissal 
would have grave consequences for the economic subsidies on which Jordan was completely 
dependent.
80
 In the United States, it was believed that if Britain revoked the subsidies, King 
Hussein would be forced to look to the Soviet Union for support. The Soviet Union had 
already entered the Middle East in Egypt, and the US observed that Britain was having 
trouble protecting the region’s strategic benefits for the Western camp of the Cold War. As a 
result, the US gradually accepted taking on “new responsibilities for the security of the 
Middle East.”81 It was only after pressure from the US that Britain’s Prime Minister, Anthony 
Eden, abstained from revoking the economic subsidies and decided to keep the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty intact.
82
 King Hussein had succeeded in a risky gamble and successfully 
repaired some of his damaged reputation. The American Ambassador in Jordan reported that 
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“[t]he King is now hero and no longer puppet.”83 Firing Glubb went a long way in aligning 
his rule with Arab nationalism, but the king learned that his regime could only be reconciled 
with nationalism as long as he controlled the events.
84
  
Reassured of his strengthened domestic position King Hussein in 1956 ordered Jordan’s first 
truly democratic elections. The result of the elections, held in October 1956, gave broad 
popular support to left-wing opposition parties who wanted to replace Jordan’s treaty with 
Britain with a treaty with Egypt and Syria. Hussein accepted the election results, as they were 
well suited for his ambitions of Arab realignment.
85
 Suleiman Nabulsi, a strongly pro-Nasser, 
anti-British, and surprisingly also anti-Hashemite nationalist, was given the task of forming a 
government. Hussein was trying to prove that he too was an Arab nationalist, and before 
Nabulsi formally took office the king forestalled him and signed an agreement with Egypt, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia on the joint command of their armed forces.
86
 Shortly after, the king 
firmly declared his nationalist inclinations when Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt and 
sparked the Suez War on October 29, 1956. By the outbreak of hostilities, Jordan had a 
defense treaty with Britain and a joint command of the armed forces with Egypt. It was a 
peculiar situation, but the Suez War ended before Egypt requested King Hussein to intervene. 
However, the fact that Jordan had prepared the army for an attack on Israel earned him credit 
as a true Arab nationalist, and Nasser’s criticism of him subsided.87  
Britain’s intervention in the Suez Crisis sparked a massive uprising against Jordan’s economic 
provider and presented a fruitful opportunity for Nabulsi to abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian 
treaty. A solution to Jordan’s everlasting financial burden had to be found, but faced with the 
anti-British atmosphere King Hussein gave in to Nabulsi’s request to replace the British 
subsidies with Arab finances.
88
 In January 1957 Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria agreed to 
share the financial burden of keeping Jordan afloat. Officially, King Hussein acknowledged 
that the fruition of the Arab option was a big step for Arab nationalism, but he was privately 
worried that the Arab goodwill would not amount to action. The distance between rhetoric 
and action had been huge before, and there was no reason it would be less now. In the end, 
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Hussein’s misgivings were justified. Only Saudi Arabia paid up, but then only one quarterly 
contribution was made.
89
 
Britain too, worried that Jordan’s new economic provider would fail in its obligations. In 
1956, the previous year, Britain pleaded with the US to assume responsibility for economic 
aid to Jordan, but US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had bluntly said that “the brutal 
fact [is] that Jordan [has] no justification as a state”.90 King Hussein too was aware that 
Jordan needed a more reliable source for economic support. In December 1956, he made a 
personal appeal for American aid, but he was turned down. American aid seemed more 
promising after January 5, 1957 when US President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced 
America’s commitment to supporting states under threat of international communism. The 
Eisenhower Doctrine presented the king with a new opportunity to score American support. 
However, before King Hussein could appeal to Eisenhower, Nabulsi signed the formal 
termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty while the Arab contributions still remained 
uncertain. Furthermore, Nabulsi refused to let the king apply for aid through the Eisenhower 
Doctrine.
91
 
King Hussein had endorsed Nabulsi’s left-wing nationalist government in order to quell the 
criticism against him, and to some degree he allowed Nabulsi to dictate policy. Nabulsi’s 
policies were popular and served as a means to suppress public unrest. It was King Hussein, 
not Jordan, who felt threatened by the opposition, and it was the king who wanted to replace 
the Arab subsidies with American aid, not the nationalist government. The abrogation of the 
Anglo-Jordanian treaty earned Nabulsi massive popularity, and Hussein was more or less 
isolated in his quest for American support. Fearful of subversion of his own authority and to 
reassert his position as the one true leader of Jordan, but also to attract attention from 
America, Hussein publicly accused his prime minister and the government of being bribed by 
the Soviet Union. It was a move intended to discredit Nabulsi, but also to declare the king’s 
opposition to communism.
92
  
Domestic Pressure and Foreign Intervention 
Nabulsi was not easily deterred. In April 1957, he dismissed several officials who were loyal 
to the throne. The king answered by forcing the resignation of Jordan’s first democratically 
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elected government on the pretext that it infringed on his royal rights.
93
 Nabulsi and the Chief 
of Staff of the Army, Ali Abu Nuwar, had reorganized the army to the point where its loyalty 
lay more with Nabulsi and Nuwar than with the king.
94
 A perceived challenge to King 
Hussein’s authority materialized on April 13, 1957 when Nuwar ordered an armored car 
regiment to conduct an exercise that included surrounding the royal palace. The king either 
interpreted the regiment’s actions as an attempt to dethrone him, or he used it as a pretext to 
carry out his own coup de palais and rid his ranks of insubordinate elements.
95
 Whatever 
reasons Hussein had for his actions, Abu Nuwar was arrested and exiled along with the other 
officers believed to be part of the coup. King Hussein succeeded in fending off the coup, if 
there ever was one, but also in securing firm American backing.
96
 
America’s commitment to Jordan’s well-being was tested already the next day when Syrian 
troops moved in the direction of Amman, apparently in support of the Nabulsi government. 
Israel had earlier contemplated taking action against Jordan should King Hussein’s regime 
collapse.
97
 The Americans realized that Israel might seize the opportunity of the present 
turmoil to capture the West Bank if King Hussein was dethroned and that such a move could 
possibly ignite a full-scale Arab-Israeli war, but Israel heeded the American warnings and 
stayed its hand.
98
 Through covert channels the US urged King Saud in Saudi Arabia to 
support Hussein, and when Israel became alarmed by Iraqi troops moving toward Jordan, the 
US reassured that the Iraqi troop movement was just another display of support for Hussein.
99
 
The US had taken a definitive stance on Hussein’s side.  
The threat to Hussein’s reign was, however, not over. Nabulsi had after all been a 
democratically elected prime minister, and both he and his policies were widely popular 
among the Jordanian public. On April 22, 1957, the large and forceful opposition assembled a 
National Congress of all the left-wing parties. The National Congress demanded that a new 
government reflecting the people’s whishes be installed, that Jordan reject the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, and that the US Ambassador be expelled.
100
 King Hussein viewed the National 
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Congress’ program as a direct challenge to his authority and on April 24, 1957 Hussein 
requested American support for his plans to crush the opposition with martial law and military 
government. Secretary of State Dulles, with President Eisenhower’s consent, promised to 
support to the king if the Soviet Union, Syria or Israel interfered with his plans.
101
 The 
American administration stated that ““the independence and integrity of Jordan was vital”” 
and ordered the US Sixth Fleet to sail for the Eastern Mediterranean to display its 
commitment.
102
  
The initial doubts Dulles had expressed to his British counterparts had been radically altered. 
To reinsure King Hussein’s authority and confidence as he emerged from the crisis with only 
limited support, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put the king on their payroll. Through 
the covert channel Hussein received some 750,000 dollars directly to his pocket in 1957. The 
money was used to ensure the loyalty of key political figures in Jordan.
103
  
By April 25, 1957 King Hussein was the sole ruler of Jordan. His government was pro-
American and comprised of friends loyal only to the king and his family.
104
 Jordan’s new 
enemy was international communism, and the US saw in Jordan a country which had chosen 
sides in the Cold War. Washington was eager to give King Hussein whatever support he 
needed, and on April 29, 1957 the president granted Jordan economic assistance under the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.
105
 The amount of money far exceeded that of the British subsidies, and 
Hussein enjoyed far more room for maneuver than under Britain.
106
 This enabled the king to 
pursue tighter alignment with the conservative states in the region and distance himself from 
the Soviet-backed regimes in Egypt and Syria.
107
 Iraq and Saudi Arabia became Jordan’s 
primary partners. The partnership of the monarchies in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan was 
directed against Nasser’s leadership in the everlasting Arab struggle for primacy, but the new 
course in foreign policy was also designed to demonstrate Jordan’s westward orientation in 
the Cold War.
108
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Several Arab nationalists did not view King Hussein as compatible with Arab nationalism.
109
 
Consequently, when on February 1, 1958 Egypt and Syria merged into the United Arab 
Republic (UAR) to counter the moderate regimes’ position in the Arab rivalry, Nasser 
successfully reasserted his position as the leader of the Arab world.
110
 The inter-Arab rivalry 
blocs were laid out between the revolutionary states backed by the Soviet Union (Egypt and 
Syria), and the pro-Western conservative states (Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq).
111
 
To counter UAR’s leadership in the Arab world, and to strengthen the moderate alternative to 
what Washington viewed as radical Arab nationalism, King Hussein formed a union with 
Iraq. The two branches of the Hashemite family had long since shared a mutual interest in the 
survival of their family’s legacy, and they proclaimed the Arab Union in Amman on February 
14, 1958.
112
 The union proved short-lived, however. Only five months later, on July 14, 1958, 
a brutal military coup in Baghdad dethroned the Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family. Jordan 
was now surrounded by revolutionary regimes, and Hussein was isolated in his own country. 
The public’s support for Nasser and the king’s weak power-base had been clearly 
demonstrated the preceding years. There were riots, demonstrations and rumors of a coup. In 
genuine fear for his life Hussein requested Western military intervention on July 16, 1958.
113
 
Britain reluctantly answered King Hussein’s request for armed intervention and asked the US 
for assistance. The US, however, felt that Jordan was Britain’s area of interest and 
concentrated its efforts on Lebanon, which too was experiencing domestic turmoil. En route 
to Jordan, the British transport planes were denied from flying over Israel. Israel was yet 
again considering using Jordanian instability to its advantage, and an Israeli takeover of the 
West Bank was discussed.
114
 After intense American pressure, the British overflight was 
granted, and the Israeli government temporarily scrapped the idea of taking over the West 
Bank.
115
 On July 17, 1958 British paratroopers, supported with artillery and fighter aircraft, 
secured the airfield in Amman and began patrolling the streets of the capital.
116
 King 
Hussein’s troubled reputation as an Arab nationalist deteriorated by the fact that it was Israel, 
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the Arab enemy above all others, that granted overflight of the essential commodities of food 
and fuel after the UAR and Iraq had closed off their borders to Jordan.
117
  
King Hussein was deeply troubled by the situation, and the US saw little hope that he could 
regain his authority. Since the intervention, the US Sixth Fleet was standing by to evacuate 
the king and his family.
118
 However, the evacuation was postponed as British soldiers in the 
streets of Amman gave Hussein some comfort, and the king regained his confidence as the 
situation cooled off.
119
 The turning point came in August 1958 when the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution that called on all Arab states to respect the territorial integrity 
of other states.
120
 The UN resolution gave legitimacy to King Hussein’s rule and to Jordan’s 
right to exist. Moreover, it enabled the king to claim that Jordan had been threatened by 
foreign powers rather than by his own people.
121
 The British troops were quietly evacuated by 
late October 1958, and King Hussein’s handling of the crisis earned him the reputation among 
his Western friends and his few domestic supporters as a brave and resourceful statesman and 
the only Arab leader to fight the forces of communism.
122
 
Accordingly, in March 1959, King Hussein was invited to Washington where he asserted 
Jordan’s commitment to standing up to the spread of communism. The king stated that radical 
Arab nationalism was a tool of Soviet communism and in his effort to deny that nationalism 
in Jordan, he presented his kingdom as “a bastion of regional stability and as a strategic asset 
of the US.”123 President Eisenhower accepted the king’s arguments and granted nearly fifty 
million dollars in economic aid to Jordan. Recuperated and reinforced by his American 
partner, King Hussein formed a new government entirely comprised of loyalists. The 
government adopted King Hussein’s newfound commitment to confronting communism and 
undertook a “more aggressive policy of confrontation with the UAR.”124 
From 1960 to 1963 Jordan was largely isolated in the Arab world while the propaganda battle 
and tensions between the moderate and radical Arab states raged on. It eventually reached a 
violent stage. On August 29, 1960 the Jordanian Prime Minister and twelve other Jordanian 
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officials were killed by Syrian agents.
125
 King Hussein ordered the army to attack Syria, but 
he simultaneously engaged in secret talks with Israeli officials in an effort to hedge against 
exposing his western border to an Israeli capture of the West Bank. The first meeting between 
the two sides, which officially were enemies, took place on September 14, 1960. Hussein 
informed Israel of the forthcoming troop movement and asked Israel not to take advantage of 
the thin defense on the West Bank. Having previously contemplated action on the West Bank, 
Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion decided that a stable Jordan served Israeli interests 
better than adopting more Palestinians into Israel.
126
 Ben-Gurion said the king “may rest 
assured. You have our pledge.”127 In the end Jordan abstained from attacking Syria, but the 
secret Jordan-Israel channel was eventually regularly used. In the meetings between the two 
sides a mutual understanding developed that Hussein’s regime was in the interest of both.128 
Jordan was still isolated from the rest of the Arab world, but some of the pressure was 
relieved when the UAR collapsed after a Syrian coup in 1961. However, it did not last long. 
On April 17, 1963, events took a turn for the worse. Egypt, along with the new revolutionary 
regime in Syria, and Iraq, announced the merging of the three states into the Tripartite 
Union.
129
 The Tripartite Union had widespread support throughout the Arab world, not least 
among Jordan’s Palestinian population who saw the move as step toward unification of the 
Arab ranks against Israel. Nasser campaigned to get Jordan to join, and his arguments once 
more rang loud in the Jordanian population. Fueled by the evident manifestation of Arab 
nationalism, demonstrators and rioters called for Jordan to join.
130
 The army was called in to 
suppress the riots, resulting in several fatalities, but eventually in a return to order. Under 
heavy criticism and in complete isolation from his fellow Arab statesmen and his Palestinian 
population, King Hussein once more disbanded parliament and assumed complete control 
over the government.
131
   
Arab Realignment 
Jordan’s isolation from the Arab world was broken by a mere coincidence. Ever since Israel’s 
creation, Israeli politicians supported a plan to divert the Jordan River from Lake Tiberias in 
the north to the Negev Desert in the south. All successive Israeli governments believed 
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Israel’s survival and ability to grow depended on this crucial plan, and in 1952 the 
government decided to implement it.
132
 The plan had been met with criticism by the Arab 
states, and as tensions mounted US President Eisenhower tried to find an equitable 
compromise. During extensive negotiations in 1952–1955, the Unified Plan, more commonly 
called the Johnston Plan, took shape. The Johnston Plan allocated the water resources to each 
of the river’s riparian states, but it failed to secure either Arab or Israeli support.133  
The Arab states saw Israel’s intentions to divert the Jordan River as another encroachment on 
their rights. Under the perceived threat of Israeli expansionism, Nasser found it vital to realign 
the Arab states against their common adversary. However, Nasser also saw another reason for 
Arab realignment. Although he had triumphed in facilitating Arab unification in the Tripartite 
Union, he saw the aggressive and militant Ba’athist bloc in Iraq and Syria as a potential threat 
to Egypt’s leadership in the union.134 To contain the radical regimes, Nasser pursued tighter 
alignment with Jordan. Nasser’s solution was to invite King Hussein to an Arab Summit. In 
spite of the fierce propaganda Egypt had used against King Hussein in the past, Nasser 
greeted the king as “a long-lost friend” at the Arab League summit meeting in Cairo in 
January 1964.
135
 
The objective of the summit was to consolidate Arab interests and put their differences aside. 
Three key decisions were taken in Cairo that had great impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The first was to divert the waters of the Jordan River before it reached Israel’s border. The 
intention was to forestall Israel’s access to the river. The second decision was to put their 
armies under the command of the Unified Arab Command (UAC) which was designed to deal 
with Israeli military actions and to protect the Arab diversion work on the Jordan River. In so 
doing it was declared that the Arab states had to modernize and increase their respective 
arsenals. The third decision was to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
an umbrella organization for various Palestinian liberation groups, of which some were 
militant in their effort to reclaim from Israel what they regarded as their homeland. Although 
King Hussein privately worried of the proposals, he was finally out of isolation and he went 
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along with them in an effort to bolster his newfound friendship with Nasser and his position in 
the Arab world.
136
  
The Cold War Game 
The Cairo summit signaled that the Arab states had joined forces against Israel. Something 
was being done to challenge Israel, and the unification was widely popular among Jordan’s 
Palestinian population. To King Hussein this posed a difficult challenge. Finally committed to 
Arab solidarity, the Palestinians’ faith in Hussein went from dubious to heartfelt.137 When 
Nasser invited Jordan to purchase arms from the Soviet Union, Hussein was forced to express 
interest. In reality, Hussein was still suspicious of Nasser and the nationalists’ support of the 
Soviet arms offer. The king wanted to make sure that Nasser, the Soviet Union or radical 
Arab nationalists would never again be in a position to undermine his regime. It was only 
when Nasser accepted King Hussein as an equal that Hussein found a knife’s edge on which 
he could balance the need for foreign support and nationalism. His fragile power-base had 
been shaken several times during his first decade on the throne, and Hussein realized he 
needed superpower support to preserve his rule. Luckily for King Hussein, Nasser feared 
Jordan might depart from the summit declaration if forced to accept Soviet arms on the spot, 
which would leave Egypt alone in fending off Syria’s and Iraq’s radicalism, and he therefore 
accepted Jordan’s attempt to acquire Western arms.138  
The King was finally in a position to control Arab nationalism in Jordan. He had found a 
feasible middle ground and he did not want to leave it. King Hussein then used the Cold War 
to play the US into adopting a more pro-Jordan policy. Even though the arms would be used 
against Israel, if that became necessary, Hussein asserted that if USA could not supply the 
arms he needed, he would purchase them from the Soviet Union. Jordan would then be 
subjected to Soviet influence, which could destroy the king’s moderation, and the US would 
be faced with widespread Soviet support for the Arab states’ radicalism against Israel. 
However, if the US furnished the Jordanian arms request, King Hussein declared he would do 
all in his power to maintain a moderate position toward Israel and continue to challenge Arab 
nationalism and Soviet influence. His tactic paid off. In Washington, Secretary of State Dean 
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Rusk and President Johnson decided to invite King Hussein on an official visit to hear him 
out.
139
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Chapter 3: The Image of Impartiality 
When the Texas Democrat Lyndon Baines Johnson ascended to the presidency of the United 
States upon the assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, he inherited 
Kennedy’s commitment to stop the spread of Soviet influence throughout the world. Johnson 
scaled up the American presence in Vietnam for that very reason, and after the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident in 1964 the Vietnam War took precedence in foreign policy for the duration of 
Johnson’s presidency.140 Preoccupied with the campaign in Vietnam and cautious of 
becoming entangled in another area where he potentially could have to directly face the 
Soviet Union, Johnson’s foremost issue in the Middle East was to keep the tensions in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict low. The tensions in the Middle East were quickly rising, however, and 
Johnson had to take a more direct approach in order to preserve the fragile status quo.  
Although the administration knew that King Hussein despised the idea of Soviet arms, it also 
realized that he could not forever withstand Arab pressure to accept such weaponry.
141
 Arms 
sales gradually emerged as a necessary evil to ensure Hussein’s moderation. To keep Jordan 
in the Western camp, to avoid Soviet subversion in the Middle East, and to ensure a stable 
status quo, Johnson had to depart from a long American tradition of abstinence from 
supplying arms to the Middle East. Soviet influence, which reportedly was on Jordan’s 
threshold, was perceived as a threat to King Hussein’s moderation and regional stability, in 
addition to being an evil in itself. However, Johnson’s sympathy to Israel and the necessity of 
domestic popularity that Israel generated in America troubled the Jordanian arms request: 
American arms sales to Jordan were bound to ignite criticism from Israel and the domestic 
pro-Israel electorate. In the effort to preserve the status quo, Johnson’s administration 
developed an image of impartiality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
How did the administration work to ensure King Hussein’s position in the Western camp of 
the Cold War and Jordan’s position in the Arab world while at the same time protecting 
Israel’s security? Why did the Johnson administration believe that direct arms sales to the 
Middle East could protect the status quo?  
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Kennedy’s Legacy and Johnson’s Ambitions in the Middle East 
The Kennedy administration had initially paid little attention to Jordan. The reason was in 
part that the Israel-Jordan relationship was decent. Secret contacts between King Hussein and 
Israeli officials had emerged from the Tripartite Union crisis in 1963 the two sides had 
reached the conclusion that a stable Jordan was in both Israel’s and naturally in King 
Hussein’s interest.142 The meeting of minds had developed into a fragile, but stable de facto 
peace between Jordan and Israel.
143
 President Kennedy was evidently aware that King 
Hussein’s moderation ensured low tensions in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in 1962 he stated 
that Jordan was “the key to the precarious stability in the Middle East.”144 
Nonetheless, Kennedy’s primary focus in the Middle East had been to reverse Soviet 
influence where it already had found a solid footing, particularly in Egypt. The decent 
relations Kennedy cultivated with Nasser enabled him to extend informal security guarantees 
to Israel and in 1962 also to authorize the first ever direct US arms sale to Israel. Kennedy had 
authorized Israel’s purchase of Hawk surface-to-surface missiles in the hope that it would 
absolve Israel’s interest in developing atomic weapons at the nuclear reactor it had built with 
French help in Dimona in the Negev Desert.
145
 Although the necessity of the Hawk missiles 
was questionable, it was a first step toward a decisive shift in the US Middle East arms 
policy.
146
 Israel had agreed to American inspections of the Dimona reactor as a precondition 
for the Hawks, but during Johnson’s presidency Israel postponed such agreements and used it 
as leverage to score more arms from the US. Robert W. Komer, a stay-over from Kennedy’s 
administration and one of President Johnson’s key Middle East advisors on the National 
Security Council, saw a lesson in the Hawk sale that Israel would have to pay a strategic or 
political prize for future arms sales.
147
 
The radical Arab states’ close ties to Moscow had already introduced the Cold War dimension 
to the Middle East, and in the eventually tense atmosphere of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
Johnson was faced with rising Israeli interest for an American security guarantee and direct 
arms sales. Accommodating arms requests and publicly declaring that the US would come to 
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Israel’s aid would only make the Soviet Union declare the same for the Arab states. Thus, the 
US preferred to keep Israel at a safe, but minimum distance.
148
 However, if the US did not 
give Israel at least some arms, the administration ran the risk of domestic criticism and 
believed it would inadvertently drive Israel to develop nuclear weapons. To simultaneously 
preserve strategic interests in the Arab states, while continuing the close relationship with 
Israel, the Johnson administration instead tried to preserve a “military and political balance” 
in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
149
  
Increased Defense Needs 
The military balance was challenged as product of the Cairo Summit. Massive Soviet arms 
shipments were delivered to Egypt and Syria, and Johnson almost immediately faced Israeli 
requests for arms. In January 1964, Israel’s ambassador to the US, Avraham Harman, 
declared that the unification of the Arab armies posed a threat not only to Israel’s access to the 
Jordan River, but to its very existence. Israel intended to strengthen its defenses to face such 
threats, and the first move was to request a purchase of tanks directly supplied from the US. 
The reasoning was that Egypt’s recent purchase of tanks from the Soviet Union, according to 
Harman, had put Israel at both a qualitative and quantitative disadvantage.
150
  
The State Department cautioned that a direct arms sale to Israel would cause serious 
repercussions for the American relationships with the Arab states.
151
 The State Department 
based its caution on a report from the US Embassy in Amman which stated that the trend of 
anti-American sentiment in Jordan was “greater than we have witnessed the last several 
years.”152 The embassy reported there was a growing “feeling among certain elements, 
following the Arab Summit Conference, that Jordan no longer need depend solely upon [the] 
United States … for economic and military assistance and that Arab … alternatives to 
American aid will now be forthcoming.”153 In another report the embassy declared that “[w]e 
most strongly believe the United States would seriously jeopardize its interest in Jordan as 
well as its interest in the area as a whole if we became a major supplier of military equipment 
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to Israel.”154 Arab nationalism already posed a serious challenge to US-Arab relations, even 
without American arms in Israel. Johnson’s special advisor for national security, McGeorge 
Bundy, recommended that Johnson postpone a final decision: “Our current problem is simply 
that the Arabs are in an excited frame of mind”.155  
If US tanks arrived in Israel while the Arabs already were excited, Bundy feared it might 
damage the US-Arab relations on which strategic interests depended. Anti-American 
sentiment was not the only reason Bundy saw for postponing an answer to Israel’s tank 
request: “[I]f we hastily give in on something as difficult as the tank deal in March, I hate to 
think what we will be asked for between now and November.”156 Elections were to be held in 
November 1964, and the pro-Israel pressure on the administration was by the spring rather 
low. However, a tank deal could be fruitful to win the important pro-Israel votes if the 
pressure were to increase closer to election day.
157
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) agreed with 
Bundy and did not see any imbalance in the strength of the combined Arab and Israeli 
military forces. To Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs even questioned 
if the Unified Arab Command (UAC) would be able to work at all: “The serious political 
differences and jealousies of the Arabs make effective combined military action against Israel 
highly unlikely.”158  
At a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in March 1964 the issues of the Israeli arms 
request were discussed. The temporary conclusion was that if the US would sell tanks to 
Israel, it had to find ways to counteract Arab reactions and resentment.
159
 Robert W. Komer, 
Middle East expert for the National Security Staff, though personally sympathetic to Israel, 
felt that continued Israeli pressure on America would have negative long-term consequences 
for both parties: 
In fact … Israel seems to have quite deliberately been seeking step-by-step to develop the 
kind of relationship with us (overt security guarantee, military aid, joint planning) which will 
compromise our relationship with the Arabs. No doubt the Israelis think that this will be a 
stronger deterrent to Arab pressures. But in my view it is a most short-sighted policy. The 
Arabs already regard us as so pro-Israeli that further steps will not add much. What they will 
do, however, is to force the Arabs to react, by squeezing our base and oil interests, and by 
moving ever closer to Moscow. This will increase the threat to Israel far more than the 
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reassurance gained from making public what we already do privately. Thus Israeli policy 
harms rather than serves US-Israeli interests.
160
 
These problems became ever more pressing when King Hussein arrived as invited to request 
direct American arms sales with money from the Unified Arab Command (UAC). In a 
meeting with Hussein, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that the US was principally 
against selling arms to the Middle East, but to prevent the king from accepting the Soviet 
arms offer, McNamara said the US was willing to send representatives to Jordan to research 
Jordan’s defense needs.161 When King Hussein stressed that Israel had the military potential 
to destroy Jordan in 48 hours, the Middle East expert from the State Department’s Office for 
Near East Affairs (NEA), Philips Talbot, interjected that “an increase of several million of 
arms on one side would almost certainly lead to an increase of an equivalent or a greater 
amount on the other.”162 Still unwilling to supply arms to either side of the conflict, 
McNamara could only say that the US was willing to talk about arms sales.
163
  
In a later meeting, President Johnson told King Hussein that he was as much the Arabs’ friend 
as Kennedy had been, and he did not question the king’s Western orientation. However, 
Johnson said the amount of help Jordan received from other sources than the US would affect 
Congress’ attitude to continued economic and military aid.164 King Hussein was acutely 
aware of the potential loss of American financial support if he accepted Soviet weapons. The 
Johnson administration was equally aware of the king’s inability to withstand Arab pressure 
to accept Soviet arms without risking domestic opposition. Also, the administration was 
aware that Jordan’s partnership with the US would be criticized if Jordan’s economic 
subsidizer supplied arms to Israel.
165
 Johnson urged Hussein to hold his ground while the 
Jordanian arms request was under discussion.
166
  
The Jordanian arms request added another dimension to Israel’s request. The CIA gave their 
estimates of a US tank sale to Israel: 
The atmosphere of US-Arab relations, which has been relatively good for the past few years, 
has recently become clouded by a resurgence of Arab suspicions that the US has a pro-Israel 
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and anti-Arab bias. These suspicions would be greatly increased in scope and intensity were 
the US to furnish 500 tanks to Israel.
167
  
The CIA concurred with the conclusions drawn by the State Department and the Defense 
Department: 
The U.S. is sympathetic to Israel's growing need for modernization of its armor and would 
find it advantageous from a production and balance of payments point of view to sell 500 
tanks to Israel but: (a) Israel's need is not immediate; (b) the political cost to the U.S. of 
meeting this need directly would be too great; and (c) there are alternate possibilities for 
meeting Israeli needs via European suppliers which offer promise.
168  
A direct US arms sale to Israel was turned down in June 1964, but the administration agreed 
to help Israel acquire tanks from Europe under deep secrecy.
169
 The choice fell on the Federal 
Republic of Germany through which Israel could purchase one hundred and fifty American-
made tanks.
170
 To counteract Israeli complaints over the negative reply, Komer advised 
Johnson to inform Israel’s Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of the strategic aspect of US Middle 
East policy:  
The one thing we ask of Israel is not to keep trying to force us to an all-out pro-Israeli policy. 
We ask this not just because a balanced policy is essential strategically to keep the Soviets 
out of the [Middle East], and economically because of oil but because it is as much in Israel’s 
interest as ours. If we choose Israel’s side so openly that the Arabs form alliances with 
Moscow, Israel loses just as much as we. Our present policy gives the Arabs an incentive not 
to swing too far away from the West. This is simple common sense.
171
 
However, Johnson decided to compensate Israel for the loss of the political benefit a direct 
arms sale symbolized, by informally reiterating the US guarantee of Israel’s security: 
It is … the US which is expected … to come to Israel’s defense if attacked. This, of course, is 
simple truth—since 1950 it has been a fixed tenet of our policy, reiterated by every President, 
to deter and if necessary cope with military aggression against Israel. We have also, through 
both public and private means, been Israel’s strongest financial backers.… I am as firmly 
behind this policy as my predecessors.
172
 
Johnson further emphasized that the US “felt it necessary to maintain at least an appearance 
of balance between Israel and the Arabs, because of our wide interests in the area and desire 
not to thrust Arabs into [the] arms of Moscow.”173 In effect, Komer and Johnson had bridged 
the gap between the containment policy and Israel’s security, and explicitly enunciated the 
terms of the American strategic impartiality. Robert Komer knew that in reality the 
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administration’s Middle East policy served to protect Israel’s security in any case. To Israel’s 
Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres, Komer disclosed the truth about American evenhanded 
policy.
174
 He said US impartiality in the Middle East was a myth: “[I]f one looked at actions, 
not words, it was clear that from 1947 on our policy had basically favored Israel.”175 The 
purpose of publicly stating that the US was evenhanded in the Middle East was simply to 
allow for continued sway over Arab leaders. This, Komer told Peres, was in their countries’ 
mutual interest as it would limit Soviet involvement (which primarily concerned the US) and 
Soviet weapons (which primarily concerned Israel, but for that reason also concerned the US). 
Komer asserted that it was Soviet influence and weapons that were the real threat to Israel, 
and he believed the US could ensure Israel’s security, contain communism and stall the arms 
race in the Middle East by forwarding an image of impartiality.
176
  
A Crisis in the Making 
The fact that the US generally sympathized with Israel did not mean the time was ripe for 
direct arms sales. The general consensus in Johnson’s administration was that a direct arms 
sale to Israel in all likelihood would damage both the image of impartiality and the strategic 
interests in the Arab states. Under continuous pressure to accept Soviet weapons, King 
Hussein’s commander in chief of the Jordanian army, Brigadier Amer Kammash, arrived in 
Washington and emphasized the urgent need for a positive reply to the Jordanian arms 
request. Kammash underscored that Jordan would be forced to accept Soviet weapons if the 
US could not furnish them.
177
 Already aware of King Hussein’s concerns about Soviet 
influence, there was some speculation in the administration that Kammash and Hussein were 
bluffing by saying “put up or shut up” and implying that Jordan would accept Soviet weapons 
if the US did not offer promise.
178
 However, the dangers of calling a bluff that turned out to 
be honest had dangerous consequences, and the question had to be answered quickly: 
Kammash reported Soviet equipment to be ready for delivery to Jordan on short notice.
179
 
King Hussein had recently escaped isolation, and Talbot and the rest of the NEA believed the 
king would do everything in his power to retain his position in the Arab world. The NEA did 
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not believe Hussein was bluffing and informed Rusk that “[i]f we are unwilling to provide the 
equipment, Soviet equipment will be delivered either through [Egypt] or directly from the 
Soviet Union.”180 However, upon hearing the extent of Kammash’s request, which included 
fighter aircraft, Talbot balked: “Should we fail to hold the line on sale of supersonic aircraft 
and other sophisticated hardware to Jordan, we would be subject to pressures from the other 
Arab states and Israel.”181 Selling arms to a conflict area did not serve the status quo, Talbot 
argued. Fighter aircraft were out of the question for Talbot, and he agreed with officials in the 
Department of Defense that Jordan be persuaded to “concentrate on modernization rather than 
expansion of their forces.”182 If persuasion would not bear fruit, the Department of Defense 
reluctantly approved that the US should be willing to help facilitate Jordan’s acquisition of 
British fighters, but only if there was no doubt that Jordan would accept Soviet aircraft.
183
 
The State Department held that “we must continue to hold the line and … [be firm] with 
Jordan in order to avert a major crisis in our overall relations with the Arabs and Israel.”184 
The State Department was willing to allow Jordan to purchase ground equipment only. The 
Department of Defense contrarily opted for Jordan to purchase fighters, and it did not agree 
that the firm line was the best course of action. Both departments made all possible sales 
contingent on the UAC making the funds available to Jordan, which they in any case 
doubted.
185
 Furthermore, Komer launched another issue into the equation: “[T]hese arms are 
for [the] announced purpose of backing [an] Arab scheme to divert Jordan headwaters—can 
we be in [the] position of selling arms to support action we oppose?”186 Nonetheless, Komer 
suggested that Hussein should not be given a “flat turndown” yet.187  
In late July 1964, the Joint Chiefs gave their assessments of the Jordanian arms request. As 
regards the State Department’s unwillingness to sell aircraft to Jordan, the JCS stated that the 
“basis for the State Department position is not known; it does not appear to be consistent with 
the decisions of this type for other Arab countries.”188 The fact was that Lebanon, Libya and 
Saudi Arabia had already purchased fighter aircraft from the US. On that basis the Joint 
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Chiefs did not have any serious misgivings about selling equivalent numbers and quality to 
Jordan and saw little reason not to sell fighters to King Hussein.
189
  
The State Department informed the US Embassy in Amman on August 4, 1964 that the 
ambassador should reluctantly approve an arms sale to Jordan, but he should also inform King 
Hussein that the US was “deeply disturbed that Jordan’s prospects for economic self-reliance 
may be jeopardized by the threat of new defense burdens.”190 Except for the exclusion of 
fighters, Rusk gave American assurances that Jordan could buy tanks and other ground force 
equipment directly from USA. In the end, the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense found a middle ground. Jordan was allowed to buy tanks directly from the US, and in 
the expected event that Hussein would pressure for fighters, Rusk authorized the embassy in 
Amman to say that the US was willing to research the need for replacing Jordan’s fighter 
aircraft, and even in helping facilitate such a sale, but from Western Europe and not the US.
191
   
Rusk appealed to the king’s opposition to communism to make King Hussein settle for the 
ground force package, and asked if he would “expect Soviet assistance if [he] were 
overthrown by internal coup or if Jordan [was] attacked from outside?”192 King Hussein did 
not believe the Soviet Union had any interest in his regime, and he had little interest in 
communism.
193
 His motives were the preservation of his regime, but without distancing 
himself from Nasser and the Palestinians in Jordan. When Hussein had joined the Cairo 
Summit declaration, he had done so not because he believed in confrontation with Israel but 
because it was in accord with the wishes of his large Palestinian population. Although the 
king privately still believed in moderation toward Israel, he could no longer afford to stand 
alone, neither in the Arab world nor in his own country. Joining the Cairo Summit 
declaration, the US Embassy in Amman reported, “has paid off in terms of possibly the 
greatest popular support for his regime, especially among Palestinians”.194 To ensure his 
newfound popularity, Hussein had to comply with the UAC’s demands, and he stressed that 
without fighters the Arab pressure on him to accept Soviet weaponry would not subside.
195
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The administration had to review the issues again. In mid-August 1964, the CIA stated that a 
“US sale [to Jordan] of all or most of the requested equipment, while it would lessen Arab 
resentments concerning alleged US favoritism toward Israel, would impair US ability to 
check the escalation of the Arab-Israeli arms race.”196 Limiting the arms race was the 
American key to preserving the status quo. However, the CIA underlined that a US sale to 
Jordan was a far lesser evil than a Jordanian army and air force equipped by Egypt or the 
Soviet Union.
197
  
The solution was to reluctantly furnish Jordan’s arms request and hope that Israel would 
understand that a Soviet-equipped Jordanian army was a far more real threat than controlled 
amounts of American weapons in Jordan. Rusk asked the US Ambassador in Amman, Robert 
G. Barnes, to inform King Hussein that the US was willing to take another look at fighters.
198
 
However, Rusk underlined that the administration needed time to make a “decision … with 
such obviously far-reaching implications”199 Rusk’s solution was to use the time to persuade 
Israel to understand that the outcome was actually in Israel’s best interest. Under the prospect 
of losing Jordan to the Soviet Union, even in light of the escalating Arab-Israeli tensions, the 
US was willing to “consider any and all types [of] US or other Western aircraft.”200 Rusk was 
in principle willing to sell American (though preferably European) fighters in addition to the 
ground force equipment, but the administration was acutely aware that Israel would try to 
score an arms deal of its own once the gates to the American arsenal were opened to the 
Middle East.
201
 
The Lesser Evil  
In addition to the impression of open gates to the American arsenal and the desire to associate 
the US closer through a direct arms sale, a perception of hostile encirclement had taken deep 
roots in Israel’s assessment of the Middle East.202 The unification of the Arab world was 
troubling enough, but King Hussein’s adherence to it accelerated concerns in Israel. Uncertain 
of the sincerity of the king’s moderation, Israel believed military deterrence would keep the 
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Arab states at bay.
203
 When the Federal Republic of Germany cancelled the delivery of more 
than half of the tanks in the deal that the US had facilitated in June 1964, Israel had yet 
another incentive and more solid arguments for a direct US arms sale.
204
  
Israel requested the US to supply the remaining tanks directly, but Rusk joined Komer’s 
speculation that the new Israeli request was born from the pending Jordanian request and not 
from Germany’s cancellation. However, since Israel did not yet have official knowledge of 
the Jordanian request, Rusk realized that Israel sought to score an arms deal of its own.
205
 
Komer informed Johnson of the dilemmas:  
We’ve agreed in principle to some staggered arms sales to Jordan so long as the Arab kitty 
[the UAC] can finance them, but have stalled on the key item—supersonic aircraft. Our fear 
is that if we sell supersonics to Jordan for an announced Arab buildup against Israel’s 
diversion scheme, we’ll come under acute Israeli and US Zionist pressure to sell arms 
directly to Israel too. In fact, our whole aid program to Jordan might come under attack. If we 
get into overt arms sales to Israel, then all the Arabs may turn against us, and Jordan may 
have to accept Soviet and UAR arms anyway.
206
 
The issue was acute. No option seemed attractive, neither to Komer nor to Rusk. Nonetheless, 
Komer recommended that Johnson should approve a ground force package while keeping 
fighters off the table, believing that the Arab rearmament against Israel would “fall apart in 
time (as it has before).”207 However, Komer gave his tacit blessing to a Department of 
Defense and State Department contingency plan: to allow King Hussein to buy one squadron 
of US fighters but only if there was no doubt about of the sincerity that Hussein actually 
intended to accept Soviet aircraft.
208
 On February 1, 1965 Rusk recommended to Johnson that 
the US should accommodate the Jordanian arms request. Although still keeping fighters off 
the table, the US should help Jordan explore European providers and only offer a direct sale 
of aircraft if absolutely necessary.
209
 More importantly, Rusk stressed the need to inform 
Israel in order to “abort its strong adverse reaction.”210  
Rusk was suspicious that Israel sought to strike an arms deal of its own and realized that 
Israel would strongly oppose any arms sale to any Arab state in the rising tide of Arab unity. 
To find a way to counter Israel’s reaction to the Jordanian arms sale which most observers 
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now accepted the necessity of, the National Security Council met on February 1, 1965 to 
discuss the issues.
211
 Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball assured that any course of 
action was bound to a series of disadvantages. If the US were to withhold fighters, Jordan 
would be forced to accept Soviet aircraft: “Thus, no matter what we do, we will contribute to 
the arms race in the Middle East.”212 The realization that arms would arrive in Jordan either 
way led the administration to conclude that controlled delivery of US weapons was preferred. 
Besides, the Joint Chiefs stated that another twenty fighters to the combined Arab arsenal 
would not upset the Arab-Israeli military balance. The CIA concurred and stressed that the 
risk of not including planes in the Jordan arms package would be too great because it would 
unquestionably mean a Jordanian air force equipped with Soviet fighters.
213
  
Johnson understood the arguments in favor of a US aircraft sale to Jordan, but he felt that 
Jordan should be persuaded to accept European suppliers.
214
 The conclusion was that the 
marginally lesser of several evils was for the US to sell only tanks and ground force 
equipment directly and help Jordan acquire aircraft from Europe.
215
 
Avoiding Compensation 
Israel was informed of the necessity to furnish the Jordanian arms request: “We believe that 
although Hussein recognizes that acceptance of the Soviet/ [Egyptian] alternative could be the 
beginning of [the] end for his regime, he would do it rather than take [the] immediate 
consequences of isolation from the rest of the Arab world.”216 The State Department argued 
that an American arms sale would secure King Hussein in the Western camp and grant 
American leverage on the placement of Jordan’s army, which was in Israel’s interest. Israel 
was asked to keep the information secret and inform its friends in Washington in order to 
clear the administration’s domestic flank. After all, an American arms sale to Jordan was the 
least unattractive alternative from both an American and an Israeli viewpoint.
217
  
Israel was not impressed with the US arguments. Prime Minister Eshkol said that the 
proposed armaments would transform Jordan’s army from defensive to offensive, that the 
tanks would pose a direct threat to Tel Aviv, and that the overall result would be a shift in the 
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balance of power to a level Israel could not accept.
218
 Under-Secretary of State Ball noted that 
Eshkol “grossly” overestimated the result of a modernized Jordanian army and argued that it 
was  
[B]etter for Israel’s security and peace of area for some arms to be given to Jordan on 
controlled basis by [a] friend of Israel [rather than] on uncontrolled basis by [the] Soviet 
Union…We presumed Israel regarded prospect of uncontrolled arming of Jordan by Soviets 
more ominous than [the] situation we contemplated.
219
 
In order to counteract Israel’s opposition and in hoping to avoid a compensatory arms sale to 
Israel, the Jordanian arms package was revised. With support from the State Department and 
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the CIA, Special Advisor Komer recommended 
that the US should sell Jordan a minimum package. The tanks should be inferior to the ones 
that the US had helped Israel acquire from Germany, and the fighters would be European.
220
 
The package was believed to sufficient to “keep Hussein from jumping the reservation,” 
meaning it would be enough to enable the king to comply with the UAC and enough to 
bolster his domestic popularity, but less than justifying a compensatory sale to Israel.
221
 
Komer recommended the US to take a hard line on Israel’s attempt to bring about an arms 
sale.
222
 The hardline approach could be successful if time was allowed to play its part, but 
“our dilemma is that if we stall any longer we may lose Hussein.”223 To Komer, the real 
American goal was “to get through this new crisis without: (1) sacrificing Israel’s security or 
getting a domestic black eye for appearing to do so; (2) ruining our relations with the Arabs—
along with all this would cost us; (3) letting the Soviets score another major gain in the Near 
East.”224  
When Talbot informed King Hussein in Amman that the US, in spite of deep misgivings, had 
agreed to sell tanks and other ground force equipment to Jordan, he was instructed to use 
every effort to dissuade the king from fighters.
225
 American fighters were off the table, but if 
the king pressured for it, Talbot was instructed to reluctantly acquiesce to European jets. More 
importantly, Talbot was instructed to inform Hussein that this could very well force the US to 
make arms sales to Israel.
226
 Upon learning of the American reluctance to sell fighters, 
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Hussein bluntly said that if European aircraft could suffice, he would not have troubled the 
US with a request.
227
 He also complained that the proposed tanks were inferior to the ones 
Israel had purchased from Germany.
228
 The ever-pragmatic Komer read Talbot’s report and 
launched another possible solution: to “sweeten the Jordan package” by making available 
better tanks.
229
 He also agreed with Talbot’s suggestion that Jordan should be allowed to 
purchase twenty fighters.
230
  
Only days earlier, news of the proposed American arms sale to Jordan was leaked, and the 
opposition criticized the Johnson administration for its new policy in the Middle East. Komer 
believed Israel had leaked the news of the Jordan arms sale in an effort to force the 
administration to sell weaponry to Israel as well. However, Komer was not deterred and 
presented yet another new solution.
231
 To counter Israel’s complaints against the Jordanian 
arms sale while still preventing King Hussein from accepting Soviet arms, Komer argued for 
“just enough sweetening to show Hussein that we’re serious and 10 days reconsideration in 
Washington (while we beat up Israelis).”232 Komer suggested that the US put on “a great 
show of indignation” after Israel’s leaking of the Jordan arms package and then “go back at 
them hard” to have Israel acquiesce to the Jordan arms package in an effort to clear Johnson’s 
domestic flank.
233
 The ten days Komer had suggested would in the end turn into a month of 
difficult negotiations. 
Persuasion and Stagnation 
Komer was given the uneasy task of getting Israel on board with the Jordanian arms sale. On 
February 10, 1965 Komer got the talking points for his coming mission to Tel Aviv. Komer 
was instructed to stress to the Israeli government that the reason for the arms sale “from the 
outset has been primarily aimed at minimizing the threat to Israeli security and area stability, 
not reverse.”234 Komer was asked to tell Israel that the US had “no independent interest in 
Jordan” and that “[o]ur subsidies to it … have been primarily designed to maintain an 
independent Arab kingdom, not under hostile domination, along Israel’s longest and most 
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vulnerable frontier.”235 In case the Israeli government did not accept the US viewpoint, and to 
make it acquiesce to the Jordanian arms sale, Komer was instructed to convey the impression 
that the US could consider direct sales of arms to Israel at some unspecified time in the 
future.
236
 
On top of Israel’s opposition to the Jordanian arms package was another difficult problem for 
American policymakers. Israel was quietly signaling intentions to strike against the Arab 
work sites on the Jordan River to secure its share of the water. Israel was sounding out the 
American position in case a preemptive strike became necessary. The US maintained that the 
Johnston Plan served as the basis for the American position, and that justifying an Israeli 
strike would be extremely difficult unless “Israel’s basic water interests [were] affected and 
all other resources [were] exhausted.”237 The State Department’s Middle East expert group, 
the NEA, believed that the Arab diversion scheme would unlikely be able to threaten Israel’s 
share of the Jordan River in any case, and therefore recommended the administration to only 
offer a compensatory arms sale to Israel if it agreed to actively support the arms sale to 
Jordan, and to not take preemptive measures against the Arab diversion work on the Jordan 
River.
238
  
In addition, the NEA recommended that Israel agree to International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspections of its nuclear power plant at Dimona. Nuclear non-proliferation was an 
important issue for Johnson’s administration, but Israel’s unwillingness to allow American 
inspections, which it had agreed to as a condition for the Hawk sale in 1962, was seen as 
disruptive for regional stability in the Middle East.
239
 Israel, however, believed that the 
ambiguity of Dimona’s capabilities served as a deterrent against the Arab states. The US felt 
that Israel was taking unnecessary risks and that its reluctance to accept international 
inspections could force the Arab states to align ever closer to the Soviet Union:
240
  
[W]e believe that Nasser’s fear of a developing Israeli nuclear power may drive him to a 
choice between accelerating the [Egyptian] military buildup or a desperate pre-emptive 
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attack. Either of these choices would have the gravest effects on the security of Israel. We 
think it plain that any possible deterrent value … is trivial compared to these risks.241  
The US was also suspicious of the reactor’s potential for producing nuclear weapons and 
gradually came to regard a direct arms sale to Israel as a means to dissuade its interests in a 
nuclear deterrent.
242
 
Meanwhile, Komer pressed ahead in Tel Aviv. The firm line met heavy resistance. It dawned 
on Komer that the US would have to bait Israel with arms sales to get the country on board 
before King Hussein abandoned the US. He summed up the third round of talks with a bleak 
outlook on the prospect of withholding weaponry from Israel: 
[E]verything I’ve heard here tends to fortify my conviction that to sell arms to Jordan without 
at least doing the same for Israel will generate a major crisis in our relations. Moreover, their 
acute worry over the general deterioration of their security position (of which Jordan arms is 
only a part) is gradually generating a pre-emptive psychology. It could even lead at some 
point to a decision to go nuclear if this appeared to be the only way to maintain a deterrent 
edge.243 
In his report to Washington on February 16, 1965, Komer recommended that the US should 
keep the Jordan arms package at the present level, meaning no US aircraft and no advanced 
tanks, while subtly stating that the US would consider direct arms sales to Israel in the 
future.
244
 Contrary to Komer’s recommendation, Rusk asserted that any compensation to 
Israel should be ““balanced assistance”” and that anything more would signal that the US was 
buying Israel’s compliance with the Jordanian arms sale.245 On February 18, 1965 King 
Hussein accepted American assistance in finding European fighters, and the need for a direct 
sale of US fighters to Jordan suddenly disappeared.
246
 However, Rusk agreed that the US 
could sell twenty fighters to Jordan by 1969 if Hussein was unsuccessful in finding aircraft in 
Europe.
247
 Since the prospect of American fighters in Jordan was assigned to future 
negotiations, Israel should be willing to accept the ground force package, and Rusk declared 
that arms sales to Israel would only be considered in the face of “a disproportionate buildup of 
arms on the Arab side.”248  
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Nonetheless, Israel still maintained that the proposed Jordanian ground force package justified 
an American arms sale to Israel. Komer was sent on a second mission to Tel Aviv. President 
Johnson personally gave the instructions for the second round of negotiations. To counter 
Israel’s complaints about the Jordanian arms sale, Komer should relay Johnson’s views:  
It is my own judgment, buttressed by those of all of my advisers, that if we do not help King 
Hussein out of his dilemma, Jordan will be compelled to accept much larger quantities of 
Soviet arms. If this occurs, we have told King Hussein we will have to cut off all aid. The 
almost certain result in our judgment will be Nasserite domination of Jordan. Then Israel will 
be hemmed in by a hostile Arab ring, with Soviet arms on the East Bank.
249
 
Johnson could not “quite understand why the Israeli Government should take such a totally 
different view from that of all my top advisers. Is Israel prepared to live with the likely result 
[of Soviet arms and Nasserite domination in Jordan]?”250 Johnson also stressed that “I 
personally have grave misgivings over the potentially disastrous effects on our relations with 
the Arab states.”251 However, Johnson was not opposed to compensation or direct arms sales 
to Israel. If Israel’s Prime Minister Levi Eshkol accepted Johnson’s arguments, Komer was 
instructed to imply that the US would consider supplying the tanks that Germany had 
cancelled.
252
 Johnson saw two possible solutions: “Our choice is either to sell arms to both 
Israel and Jordan or to sell arms to neither.”253  
The mood of the meeting between the Israeli government and the US trio, namely Special 
Advisor Robert Komer, Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour, and Under-Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs and experienced diplomatic heavyweight, Averell W. Harriman, 
was not as bad as Johnson had anticipated.
 254
 Although the talks were largely surrounded by 
good manners from both sides, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir and Prime Minister 
Eshkol time and again said that a public American statement announcing Johnson’s 
willingness to consider direct arms sales to Israel would accelerate their acceptance of the 
Jordanian arms package. It was evident that Israel accepted the necessity and reasons for the 
Jordanian arms sale but that it sought compensation in the form of a direct US arms sale, or at 
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least a public declaration of support. Komer tried to persuade the Israelis that this was not the 
time for such a discussion. Israel had to accept the subtle guarantee or leave.
255
  
In an afternoon meeting between Komer and Eshkol on February 26, 1965, the negotiations 
took a turn for the worse. Eshkol demanded a formal American commitment to Israel’s 
security and asked for an official statement of American willingness to consider direct arms 
sales to Israel. Eshkol even brought specific mention of American bombers. It was the first 
time Israel raised such a request, and Komer had no means to provide an answer. From the 
very onset of the negotiations, Israel had to give in to US demands, keep the agreement secret, 
and make sure that Israel’s friends in America abstain from making a political mess of it. 
Additionally, there was hope that Israel would accept, as preconditions to any direct 
American arms sale, inspections of the Dimona reactor and agree to no preemptive strikes 
against the Arab states diversion work of the Jordan River. As of February 1965 the US was 
only willing to consider direct arms sales. Israel’s two alternatives, in American 
policymakers’ minds at least, were to accept the deal or see the Soviet Union overrun Jordan 
with arms. So when Eshkol requested specific hardware, it was out of touch with the 
agreement Johnson had in mind.
256
  
To bring Israel closer to an agreement, American policymakers adopted a new approach. 
Harriman suggested giving specific references to tanks and even fighters: “[T]he more 
specific we can make this undertaking the more quickly [an] agreement can be reached, and 
the more leverage we have on [the] other points we want.”257 The ambition was to reach a 
meeting of minds promptly. King Hussein was being stalled close to the breaking point. Rusk 
replied from Washington that the US was willing to furnish portions of Israel’s defense needs, 
but that bombers were out of question at the moment.
258
 Even with the carefully worded 
statement that the US would sympathetically consider any Israeli defense needs, Eshkol could 
not agree and continued to defer the American demands of accepting the Arab diversion of the 
Jordan River and IAEA inspection.
259
 Harriman would return to Washington shortly but felt 
that his visit after all had been productive: “[I] [r]egret I haven't been able to bring home the 
bacon but feel that much has been accomplished in calming Israeli emotions on our providing 
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arms to Jordan and the ground has been prepared for reasonable future understandings on 
issues involved.”260 
On March 1, Rusk stated that neither Johnson nor he could accept any further delays in the 
reply to King Hussein and that an agreement had to be found. To speed up the process, Rusk 
proposed that the US could compensate Israel’s loss of the German deal, but he also 
demanded that Israel should accept regular international inspections of the Dimona reactor 
before a sale could take place, and stated that the “the United States cannot support any Israeli 
flirtation with nuclear weapons.”261  
The Breaking Point 
Komer was instructed to remain in Tel Aviv to assist Barbour in pressuring the Israeli 
government to concede to the American demands and consent to the Jordanian arms sale. On 
March 2, 1965 in his closing meeting with Eshkol and Meir, Harriman made some headway 
regarding an agreement.
262
 And on March 3, after Harriman had left, Johnson authorized 
Komer to try another tactic: 
The President has decided that in view of Israeli difficulties with the proposal carried by 
Harriman, as subsequently modified at Israeli insistence, we might now take another track. 
You should inform Eshkol that while we cannot wait longer to go forward with our 
agreement with Jordan, which as Israelis [is] aware we consider in mutual interest of Israel 
and [the United States Government], we recognize Israeli concerns. In view of Israeli 
hesitation in accepting proposal presented by Harriman with subsequent modifications we 
were able to make, we are now prepared to make following alternative offer.
263
 
The alternative offer was that Washington could sell arms and equipment to Israel of the 
equivalent number and quality as was proposed to Jordan.
264
 Such a sale to would, however, 
not signal a shift in the US arms policy, and Rusk emphasized that the sale would merely be a 
one-time exception from the current policy of abstinence from supplying arms to the 
region.
265
 The move presented a quick solution to Israel’s loss of the German tank deal, but if 
Israel accepted, Rusk would revoke sympathetic consideration of Israel’s defense needs that 
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opted for larger sales of more advanced equipment in the future. In the end, Eshkol did not 
view a one-time deal as more attractive than an open-ended consideration, and the 
negotiations deadlocked once more.
266
  
From the outset of the mission, Komer, Harriman and Barbour stressed to the Israeli 
government that the issue had to be solved quickly. If not, King Hussein would be forced to 
accept Soviet weapons, and both sides would lose. By March 6, 1965 nearly one month had 
passed since the need for urgency had first been called for, and in the meantime no deal had 
been concluded with Hussein. The American indecisiveness demonstrated that Israel could 
wait out for a better deal.
267
 Komer launched two alternatives: “either … make [the] final 
offer good enough to sign up Israel; or … soften up Israelis by showing them they don’t have 
veto on Jordan arms.”268 Komer was authorized to pursue the first option. On March 8, 1965 
Komer was instructed to seek out Eshkol. The new draft agreement he presented bore specific 
mention of nearly two hundred tanks and as many as twenty fighters of unspecified model 
directly supplied to Israel from the US at some undesignated time in the future.
269
  
By March 11, 1965 Eshkol finally agreed and signed a memorandum of understanding in 
which Israel accepted the Jordanian arms sale, gave informal assurances that it would not 
acquire nuclear weapons, and gave yet another assurance that it would not attack the Arab 
states’ Jordan River diversion scheme. The memorandum of understanding was not a legal 
document but rather an informal gentleman’s agreement.270 The most contested item in the 
memorandum of understanding was periodic inspections of the Dimona reactor, but Johnson 
decided to leave the discussion of formalities for later, thus enabling Israel to continue to 
dispute the issue.
271
 
With the domestic flank cleared and the US-Israel relationship safeguarded, the negotiation of 
the ground force package to Jordan was finally completed. On March 12, 1965 King Hussein 
was informed of the agreement between Israel and the US, but his reaction was calm. He 
hoped the Jordanian arms sale would not result in American arms sales to Israel, but he 
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recognized that Israel could not be denied arms.
272
 The US-Jordan arms deal was finally 
formalized on March 18, 1965. The aircraft would be European and the tanks and ground 
force equipment American. The Jordanian arms deal was sufficient in keeping Jordan in the 
Western camp, and although the month-long negotiations with Israel immediately led to 
negotiations of a direct arms sale to Israel, the US had averted a domestic and foreign crisis 
and maintained its carefully balanced image of impartiality.
273
  
Fueling two opposing sides of a conflict contradicted the Johnson administration’s ambition 
to preserve a stable status quo, but it was perceived to be the only way to ensure stability in 
Jordan, security for Israel and domestic support for other policies. By March 1965, the 
prospect of armed confrontation between Israel and Jordan was perceived to be so unlikely 
that the arms sales were believed to be one-time deviations from policy. As Komer told 
Johnson, “I think we finally came out all right—and without giving more than we'd have to 
give sooner or later anyway to our Israeli friends.”274 In hindsight, the Johnson administration 
gambled that the UAC would fall apart and obviate the need for arms. The gamble failed. 
Arab nationalism was accelerating, and the tensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict rose to a level 
where the status quo eventually collapsed.  
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Chapter 4: Reluctant Observer 
The ambition to preserve the status quo in the Middle East initially seemed reasonably 
possible to achieve. The Jordanian arms sale had secured Jordan in the Western camp, and 
Israel had assured it would neither introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East nor would it 
attack the Arab states’ work on diverting the Jordan River. Johnson had an opportunity to 
concentrate his foreign policy on the worsening situation in Vietnam, but as the number of 
soldiers killed continued to rise in Southeast Asia, Johnson came under increasing domestic 
criticism.
275
 Thus, Johnson was cautious not to stretch his domestic support too far. In the 
Middle East, however, Johnson used the relatively good relationship between Israel and 
Jordan to demonstrate the fairness of US Middle East policy to other Arab states on which 
strategic interests depended. Nonetheless, Johnson’s image of impartiality faced a serious 
challenge when the relationship between Israel and Jordan collapsed in 1966. 
For some time, Johnson successfully balanced on the thin edge with commitment to Israel’s 
security on the one hand and support for Jordan’s stability on the other. The administration 
took great interest in preserving the de facto peace between Israel and Jordan. It served as the 
basis for Johnson’s attempt to forward the image of impartiality in the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
However, shortly after the conclusion of the Jordan arms sale and while the negotiations of an 
arms sale to Israel were underway, tensions rapidly escalated in the Middle East. Arab 
nationalism was on a high tide and showed no signs of subsiding. In an effort to deter acts of 
aggression, Israel, slowly at first but soon resolutely and determined, adopted a retaliatory 
policy in response to Palestinian infiltrations. Palestinian infiltrations and Israeli reprisals 
became a cycle of increasing violence that eventually culminated with the Israeli attack on the 
West Bank village of Samu in November 1966. By then it was Israel, Johnson’s most trusted 
partner in the Middle East, that ““deliberately destroyed”” his attempt to preserve the status 
quo.
276
  
How did Johnson’s administration deal with the souring relationship between Jordan and 
Israel? Why did the administration fail to preserve the troubled, but stable status quo, and 
how did that contribute to the first steps toward war between Israel and Jordan? 
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Retaliation and Escalation 
The trouble on the border between Jordan and Israel was rapidly accelerated when Palestinian 
guerillas started targeting Israeli work sites for diverting the Jordan River. Fatah emerged by 
1966 as the most coordinated, daring, and active Palestinian organization that took upon itself 
to establish a Palestinian state by military means.
277
 To achieve its objective, Fatah launched 
guerilla raids into Israel and aimed to provoke border clashes that would drag the Arab states 
into another war with Israel.
278
 Contrary to earlier infiltrations, these were well organized and 
clearly politically motivated raids. Israel believed the infiltrators were sponsored by the Arab 
states in an undeclared war against its existence. Israel’s security doctrine had for long been 
rooted in the belief in deterrent capacity, and infiltrations only accelerated such beliefs. 
Moreover, Israel began provoking incidents in the border areas to produce excuses to attack 
and forestall the Arab states’ attempt to divert the Jordan River.279 Israel claimed the 
Palestinian sabotage raids, and Fatah’s in particular, were a preamble to a coming declaration 
of war by the Arab states, and Israel used the infiltrations as a pretext to demonstrate its 
military superiority. Since Jordan had a large Palestinian population and the longest border 
with Israel, many Fatah infiltrations were launched from Jordan, and consequently several 
Israeli reprisals were aimed at Fatah’s bases in Jordan.280  
In spite of the assurances it had conceded to in the March 1965 memorandum of 
understanding, Israel launched several retaliatory raids against the Arab states’ work sites to 
divert the Jordan River. Israel believed that if it did nothing to prevent the Arab states’ 
diversion scheme it would lose its allotted share of the waters. The US on the other hand 
perceived Israel’s unilateralism as destabilizing and tried to dissuade Israel from answering 
private Palestinian infiltrations with attacks on state-sponsored Arab work sites. In America’s 
eyes retaliations only provoked further infiltrations which in turn only lead to further 
reprisals. Israel’s Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, although he emphasized that he was not 
preparing for war to protect the Israeli diversion scheme, still maintained that retaliations 
were effective in coping with infiltrations.
281
 The State Department declared that the US could 
not condone any shooting related to the Jordan River projects and stressed that if Israel had 
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any expectations of American support in the water dispute, it would have to follow US 
advice.
282
  
In an effort to find out if there was any basis of truth in Eshkol’s fears regarding the Jordan 
River, US Ambassador to Jordan, Robert G. Barnes, asked King Hussein in early May 1965 if 
there was an Arab plan for the destruction of Israel or a plan to prevent Israel from utilizing 
the Jordan River. The king answered that the Arab armies’ modernization program was 
designed to protect the Arab diversion scheme. The king said there was no plan to prevent 
Israel from acquiring its allotted share of the Jordan River, and no plans were laid in 
preparation for a war against Israel. To Hussein at least, the motivation behind modernization 
of the army was sparked by a desire to enable Jordan to protect itself from Israeli retaliations, 
and the king had a sincere desire to keep infiltrations to an absolute minimum. His silent 
support from Israel depended on his ability and commitment in keeping the infiltrators at 
bay.
283
  
In Israel, military reprisals were widely accepted as the best means available in deterring 
infiltrators and the government was hardly impressed with King Hussein’s statement. On May 
19, 1965 Israel opened fire on bulldozers working on the Syrian side of diversion project, and 
ordered air strikes and used artillery against the Syrian bulldozers. The US expressed sincere 
misgivings about Israel’s extensive use of force and urged caution.284 In a meeting with 
American Ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, Eshkol claimed that the incident with the 
Syrian bulldozers had sent unmistakable signals that the Arab armies had no chance to force 
an end to Israel’s interests in the Jordan River.285 Under the pretext that Israel would be in a 
worse position to ensure its share of water once the Arab states completed their installations, 
Eshkol maintained that force might still become necessary.
286
 Barbour reported a grim 
prediction of Eshkol’s preemptive mentality: “[H]e still holds to his thinking tenaciously and 
will be dissuaded if at all only with difficulty.”287 
The US did not share Israel’s assessment of being under threat, but warnings against 
continued reliance on military action fell on deaf ears. Eshkol’s mindset was set on retaliation 
and the Johnson administration found no obvious way to alleviate the pressure that Israel 
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believed itself to be under. The disregard for American advice was highlighted when Israel 
attacked three villages on the West Bank on May 27–28, 1965. It signaled that Israel was 
willing to ignore US cautions. Moreover, Israeli reprisals had usually been pinpoint attacks, 
but the raid on May 27–28 marked a change in Israel’s methods. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk criticized Israel’s use of force and claimed that sustained artillery fire was not in line 
with a pinpoint assault.
288
 Israel countered by asserting that the raid had been aimed at Fatah 
infiltrators operating from Jordan, and asked the US to pressure King Hussein to crack down 
on the bases.
289
  
As infiltrations and raids continued to take place on the Jordan-Israel border during June 
1965, Rusk warned that Israel’s retaliations signaled an aggressive posture rather than a 
peaceful one:  
We would have expected … that [Israel’s] actions would be characterized more consistently 
by calm, confidence and restraint expected of [a] nation whose security is essentially, if not 
absolutely, assured. However we have noted [that Israel] on several occasions [during the] 
past six weeks has acted as if its existence was in immediate jeopardy. [Israel’s] reaction late 
May to alleged Fatah raids was out of proportion to damage [from] those raids and appears to 
us ill-advised in that [the] target nation was one that seemed to be working [to] curb terrorist 
activities.
290
 
Israel was non-responsive to Rusk’s caution and continued to blame Jordan for not cracking 
down on insurgents in Jordanian territory. It denied evidence to the contrary as forged or 
insufficient. The US had pressured King Hussein to do his part in preventing infiltrations and 
saw no reason to doubt his effort. Moreover, the US understood King’s painful dilemma. 
Cracking down on his own citizens threatened the popularity he enjoyed among the West 
Bank Palestinians, but failing to protect them from Israel’s retaliations had the same 
consequence. Not answering Israel’s raids on May 27 was as far the king could go, and the 
US realized that in the future Hussein would be hard pressed to order his army into action, if 
the reprisals did not stop.
291
  
Limiting Israel’s Preemptive Mentality 
The State Department, the safeguard of strategic interests in the Arab world, saw Israel’s 
unilateralism as a challenge to the fragile status quo, and suggested using arms sales to 
dissuade Israel from retaliation and to regain influence in Israel. By using arms sales as a 
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carrot, it was hoped that Israel would be willing to listen to American advice. American-
Israeli arms sales negotiations were well under way by spring 1965. The original March deal 
was for a direct sale of 210 tanks, upgrading kits to install larger cannons on several more 
tanks and artillery cannons. However, Israel continued to pressure for more. Israel’s interest 
in fighter aircraft had been deferred to European suppliers, but Israel kept overestimating the 
Arab aerial combat strength and avoided the European market only to procure American 
aircraft.
292
 President Johnson’s Special Advisor, Robert W. Komer informed Johnson of the 
hardening Israeli position: 
When I was out there [in February/March 1965], they talked about an old light bomber like 
the B–66, which they thought they could buy for peanuts. We agreed to help them get up to 
24 “combat” planes (not necessarily bombers) either in Europe or here. Since then we've 
convinced them that the B–66 is not available as surplus so now they're asking for the F–4, 
our fanciest current operational model.
293
 
Israel had made specific reference to the B-66 bomber, an aircraft that, with some 
modifications, could be enabled to carry nuclear bombs, but nonetheless termed as a 
defensive weapon. By June, Israel requested the brand new F-4 Phantom interceptor fighter, a 
far more advanced and undoubtedly offensive weapon that by default was capable of carrying 
nuclear payloads.
294
 Komer did not believe the Phantom was what had been laid out during 
the month-long negotiations in February and March 1965, and told Johnson that the “F–4 is 
… simply outside the spirit of our understanding … would cost them a mint … and … raise 
hob with the Arabs.”295  
Komer was a prime pragmatist, and he was not afraid to replace the carrot with a stick to 
bring Israel around. Although he accepted Israel’s need for modern fighters, Komer believed 
that “it is far wiser for us to soften them up on certain conditions … than to give way 
piecemeal and end up getting less than otherwise.”296 Komer wanted Israel to officially 
foreswear nuclear weapons, sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and give a firm 
guarantee that it would not attack Arab work sites for diverting the Jordan River. Komer did 
not oppose a direct sale of aircraft, but he believed that by stalling the US could force through 
a change in Israel’s handling of infiltrations and hopefully acquire Israeli acceptance of IAEA 
inspections of the nuclear reactor in Dimona.
297
 By the end of July 1965, Komer informed 
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Johnson that the tank deal had been concluded on the original basis. He had successfully 
fended off Israeli attempts to sweeten the deal and deferred the sale of fighters to future 
negotiations.
298
  
There was no mention of Israel’s use of reprisals or IAEA inspection in the tank deal. Komer 
realized that the tank deal aimed to score Israeli acceptance of the Jordanian arms package 
and left the issues to future discussions, but Komer believed a sale of fighter aircraft could 
make Israel accept the American demands of regular inspections of the Dimona reactor 
later.
299
 The key prize Komer wanted to extract from Israel was compliance with IAEA 
inspection, but he also stated that “it’s good to have leverage on the Israelis because we don’t 
like their threats to attack the Arab water diversion works.”300  
Komer’s pragmatic influence on policymaking encompassed several aspects of policy. 
Foreign policy, the Cold War and electoral considerations played into the formulations of 
Komer’s recommendations. The domestic considerations led Komer to view the US-Israel 
relationship as one among a decreasing number of platforms on which Johnson’s domestic 
support rested, but one that could be strengthened. Vietnam was taking its toll on Johnson’s 
popularity in America, and Komer was therefore inclined to side with Israel’s arms requests 
because they could boost the President’s popularity. On the other side of the spectrum was the 
State Department which had never been too supportive of the Israel pillar of American Middle 
East policy and believed it compromised strategic interests in the Arab world.
301
 In this 
instance, Komer approved Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s recommendation that the US 
should threaten Israel with making “continued [arms] deliveries contingent on no preemptive 
strikes.”302 
Trouble on the Jordan-Israel Border 
Israel’s perception of the security situation differed so much from the American assessment 
that even threats to withhold arms deliveries proved ineffective in keeping Israel in line. The 
number of infiltrations and retaliations rose steadily throughout the summer of 1965. It forced 
the US to accept being a mere messenger between Israel and Jordan. Israeli Foreign Minister 
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Golda Meir asserted Israel’s efforts to keep the border calm, but she argued that it could not 
stand idly by as Fatah infiltrators staged sabotage missions from inside Jordan.
303
 Meir asked 
the US to pressure King Hussein to do more, but Meir was unwilling to acknowledge that 
Israel had a potential to relax the tensions by scaling down the retaliations.
304
 As tensions 
between Israel and Jordan mounted, the US lost much of its leverage on both sides. Israel 
claimed to have followed US guidelines but that it could not do so forever: Jordan had to do 
more.
305
 However, the US Embassy in Amman reported that there was little else for Jordan to 
do without ruining the king’s domestic standing, Jordan’s position in the Arab world, and that 
King Hussein was going along with Nasser and the UAC “because he fears the adverse 
consequences to his own position if he does not.”306 
The US realized that Israel’s reprisals only escalated the tensions and forged the Arab ranks, 
but it had not yet found any desirable means for bringing Israel to change its policy. Another 
arms sale could potentially bring about a change, but without an official Israeli declaration of 
the peaceful nature of the Dimona reactor, the US found this option undesirable.
307
 Therefore, 
when Israel presented concrete suggestions for what Jordan could do, the US believed it to 
have as good a chance for success as any. Ambassador Barnes relayed Israel’s suggestions to 
the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tall, and emphasized that the suggestions were not 
endorsed by the US government. Prime Minister Tall was irritated that Israel seemingly gave 
orders on what to do. Jordan was doing its part, Tall argued, and King Hussein had authorized 
extensive measures to prevent infiltrations from Jordanian territory.
308
 Tall asked Barnes to 
inform Israel that Jordan would not sit out another raid and cautioned that if Israel raided 
again, Jordan would retaliate. Barnes reported there was no reason continuing to doubt 
Jordan’s effort, and that being asked to relay Israeli suggestions to Jordan in such a manner 
had been “embarrassing”.309 
There was evidently little doubt about Jordan’s desire to maintain a stable border, but when 
Ambassador Barbour relayed Tall’s comments on the Jordanian measures to the Israeli 
government, Foreign Minister Meir bluntly asserted that Fatah infiltrations happened in spite 
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of Jordan’s countermeasures.310 Therefore, Israel could not be expected to abandon the policy 
of retaliation, Meir argued. Barbour disagreed and stressed that reprisals served no purpose 
other than provoking further infiltrations and running the risk of forcing King Hussein to 
retaliate.
311
 He made no headway. Israel steadfastly held to its firm belief that reprisals were 
the best available option and did not cooperate.
312
 King Hussein was willing to do his part, 
and the US was impressed with the lengths to which Hussein was willing to go, and realized 
that in the face of Israeli intransigence, “our relations with King Hussein and his Government 
take on ever increasing importance” in order to ensure the status quo.313 
Nonetheless, Israel kept pressing Jordan ever harder, and it did not realize the degree of 
domestic pressure its raids caused in Jordan. This gradually led King Hussein to believe that 
Israel was not honest in their secret assurances that a stable Jordan was in Israel’s interest. 
The meeting of minds between Israel and Jordan was breaking apart. Hussein privately 
suspected that Israel was seeking to capture the West Bank if it only got the pretext it 
needed.
314
 As a result of Israel’s retaliations, increasing discontent was spreading throughout 
Jordan. In early December 1965 the CIA brought King Hussein’s deteriorating domestic 
position to the attention of US policymakers. In a grim forecast, intelligence officers predicted 
that even though Hussein tried to the best of his ability to curb infiltrations, retaliatory raids 
by Israel and continued infiltrations from the Arab states could lead to the most serious Arab-
Israeli clash since Suez.
315
  
The report did not yet result in any evident attempt to strengthen King Hussein, and the US 
was still unwilling to risk its relations with Israel in order to bring an end to Israel’s use of 
force. However, when King Hussein in late December 1965 said Jordan was unable to procure 
European aircraft on reasonable terms, he forced the US to reassess how much influence 
domestic considerations should have on foreign policy.
316
 Realizing that Hussein could not 
withstand the popular Arab pressure to accept Soviet aircraft at spot price, Rusk and Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara recommended that Jordan should be allowed to purchase thirty-
six F-104 Starfighters. The Starfighter was a fighter-bomber which could operate in a grey 
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area as both an offensive and a defensive weapon, but the secretaries advised Johnson to only 
approve the sale of a version of the Starfighter with defensive capabilities.
317
  
The secretaries also realized that such a sale would ignite Israeli criticism. To anticipate that 
criticism and to speed up the sale to Jordan, the secretaries recommended Johnson to also 
approve the sale of twenty-four A-4 Skyhawk attack-bombers to Israel.
318
 The Skyhawk was 
less advanced and less obviously offensive than the Phantom which Israel had requested, but 
it was considerably more advanced than the Starfighter the secretaries recommended for 
Jordan. Along with the first twenty-four aircraft, Israel would also have an option to purchase 
another twenty-four of the same aircraft, either all at once or the last twenty-four later. 
Komer’s earlier suggestion that a sale of fighter aircraft to Israel should be coupled with 
Israeli compliance with IAEA inspection was not mentioned by the secretaries.
319
 Rusk and 
his State Department had gradually started accepting that in the absence of conventional arms, 
“those in Israel who advocate acquisition of nuclear weapons will find a much more fertile 
environment for their views”.320 
Reclaiming Leverage 
The Unified Arab Command (UAC) had learned of Jordan’s inability to purchase Western 
fighters and reintroduced the Soviet option. The secretaries believed the administration could 
repeat the same procedure as in the tank deals. Selling arms to both sides would prevent the 
Soviet Union from entering Jordan without damaging Johnson’s image of impartiality.321 On 
February 8, 1966 Komer sent Johnson an extensive memorandum discussing the best course 
of action. Komer’s reason for selling aircraft to Jordan was that if the Soviet Union supplied 
Jordan militarily, it could mean the subversion of Hussein’s moderate regime. He also 
realized that the US would be forced to adopt a more pro-Israel policy in such a scenario, and 
he underscored that Israel “recognize that our subsidizing King Hussein is worth its weight in 
gold to them.”322 The necessity of preserving good relations with Jordan was for Komer “to 
prevent the closing of a hostile Arab ring around Israel.”323 Komer believed that  
Hussein’s ability to stay on his uneasy throne depends critically on his not appearing to be a 
US or Israeli stooge (his grandfather was assassinated for this reason). We’ve already stalled 
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Hussein to the point of no return—in his judgment and that of our Ambassador. Jordan’s 
independence is important enough to us, and to Israel, that we should not risk jeopardizing it 
short of over-riding reasons.
324
 
President Johnson approved, and King Hussein entered negotiations with US representatives 
shortly after. Komer then suggested using the advanced fighters to force Israel to listen more 
sincerely to the US. An arms sale to Israel would increase its deterrent capabilities and 
obviate the need for an American security guarantee, and the need to strike preemptively 
against any perceived threats.
325
 Komer also highlighted the aircraft sale’s potential in 
obviating Israel’s interest in a nuclear option: “Desperation is what would most likely drive 
Israel to this choice, should it come to feel that the conventional balance was turning against 
it. So … US arms supply, aimed at maintaining a deterrent balance, is as good an inhibitor as 
we’ve got.”326  Komer informed Johnson of the other benefit of an arms balance in Israel’s 
favor:  
Since our own deep commitment to Israel’s security would almost force us to intervene if 
there were another major Arab-Israeli flareup, it is in our interest to help Israel maintain a 
sufficient deterrent edge to warn off Nasser and other eager beavers. And the more secure 
Israel feels, the less likely it is to strike first, as at Suez.
327
 
In agreement with Komer Johnson saw little interest in Jordan except that a stable Jordan was 
in Israel’s interest.328 President Johnson took great interest in preserving strategic interests in 
the Arab world, but he viewed Israel with even more interest and agreed with Komer’s 
recommendation that the US should sell aircraft to both Jordan and Israel.
329
 Johnson was 
inclined to sell fighters sooner rather than later, but Rusk and the NEA cautioned that it would 
serve US interests better if Israel foreswore nuclear intentions and vowed not to act 
preemptively against the Arab states as preconditions to a sale. The Department of Defense 
and McNamara agreed, and the secretary of defense asserted that the Phantom fighter was out 
of the question. On February 12, 1966 McNamara presented a specific aircraft package 
consisting of forty-eight Skyhawks to the newly appointed Foreign Minister of Israel, Abba 
Eban, and asked for a prompt answer. To avoid domestic opposition, McNamara bluntly said 
that “in the absence of Israeli concurrence and support, the US would not sell aircraft to 
Jordan.”330 Israel was naturally interested in advanced weaponry, and when a moderate Jordan 
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could emerge from it, there was little reason not to accept the deal: On February 22, 1966 
Komer informed Johnson of Israel’s acceptance of the Skyhawk package.331  
There was no formal agreement regarding Israel’s use of retaliation or of IAEA inspection 
between Israel and the US. President Johnson was distressed by the potentiality of an Israeli 
nuclear weapons production, but he too realized that a strengthened conventional Israeli 
arsenal possibly could postpone such Israeli plans, and he therefore once again left these 
issues issue to future discussions.
332
 On February 25, 1966 Johnson approved the aircraft sales 
to Jordan and Israel.
333
 About one month later, Johnson’s administration formally closed the 
deals with Israel and Jordan. Israel was to receive all forty-eight Skyhawks at once while 
Jordan had signed a deal for thirty-six secondhand Starfighters.
334
 In addition to the greater 
quantity and advanced state of Israel’s purchased fighters, their delivery was agreed to take 
place faster than the delivery to Jordan.
335
 Moreover, the US had once again settled with only 
vague concessions that Israel would not introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East, would 
not oppose the Jordanian aircraft sale, and “from time to time” would open the Dimona 
reactor to American, but not to international inspection.
336
  
The Johnson administration had hoped the aircraft sale would make Israel listen to US advice, 
but Fatah infiltrations from Jordan continued along with ever larger Israeli reprisals. Even 
with renewed means to influence policy in Israel, the US only observed the deteriorating 
situation throughout the summer of 1966. Already on May 2, 1966 the US Embassy asked 
King Hussein to refrain from retaliation after an Israeli raid against Fatah bases on the West 
Bank. Hussein replied that he was doing everything he possibly could to prevent infiltrations 
into Israel, even though he was under heavy domestic pressure to retaliate.
337
 The US was 
well aware of Jordan’s effort to curb the infiltrators and saw no reason to doubt the king’s 
interest in doing so, and it took no interest in Israel’s attempt to discredit the Jordanian 
effort.
338
 Hussein was weary of the US constantly urging restraint on Jordan rather than 
pressuring Israel to lessen its aggression. King Hussein was not only under pressure from his 
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population and fellow Arab statesmen to retaliate, but his patience with Israel was running 
low: ““Do not come to me on next occasion asking that I restrain [my] army. We cannot 
continue [to] take attacks [of] this sort and retaliation [is] apparently [the] only language 
Israelis understand.””339 
King Hussein could not understand why Israel continued the retaliations, and he was irritated 
of its failure to understand that the raids jeopardized Jordan’s moderate policy.340 Through 
secret channels and through the US Embassy, Hussein had described the disruptive effects the 
raids had on his moderate policy, but presented with the Israeli failure to heed his warnings he 
speculated that Israel sought to provoke Jordan as a way to create a pretext for a full-scale 
attack.
341
 The only reason King Hussein could find for Israel’s continuation of attacks on 
Jordan was that Israel secretly wanted to seize the West Bank, and he had nursed that thought 
privately for some time. The embassy reported that although the king was calm, he had 
seemed deeply troubled by the domestic opposition against him as he once more ordered his 
army to stay at base.
342
  
To US observers King Hussein seemed able to cope with the domestic situation, but his 
reluctance to answer Israeli retaliations accelerated the Arab rivalry. Hussein was attacked by 
Nasser with ferocious propaganda. Nasser accused the king of departing from the Cairo 
Summit declarations and for being permissive toward Israel.
343
 To boost Hussein’s 
confidence, and to reward his brave stance against the calls for answering Israeli raids and 
accepting Soviet arms, Walt Rostow, Komer’s successor as special assistant to the president 
for national security affairs after March 1966, recommended Johnson to approve a twenty 
million dollar budget support to Jordan.
344
 Rostow saw a “clear political case for keeping 
Israel’s longest and most vulnerable flank out of Nasser’s hands”:345 
Hussein [has] resisted heavy Arab pressure to take MIGs. He has privately agreed to keep his 
armor off the west bank of the Jordan where Israel would be hard-pressed to defend. He has 
squelched fanatical Arabs raiding across Israel’s borders. He has resisted heavy pressure 
from his military—whose support keeps him in power—to retaliate when Israel has attacked 
Jordanian villages harboring those raiders.
346
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Still, there was no evidence that Jordan itself served the US any other purpose than keeping 
Israel’s eastern flank moderate. Rostow, much like Komer, believed the alternative to King 
Hussein would be a radicalized Jordan flooded with Soviet arms and influence. The Soviet 
influence would lead to a far worse and more volatile border. More so than Komer, Rostow 
did not see Soviet influence in its own right as the worst evil, it was its consequences for 
Israel that should be feared: “[W]e would rather not subsidize Jordan, nor sell tanks and jets 
to Arabs. But after painful consideration, we see no other way to keep Soviet-backed radical 
Arabs off Israel's softest flank.”347 American policy toward Jordan had gradually begun to 
shift from aiming to contain Soviet influence, to aiming to ensure Israel’s security. 
Nevertheless, neither aircraft nor funds enabled Jordan to prevent Fatah infiltrators from 
launching sabotage missions from Jordan into Israel throughout the summer and fall of 1966. 
And aircraft proved ineffective in sobering Israel’s reaction to the infiltrations. Gradually, 
Jordan’s permissiveness assumed precedence over Israel’s retaliations in the Arab rivalry’s 
propaganda battle. In October 1966 Israel informed the US that the most recent infiltrations 
were carried out by Syrians, and that the aggressive Syrian government was deliberately 
trying to humiliate Jordan by sending Syrian-sponsored Fatah infiltrators via Jordan into 
Israel. By putting Jordan at the receiving end of Israeli retaliations, Syria could attack King 
Hussein’s permissive moderation toward Israel. Upon learning of Syria’s tactic, the State 
Department questioned Israel’s conduct of knowingly attacking a third party which did its 
best to prevent the use of its territory for infiltrations. Israel appreciated Hussein’s effort to 
limit the incursions, but firmly asserted that it had to retaliate to demonstrate decisiveness.
348
 
Rusk could only observe that the US could do nothing to prevent further deterioration: 
Failure [of] all Arab governments to curb Fatah operations will, in our considered opinion, 
almost certainly lead to major Israeli retaliation that could embroil [the] area as [a] whole 
militarily. We are urging Israelis avoid retaliation and avail [them]selves of UN machinery, 
but there is limit to our influence in this regard if Fatah incidents continue. We recognize 
[that Jordan] has been making serious effort [to] control Fatah. Nevertheless, several recent 
incidents appear to have been launched from Jordanian territory. In discussing with us 
[Israel] has taken line [that Syria is] deliberately seeking [to] involve [Jordan] by staging 
Fatah incidents from Jordanian territory and that, although [Israel] believes [Jordan is] 
sincerely attempting [to] prevent such use [of] its territory, it is under growing domestic 
pressure to take action. We therefore urge [Jordan] [to] redouble efforts [to] prevent further 
Fatah operations from or through Jordan.
349
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While Jordan was urged to do ever more, the State Department asked Israel to trust the UN 
apparatus.
350
 While the UN Security Council was working on a resolution condemning the 
recent attacks, nine more incidents took place, five of which were from Jordan.
351
 Israeli 
officials in Washington expressed misgivings that while the UN failed to deter Fatah, the 
infiltrators went unpunished. In Israel’s view, both the UN and Jordan were unable to prevent 
infiltrations. According to Israeli officials, only Israel could guarantee its own borders. The 
US accepted that the raids took place under the nose of the UN and Jordan but even when 
Israel’s patience was running out the State Department could only plead with Israel to refrain 
from retaliation and ask that Israel trust in Jordan’s ability to keep tensions low.352 
Ignored Influence 
The repeated US warnings and the substantial evidence of Jordan’s efforts to halt infiltrations 
made no headway in making Israel reconsider the wisdom of the reprisals. When Palestinian 
infiltrators planted a landmine in Israel that resulted in three fatalities, the Israeli government 
deemed the time to be ripe for an assertive show of force against the infiltrators. On 
November 13, 1966 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) stated an example of its determination 
and launched a large raid against Samu, a village of some twelve kilometers south- southwest 
of Hebron on the West Bank. In contrast to earlier reprisals where the goal had been to 
apprehend the infiltrators and destroy their bases, the raid on Samu was conducted in broad 
daylight by some four hundred soldiers, armed vehicles, tanks, artillery and air force. The 
targeted town of Samu had questionable value for Fatah and thereby also for the IDF. 
Moreover, Israel had only weeks earlier expressed understanding for the fact that Syria was 
trying to provoke exactly such an attack against Jordan. The IDF laid Samu in ruins, blew up 
nearly all the houses and a medical clinic. The Jordanian battalion sent to drive the IDF out 
came under fire, killing several Jordanian soldiers. Along with a large number of destroyed 
vehicles, Jordan lost a British-made fighter and its pilot in a short air battle against Israel’s air 
force.
353
 
Rusk realized that the US warnings against Israel’s reliance on reprisals had limited effect at 
best, and he was deeply surprised by the violence inflicted by the raid. He took a hard line on 
Israel and expressed deep misgivings that King Hussein had been the victim of something the 
Israelis just days earlier had blamed Syria for. Rusk knew all too well that Israel was 
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69 
thoroughly informed of Hussein’s efforts to prevent Fatah from using Jordanian territory for 
attacks on Israel.
354
 In Rusk’s view the American ineffectiveness to present Israel with 
alternative reactions to infiltrations did not legitimate such a drastic escalation of violence on 
Israel’s part and he felt betrayed: “We have served as intermediary between Israel and Jordan 
in the interests of peace—not in the interests of facilitating or explaining Israel’s policy of 
retaliation.”355 In Amman, Ambassador Barnes pleaded with Hussein to withstand the 
momentous pressure to retaliate.
356
  
If Johnson’s administration ever seriously considered ignoring Israel’s advice on the Middle 
East policy, it was in the brief moments after the raid on Samu. Rostow was shocked: “This 
300-man raid with tanks and planes was out of all proportion to the provocation and was 
aimed at the wrong target.” 357 Israel’s explanations fell on deaf ears, and the top priority for 
Johnson’s administration was how to shore up King Hussein. Strategic concerns were once 
more the primary American interest in Jordan but not primarily for the sake of preventing 
Soviet influence. Whereas before Samu, the US had looked reluctantly toward the king’s need 
for support, it suddenly realized Israel had made Jordan ripe for a takeover by radical Arab 
nationalists, and such a development would threaten Israel’s security.358  
However, the US did not draw the same conclusion that King Hussein immediately reached. 
In the king’s assessment Israel had sought to provoke a pretext to capture the entire West 
Bank.
359
 Moreover, the raid had revealed the inadequate training, organization and equipment 
of the Jordanian army. The popularity King Hussein had enjoyed at home was shattered, but 
the attack on Samu also inflamed the Arab rivalry that had been largely set aside since the 
Cairo Summit. The king came under an intense propaganda offensive from Syria and Egypt, 
which discredited the king’s permissiveness and his failure to protect his own citizens. 
Hussein was personally blamed failing to protect Samu and for the loss of life. The 
Palestinians questioned their faith in the king and flocked to support the radicalism expressed 
by Egypt and Syria.
360
 It ignited riots and demonstrations that forced Hussein to dispatch the 
army against the demonstrators. Several civilians were killed, which only accelerated the 
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criticism against the king.
361
 As so many times before, Hussein’s delicate power base was 
disrupted by public discontent and foreign pressure. Fuelled by Syrian and Egyptian 
propaganda, the rioters called for the king’s abdication.362  
Cut the Cord? 
For nearly a year the US had warned Israel of the destructive effects of their retaliations. 
Nonetheless, the Johnson administration had not been willing to risk its relations with Israel 
to ensure a peaceful status quo. Israel proved too valuable a source for domestic support, 
which Johnson desperately needed for his other policies, and in particular the American 
campaign in Vietnam.
363
 Therefore, Johnson in 1965 had decided against Rusk and Komer 
when they recommended “threatening to make continued [arms] deliveries [to Israel] 
contingent on no preemptive strikes.”364 The US had not once issued warnings that continued 
reliance on retaliations would have consequences for the US-Israel relations. After Samu, the 
administration reassessed the wisdom of this policy. Johnson’s administration for the first 
time seriously considered making good on its threat. Even Robert Komer, the stern believer in 
the balancing act, although reassigned in March 1966 to deal with Vietnam, privately 
informed an Israeli official that continued use of retaliations could force the US to reconsider 
all arms sales to Israel, “regardless of whether contracts had been signed or not.”365  
In Komer’s view the raid “undermined the whole American effort to maintain Jordanian 
stability, which was so much in Israel’s own interest that Israel’s action was almost 
incomprehensible.”366 The US Embassy in Amman reported that the raid not only had 
embarrassed King Hussein, it had also fueled the tense polarization between the radical and 
the moderate states of the Arab rivalry and a point was rapidly approaching where Hussein’s 
regime could be in immediate jeopardy.
367
 The riots were still roaring, and on the West Bank, 
tanks had been ordered to disperse the crowds, which were declaring their support to 
Nasser.
368
 The US Embassy in Amman reported that “the outlook for easing … tensions … 
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does not appear promising.”369 In an effort to bring Israel back in line and to shore up King 
Hussein’s regime, the National Security Council (NSC) recommended suspending all arms 
shipments to Israel, delaying deliveries that were underway, and taking a firm stance in the 
UN against Israeli aggression.
370
 Israel was reduced to a marginal concern:   
They’ve wiped the slate clean by this attack and laid low the impressive tacit arrangement 
we’ve built over the years to neutralize the Israeli-Jordan border. They’ve probably wiped out 
the King’s commitment not to station his army on the west bank. They’ve destroyed the 
running dialogue we had on controlling the cross-border terrorism. The King will shortly ask 
us for substantial quantities of military equipment and if we don’t provide it, [he] says he will 
go anywhere he can get it. So the Israelis have left us with a tremendous bill on our hands. 
We’d be entirely justified in suspending all aid to Israel simply to offset that bill.371 
While the NSC recommendation was being discussed in Washington, the situation in Jordan 
was deteriorating. The CIA warned of the very potential threat of a coup or assassination 
attempt in Jordan’s heated political atmosphere.372 Not only had the Jordanian army been 
humiliated in the fighting against the IDF, King Hussein’s personal pride had taken a beating. 
In the secret contact with Israeli officials, Hussein had developed a sense of trust and 
understanding with the Israelis. After Samu, the king believed Israel had been dishonest from 
the beginning, and the raid assured him that his fear of Israeli designs on the West Bank and 
Jerusalem was justly founded.
373
 Samu shattered the king’s belief in Israel, and all direct 
contact broke down.
374
 His moderation toward Israel seemed to diminish, but even faced with 
violent opposition, Hussein vowed not to retaliate. The king believed that the only way he 
could reassert himself was by giving new hardware to the army.
375
 Jordan was once more 
approached by Soviet offers of massive military equipment at low costs, and King Hussein 
stated he would accept weapons from ““the devil himself”” if necessary.376 However, King 
Hussein was cautious of giving the Soviets an entrance on the already tense political scene 
and asked the US for a substantial increase in arms support.
377
  
When the Israeli Ambassador to the US, Avraham Harman, explained in Washington the 
reasons for the raid, Rusk replied “what you have done in the name of your security seems in 
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fact to have undermined Israel’s security.”378 The rift between the US and Israel was growing, 
but it had not yet brought any positive consequences for Jordan, and it had not resulted in any 
negative consequences for Israel. The discussion on how to face up to Israel’s aggression 
revealed that a sufficient stance would destroy the very essence of the US-Israeli relationship, 
a cost the administration was not willing to pay. The debate on whether or not to suspend 
arms deliveries to Israel finally concluded that such an announcement would have costly 
consequences for the pending Jordanian arms request, and by extension the entire Middle East 
arms support program.
379
  
The initial sympathies with Jordan faded out as the US retreated to its original position of 
trying to appear impartial. In so doing the US signaled that aggression would not be tolerated 
but that it would not have any consequences for the US-Israel relationship, a lesson Israel 
studied thoroughly. Rusk informed the Middle East embassies that the US would not suspend 
deliveries and that for now, in search of other means to give Jordan psychological backing, a 
reply to King Hussein’s request for new arms was postponed.380  
Strengthening Jordan 
The criticality of the situation in Jordan reached the administration from the US Embassy in 
Amman. The reports read that King Hussein was considering an all-out attack on Israel, or at 
least an increase in military spending which in the embassy’s opinion would run the risk of 
political suicide or bankruptcy.
381
 The Johnson administration had to quickly abandon the 
idea of purely psychological backing. To strengthen the king, to keep him in the Western 
camp, and to prevent him from attacking Israel, the administration agreed to speed up the 
planned delivery of arms.
382
 On November 24, 1966 Rusk informed Hussein of the decision, 
but he stressed that the expedited delivery did not symbolize US approval of an increased 
military buildup and the equipment to be delivered would only be already agreed-upon items 
under contract.
383
  
King Hussein was deeply troubled by Rusk’s reluctance to expand the arms support and again 
sent his commander in chief, General Amer Kammash, to Washington to emphasize that 
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Jordan and indeed Hussein himself needed American arms to survive in the Western camp. 
Kammash met Rusk on November 29, 1966 and said that Jordan’s defense needs were more 
acute than they had been at any time in King Hussein’s reign and that the king would rather 
risk death at war against Israel than having to fight his own people.
384
 The newly appointed 
Ambassador to Jordan, Findley Burns Jr., had warned the king that an attack on Israel would 
mean suicide and not preserve his regime at all, but the king had replied, “I know that, but 
there could come a point when I would say to hell with the regime. Let’s go down fighting 
our enemies instead of our own people.”385 Rusk said the US was deeply concerned for the 
stability of Jordan and that Israel’s attack on Samu had no sympathy in the US, but the US did 
not agree with King Hussein’s suspicion of Israel’s ambitions for the West Bank. Rusk 
expressed sympathy with Jordan’s renewed arms request but said that an expansion of arms 
support was a decision that could not be taken hastily.
386
 
Rostow suggested putting together a symbolic arms package in order to bolster King 
Hussein’s domestic position, but he did not acknowledge an Israeli plot on the West Bank. 
Rostow therefore suggested a limited arms package comprised of some minor additions to 
items already under contract.
387
 The Joint Chiefs concurred that a full compliance with 
Kammash’s request was out of the question, but they too recommended an expedited delivery 
of arms that could serve as a deterrent against future Israeli retaliations and give Jordan more 
effective measures to curb Fatah operations into Israel.
388
 While the limited package was 
under discussion, Israel raised objections to a sudden increase in Jordan’s arsenal, however 
limited, and said it would disrupt the delicate military balance on the border. Rostow stated 
that “we are only picking up the pieces in a mess they created” and rejected the Israeli 
complaints.
389
  
It was not only Israel’s possible interest in the West Bank which worried King Hussein. The 
Palestinian population on the West Bank flocked to the Egyptian-supported leadership of the 
PLO, which many Palestinians now saw as a viable alternative to Hashemite rule.
390
 Israel’s 
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raid had enabled the PLO to “pose a deadly threat to [Jordan].”391 King Hussein was deeply 
disturbed by the situation and on December 10, 1966 Ambassador Burns was called to meet 
King Hussein in his private residence.
392
 Throughout the meeting the king had tears in his 
eyes, and Burns reported that he was on the brink of breakdown. The king had contemplated 
his alternatives if the US could not help him. The first was to turn east, but Hussein stated that 
“[i]f in the end Jordan feels she must turn to the East, it would have to be under someone else, 
not with me.”393 The second alternative was to attack those who opposed the legitimacy of his 
rule, meaning Egypt and Syria. Although he reportedly expressed no concern for his own life 
in such an event, he said he did not have the resources to carry it through. The third and most 
appealing option for Hussein was to declare the West Bank a semi-autonomous region under 
military government and call upon all Arab states to take an active part in protecting the 
area.
394
  
The West Bank was the monument of his grandfather’s legacy and housed the majority of 
Jordan’s industry, and it is unlikely that King Hussein would have gone through with such a 
plan.
395
 However, it would allow him to distribute the blame to all Arab states and the 
Palestinians themselves in the event Israel raided again.
396
 It would thereby stifle the criticism 
against his regime as he would not have the sole responsibility to protect the West Bank and 
its citizens. Moreover, it would complicate Israeli attempts to seize the West Bank, which 
King Hussein sincerely believed it wanted.
397
 Hussein acknowledged that the alternative was 
unattractive and stressed the need for a favorable reply to his arms request which would 
obviate the need for carrying it through. Burns picked up signs that the king nursed a growing 
sense of suspicion of the US. King Hussein inquired if the US did not realize “the seriousness 
of the situation” or the “potent desires of others to … liquidate Jordan?”398 Was there in fact 
nothing more Johnson could do to relax Israel’s aggression? King Hussein was probably 
closer to the truth than he realized when he, according to Burns, said, “we are so closely tied 
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to Israel, and the Israelis can generate such pressure on us, that this is a powerful inhibiting 
factor in our ability to respond to the King’s request for assistance.”399  
Burns’ cautions were heeded. On December 13, 1966 McNamara informed Kammash of the 
expedited delivery of an arms package which now included riot control equipment, fifteen 
vehicles with mounted machine guns, one hundred recoilless rifles and five F-104 
Starfighters.
400
 Kammash was still not impressed and said the loyalty of the army was in 
question: “The Jordan Army was humiliated by the raid of November 13 and this has caused 
the people of Jordan to view the Army with suspicion; it has also caused the Army to question 
King Hussein’s leadership and his policy of moderation toward Israel.”401  
The attempt to salvage the American image of impartiality was too little and too late to 
persuade King Hussein that Israel did not take precedence over Jordan in the US Middle East 
policy.
402
 Nonetheless, by December 21, 1966 the terms of the limited arms package was 
successfully negotiated.
403
 The Jordanian air force did not have adequate training or the 
necessary facilities for maintaining the new aircraft. Moreover, there were no Jordanian 
airmen trained to pilot the five F-104 Starfighters which were hastily delivered ahead of 
schedule during the first few months of 1967.
404
 Although the package was far less than what 
he had hoped for and putting aside the fact that the aircraft would remain out of operation for 
some time, King Hussein believed the dramatic effects of an express arms airlift would help 
restore the loyalty of his army.
405
 Although the US tried to reiterate Israel’s assurances that 
the West Bank was of no interest to them, Hussein’s belief that Israel in fact had changed its 
policies had taken deep roots.
406
 
No Calm before the Storm 
Israel claimed that the effects of the raid on Samu had been unintentional, and American 
officials hoped for a change in Israel’s reaction to infiltrations. However, tensions on the 
borders still spurred domestic pressure on the Israeli government to continue the policy of 
retaliation. The Syrian border caused the most difficult and most pressing issues as 1967 
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began, but in contrast to the secrecy around the raid on Samu, the Israeli government now 
warned the US that it would soon be forced to act against Syria. Rostow acknowledged that a 
successful restraining effort on Israel meant putting the US-Israel relationship on the line, 
which both he and Johnson wanted to avoid.
407
 Unwilling to risk domestic criticism by taking 
a harder line on Israel, the Johnson administration was thereby left without any means to 
dissuade Israel from retaliations. On January 17, 1967 Israel informed the US that the 
government, with great indignation, had called off a retaliatory strike after Syrian infiltrators 
had killed one Israeli and opened fire on Israeli vessels on Lake Tiberias in the north.
408
 The 
US was unaware of the fact that Israel was responsible for nearly 80 percent of the fighting in 
the border areas, by provoking the Syrians to open fire and then attacking with large-scale 
operations.
409
 The US therefore praised Israel for its brave policy of restraint and asked Israel 
to draw the same conclusion the US had: 
We believe that the evidence from years past demonstrates that military retaliation is not the 
answer to this problem. We have already seen enough of the present pattern of events in the 
Middle East to realize that armed reprisals not only fail to put a halt to terrorism, but on the 
contrary, strengthen the radical and irresponsible forces in the Arab societies that provide a 
favorable climate for terrorist activities.
410
 
To improve its border patrol capability, Israel approached the US for 200 armored personnel 
carriers (APCs) in January 1967.
411
 The Joint Chiefs informed McNamara that even with the 
expedited deliveries of arms and aircraft to Jordan, there was no reason the US should 
accommodate the request. Another arms sale to Israel would only escalate the tensions on the 
border and also discredit America’s support to King Hussein.412 In fact, the Joint Chiefs stated 
that for the next four to five years Israel had the defensive strength to withstand any attack 
from any Arab state or a collective attack by all of them.
413
 Moreover, Israel had several times 
brushed away the American team of inspectors it had agreed to allow visit the Dimona 
reactor.
414
 With that in mind, the Department of Defense advised against selling the APCs. 
The State Department could accept selling one hundred APCs, but only if Israel accepted 
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periodic inspection.
415
 If that could not be guaranteed, the State Department would vote 
against furnishing Israel’s request.416  
Rostow sided with Rusk and McNamara, but he was a pragmatist and reintroduced the 
periodic inspection of Israel’s nuclear reactor into the US-Israel relationship. Rostow advised 
Johnson that Israel should officially declare the peaceful intent of their nuclear program 
before the US would offer them additional military hardware: “So far the Israelis have 
succeeded in keeping this apart from the rest of our relationship.”417 Rostow stated that “Israel 
has never leveled with us on its nuclear intent.… But we know enough to be seriously 
concerned.”418 In the end, Israel grudgingly accepted American inspectors to the Dimona 
reactor. On May 8, 1967 the inspectors reported back finding no evidence of an Israeli nuclear 
weapons program, but Rostow cautioned that “there are enough unanswered questions to 
make us want to avoid getting locked in too closely with Israel.”419 Rostow still warned 
against the sale of APCs, and he relayed the State Department’s concerns for American oil 
interests in the region and “our obligations to our Arab friends.”420 However, even Rostow’s 
pragmatic influence and understanding for the domestic concerns could not prevent Israel 
from keeping nuclear issues out of the US-Israel relationship: On May 23, 1967 Johnson 
approved the sale of one hundred APCs to Israel, once more without a formal agreement on 
periodic inspections of the Dimona reactor.
421
  
The raid on Samu marked a severe change in King Hussein’s assessments of Israel. Having 
kept back-channel meetings with Israeli officials since 1963, the king sincerely believed that 
Israel supported his regime and that a stable Jordan was in Israel’s interest. After the raid on 
Samu, all Hussein’s trust in Israel vanished. In the king’s view, Israel had betrayed Jordan and 
eliminated all hopes of peaceful coexistence, and the raid also drove Hussein to question the 
US and its policies. President Johnson’s domestic dilemma was that a pro-Israel policy could 
generate popularity whereas a pro-Jordan policy brought only negative domestic 
consequences. Unwilling, unable, or both, the US failure to address the problems between 
Israel and Jordan allowed the situation to disrupt the status quo. Jordan had lost its silent 
supporter in Israel, and American support was not nearly as strong as the king felt he needed. 
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Faced with intense criticism from Egypt and Syria, King Hussein could no longer afford to 
stand alone as the only moderate on Israel’s border. However reluctantly, the king felt forced 
to look around for new friends. He came to believe that closer alignment with Nasser was in 
his own and in Jordan’s best interest.422  
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Chapter 5: Loss of Options 
A brief period of stability followed in the wake of Samu, but Israeli insecurity was soon again 
accentuated when Syrian-sponsored Fatah infiltrators stepped up their campaign and launched 
a large number of infiltrations into Israel.
423
 Continued infiltration reaffirmed Israel’s reliance 
on reprisals, and the Arab states had started pointing fingers at each other for not resisting 
Israeli reprisals. Once more the Arab rivalry troubled King Hussein. The large riots in the 
wake of Samu had demonstrated public support for more forceful opposition against Israel.
424
 
Although the raid had destroyed the de facto peace with Israel and made the Jordanian people 
increasingly receptive to calls for confrontation against Israel, King Hussein still did not share 
Egypt and Syria’s calls for Israel’s destruction.425 After all, Jordan’s army units had been 
badly humiliated by the Israeli Defense Forces in the short battle for Samu.
426
  
Syria was for some time alone in pressing for Arab action against Israel.
427
 Although it had 
been limited, the American assistance in the wake of Samu enabled King Hussein to disregard 
Syria’s aggressive propaganda, but Hussein’s longtime rival in Nasser intensified his criticism 
of Jordan’s permissiveness toward Israel.428 However, American support of King Hussein was 
absent when in the late spring of 1967 Egypt finally committed to Syria’s position. Unwilling 
to risk isolation and uncertain of American support, Hussein eventually believed his position 
could best be preserved by Nasser’s side. The US suddenly faced a united Arab world, firmly 
committed to action against Israel. Johnson faced a question of the primacy of policy pillars 
that potentially could unveil his administration’s image of impartiality.  
How did the US face the challenge when strategic interests directly opposed the American 
sympathy and commitment to Israel? Why did the US keep to the sidelines when tensions 
were rising, and how did that affect the US-Jordan relationship? What consequences did the 
American distance have for a postwar settlement between Israel and King Hussein?  
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Rising Tension in the Arab Rivalry 
Although Jordan had been largely sidelined after Samu, Arab unity was on a high tide during 
1967, but it was Syria rather than Egypt that had become the most vocal advocate for action 
against Israel. In the wake of Samu, Nasser launched a propaganda campaign against Jordan 
in an attempt to reassert his supremacy in the Arab world, but during the spring of 1967, Syria 
still wielded the heaviest appeal among Jordan’s Palestinians. On the Syrian border, Israel 
provoked the Syrians by ordering Israeli vehicles into the demilitarized zone, and when the 
Syrians eventually opened fire, Israel then had an excuse to launch attacks.
429
 Contrary to 
what Syria hoped Nasser was reluctant to extend support against Israeli reprisals. As a result, 
the driving force behind Arab nationalism was gradually losing his primacy in the inter-Arab 
rivalry.
430
 Nasser’s reticent position enabled King Hussein to resist the aggressive 
propaganda, but the riots after Samu had left Hussein even more cautious of Arab nationalist 
influence in Jordan.
431
 
Syria realized its sponsorship of the Fatah guerilla and the border skirmishes could very well 
lead to a full-scale Israeli attack. It therefore secured Egypt on its side. On November 4, 1966 
Syria and Egypt signed a defense treaty to the widespread applause of the Palestinians and 
Arabs.
432
 However, Nasser was reluctant to accept Syria’s propaganda for an all-out attack on 
Israel. He believed that before any action against Israel could have any chance of success, the 
Arab armies had to equal Israel’s military strength, and there had to be firm unity in the Arab 
armies.
433
 As he time and again stayed his hand, Nasser drew heavy criticism from his 
defense partner in Syria.
434
 Similar to the situation in Jordan, Egypt too was under increasing 
nationalist pressure, and rather than containing Syria’s aggression, Nasser was being moved 
by it.
435
  
When Nasser stayed his hand while Israeli fighters in April 1967 shot down six Syrian aircraft 
near Damascus, Syria and Egypt clashed.
436
 The internal struggle between Syria pressing for 
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an ill-considered attack and Nasser’s urging for restraint only strengthened Syria’s leadership 
in the rivalry between them. It led to massive criticism throughout the Arab world against 
Egypt’s inaction, and King Hussein used the opportunity to declare Nasser no better than 
himself when directly faced with Israeli aggression.
437
 Nasser’s prestige was in rapid decline. 
To shore up his position as the leading figure in the Arab world, Nasser took a series of steps 
that neither he nor Hussein eventually could resist the consequences of.
438
 Hussein felt forced 
to jump on Nasser’s bandwagon in order to secure his own position when Nasser embarked 
on “brinkmanship that went over the brink”.439  
The first step toward the brink was taken when the Soviet Union falsely reported of Israeli 
troop movement on the Syrian border in mid-May 1967. Nasser saw an opportunity to seize 
control of the events and ordered the evacuation of the United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF) stationed in the Sinai Desert since the Suez War in 1956.
440
 Shortly after, Egyptian 
troops reoccupied the Sinai and were ordered to dig in without any international buffer force 
between them and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
441
 It was a step designed to demonstrate 
Egyptian support to Syria in the event Israel did plan to attack, but also to reassert Egypt as 
the leading force in the Arab world. As Nasser seemed to be preparing for war against Israel, 
King Hussein had to face up to challenging considerations of whether to oppose or to join 
Nasser.
442
 Opposition meant dissociation and criticism from his own people who were “swept 
along with the rising tide of Arab nationalism.”443 Joining Nasser would strengthen Hussein’s 
shattered popularity among Jordanians, Palestinians, and foreign Arabs alike, but it potentially 
implied facing a superior Israel in battle.
444
 It took another two weeks before Hussein made 
his decision. 
Israel was alarmed by Nasser’s move, and having demonstrated its unilateralism at Samu, 
Washington worried of the sudden escalation of tension. The American Embassy in Cairo 
reported that the Egyptian buildup on Israel’s southern border was an attempt to demonstrate 
support to Syria and not aimed at an attack on Israel.
445
 The embassy reported that Egypt 
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would not be the first to attack Israel, but if Israel attacked another Arab state, Egypt might 
intervene.
446
 The State Department relayed the report to Israel along with American 
intelligence estimates which reassured that Egypt’s positions were defensive in nature. In 
spite of American reassurances, Israel, attempting to persuade the administration that Nasser 
threatened Israel’s security, continuously sent conflicting intelligence estimates to 
Washington.
447
 Rostow was aware that the Arab rivalry would force Egypt to take action if 
Israel retaliated against Syrian-sponsored infiltrations:  
[Nasser’s] brinksmanship stems from two causes: (1) The Syrians are feeding Cairo 
erroneous reports of Israeli mobilization to strike Syria. Regrettably, some pretty militant 
public threats from Israel by Eshkol and others have lent credibility to the Syrian reports. (2) 
Nasser probably feels his prestige would suffer irreparably if he failed a third time to come to 
the aid of an Arab nation attacked by Israel.
448
  
The gravity of the situation was critical, but Rostow cautioned that it might very well be an 
Israeli raid on Syria that would drag in Egypt and ignite a full-scale war.
449
 Johnson urged 
Eshkol to avoid retaliation against the infiltrations and cautioned that unilateral action had no 
support from his administration.
450
 
The riots and unrest after Samu made King Hussein believe that he would have to commit to 
the Arab camp, however radical it turned out, if another showdown was forced on him.
451
 The 
king wanted to avoid being dragged into an armed confrontation with Israel, because the 
present turmoil provided perfect cover “for an Israeli attack on anyone of their choosing.”452 
Hussein was referring to his suspicion that Israel wanted to acquire the West Bank, but the 
question was whether the fear of losing a battle against Israel would outweigh the fear of 
being scapegoated by Egypt if he did nothing. In a meeting with US Ambassador Findley 
Burns Jr. in Amman on May 18, 1967, the king said that if Israel attacked Syria, and if Egypt 
did not attack Israel, then Jordan would stay out of the matter. However, Hussein believed 
Nasser would not risk discontent and criticism by not attacking and said that when Egypt 
intervened, Jordan would have to take action in order to avoid domestic unrest and foreign 
criticism.
453
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Burns tried to persuade King Hussein to stay his hand even if fighting ensued and said the US 
had no evidence of Israeli plans to attack Jordan nor did it have any interest in the West Bank. 
The king was by no means reassured. In addition to the fear of being scapegoated, King 
Hussein sincerely feared that Israel in any case would attack Jordan to seize the West Bank. 
Hussein inquired what the US would do if his hypothesis proved accurate. Could he count on 
American support against an Israeli capture of the West Bank? Burns said any alteration of 
borders by force would be opposed by the US, but the form of opposition would only be 
considered if the situation arose. Uncertain of the credibility of American support and 
unwilling to allow Israel to capture the West Bank, Hussein sought to avoid a confrontation 
with Israel above all. Nonetheless, the king still feared Nasser’s criticism and domestic 
opposition more than a loss against Israel, and Burns reported that if push came to shove, 
Hussein was intent on supporting Nasser.
454
 
Preserving the Image of Impartiality 
Burns’ report was not observed by most US policymakers until May 30, 1967. Some of the 
reason lay in part with the deteriorating campaign in Vietnam which overshadowed the 
situation in the Middle East.
455
 In the weeks leading up to the Six Day War, the Johnson 
administration’s focus was to avoid Israel from dragging the US into in another issue of the 
same magnitude.
456
 In Middle East policy it seems that the preservation of the image of 
impartiality for the sake of the image of impartiality was the most important issue for the 
administration. Preserving the relationship with Jordan or alleviating the threat Israel 
perceived itself to be under was reduced to secondary concerns.
457
  
On May 19, 1967 the US Embassy in Israel reported that American reassurances of the 
defensive nature of Nasser’s troops in the Sinai had fallen on “deaf ears” in Tel Aviv.458 
Ambassador Barbour reported that Israel seemed to only consider unilateral action:  
I have put to them in strong terms [the] importance [that] they keep their nerve and not do 
anything in their anxiety to heat up the situation further. I have gone so far as to say that their 
professed frustration at this development and apparent fright of [Egypt’s] force now facing 
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them, which although large is obviously not of invasion magnitude, is giving me qualms as to 
their own strictly defensive intentions.
459
 
Time was needed to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, but already on May 22, 1967 Nasser 
closed off the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to all ships under Israeli flag and carrying 
goods to or from Israel.
460
 He had taken the second step toward the brink. Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk realized that in Israeli eyes at least, this was a just cause for a preemptive strike. In 
the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in 1957, Israel declared that infringements on its right to free 
passage of international waters would be interpreted as declarations of war.
461
 The US shared 
Israel’s understanding of the international status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran 
and agreed that the waters should be open to passage for ships of all nations.
462
 The US did 
not, however, view it as a just cause for war. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
and Walt Rostow’s brother, Eugene Rostow, tried to dissuade Israel from losing its nerve: 
“We share your concern about reports that [Egyptian] troops have taken up positions at 
Sharm-el-Sheikh… [but] recall that I pointed out that the presence of [Egyptian] troops on 
[Egyptian] territory is not in itself illegal.”463 Under-Secretary Rostow, though personally 
vehemently pro-Israel, warned that 
464
 
My Government is proceeding in this matter … on the basis that Israel will take no unilateral 
military action at any time. Military operations at this time, in our view, may well lead to 
general hostilities in the area. We are convinced that the issue of the Strait of Tiran must be 
handled as an international matter.
465
 
The CIA observed on May 23 that neither side in the Middle East wanted war, but also that 
neither party supported peace too vigorously. Even Jordan, which had been taught the 
devastating military precision of the IDF at Samu, was intent on attacking Israel if asked to. 
Interestingly, the CIA in briefing the administration did not mention Jordan’s intentions.466 
The CIA merely reported that “the danger lies in the fact that the leaders on each side are 
being moved by the chain of events, rather than controlling those events at this point…war 
can now come from accident, incident, or miscalculation.”467  
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Israel too was preoccupied with Egypt and Syria and did not contemplate that a strike on 
Egypt could force King Hussein to join a war. When Israel once more presented an inflated 
estimate of Egypt’s military strength, Walt Rostow disregarded the report as “a gambit 
intended to influence the US to …provide military supplies… make more public 
commitments to Israel [and]…approve Israeli military initiatives.”468 In America’s eyes, such 
moves would only accelerate Israel’s belief in unilateral action that could possibly force the 
US to join a war on Israel’s side. The top priority was to dissuade Israel from a preemptive 
strike and to preserve the image of impartiality. On May 25, 1967 Barbour reported from Tel 
Aviv that Israel now believed a strike by Syria and Egypt was imminent, and that Israel’s 
Foreign Minister Abba Eban was sent on a mission to Washington with instructions to 
pressure for an American declaration of support or at least an approval of an Israeli first 
strike.
469
 Barbour said Israel’s intelligence held that the “Egyptians and Syrians [are] no 
longer concerned with Aqaba but [are] prepared to launch full scale attack against Israeli 
existence.”470 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk met Eban in Washington early in the morning of May 25, 1967, 
and Rusk said the US did not “really support the belief that an attack by [Egypt] and Syria is 
imminent.”471 After thorough examination of the Israeli intelligence reports there was no 
doubt within Johnson’s administration that the inflated Israeli estimates were an attempt to 
secure American approval for unilateral action that in the US assessment would lead to 
war.
472
 Still, there was no mention of King Hussein’s intention to join such a war. Even so, 
Rusk said the US could not “give assurance along the lines of “an attack on you is an attack 
on us””.473 Eban was disappointed and stressed that Israel was forced to strike or surrender if 
Rusk could not reassure him of American support.
474
 Neither Rusk nor Secretary of Defense 
McNamara, whom Eban met an hour later, was at all willing to allow Israel to take action that 
could jeopardize American interests in the Arab world. McNamara stuck to Rusk’s line and 
declared that “Israel should realize that an Israeli attack under present circumstances would 
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have most serious consequences. We cannot undertake to support Israel if Israel launches an 
attack.”475 
Stalling 
In preparation for Johnson’s meeting with Eban, scheduled for the next day, Rusk delivered a 
briefing paper that mentioned two options for Johnson: either ““unleash”” Israel, which Rusk 
strongly opposed, or firmly commit to a British-sponsored maritime convoy designed to 
challenge and reopen the blockade of the strait.
476
 Rusk supported Britain’s plan for a naval 
task force, but he believed Eban needed “something pretty solid to hold the line against his 
hawks.”477 Since Israel had “absolutely no faith in the possibility of anything useful coming 
out of the U.N”, Rusk believed the US would have to unilaterally commit to reopening the 
strait if Eban should be persuaded.
478
 Unilateral action was unattractive because challenging a 
united Arab world threatened to reveal the strategic veil of the American impartiality, and 
there was a daunting possibility of direct confrontation with Egypt. The British-sponsored 
plan for a multilateral naval task force opted for international cover and was designed to 
secure the rights of free passage through international waters. Rusk advised Johnson to inform 
Eban that Israel had to await the results of the planned naval task force, and that if Israel acted 
prematurely the US would offer neither political nor military assistance.
479
  
At a National Security Council meeting just prior to President Johnson’s meeting with Eban 
on May 26, 1967, Rusk’s suggestion met resistance from Supreme Court Justice and President 
Johnson’s close friend, Abe Fortas. Fortas was ardently pro-Israel, and his advice on Middle 
East policy had long since enjoyed Johnson’s close attention.480 Justice Fortas questioned if 
Johnson had the luxury of stepping aside even if Israel acted on its own, but Johnson was non-
responsive to Fortas’ advice that the US should utilize “whatever force necessary” to reopen 
the Strait.
481
 Johnson ruled out unilateral American action, but since the naval task force still 
was only on the drawing board, Fortas believed that even if Israel acted preemptively the 
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President had a moral obligation to stand by his commitments.
482
 If nothing came of the UN 
or Britain’s naval convoy, the US had, in Fortas’ view, a responsibility to accept a preemptive 
attack by Israel.
483
 
The discussion on what Johnson should tell Eban shifted from supporting the State 
Department’s desire to preserve the strategic interests, and the White House’s desire to 
support Israel.
484
 Johnson decided to heed Rusk’s caution and did not risk sacrificing the 
strategic veil of his administration’s impartiality. An impartial approach was still the preferred 
policy, but the administration would conceal its effort to serve Israel’s interests from a safe 
distance under international cover. After several reschedules Johnson finally met with Eban 
late on the evening of May 26.
485
 Johnson twice repeated the sentence Rusk had coined in the 
briefing paper: “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.”486 Johnson read from 
Rusk’s briefing paper and said the UN “has not yet demonstrated what it may or may not be 
able or willing to do although the United States will press for prompt action in the UN.”487   
Eban returned to Israel with a warning that if Israel went alone, the US would not intervene 
militarily on its side, even if Israel could not handle the situation on its own. If Israel kept its 
nerve, however, the US could offer help either through the UN or a naval convoy. The 
question is whether it also implied that the US would not oppose Israel’s action if Israel went 
alone and the campaign went well. The ambiguity of Johnson’s warning incorporated the 
State Department’s opposition, and Johnson’s reluctant approval, of an Israeli first strike.488 
Coupled with Johnson’s subtle warning against a preemptive strike, a message from Moscow 
added importance to preventing premature Israeli action. A Soviet message to Washington 
read, “[s]hould Israel commit aggression … then we will render aid to those countries that are 
subjected to aggression.”489 Accordingly, Rusk instructed Barbour to seek out Eshkol “at once 
whatever the hour or the circumstances … even if the Cabinet is sitting.”490 It is possible that 
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it was the Soviet message which enabled Barbour to report on late May 28 that “they have 
decided not to go to war at this time.”491  
The administration hoped Israel had decided to await the UN’s results and the naval convoy. 
However, Israel’s impression of being under imminent threat was rapidly accelerated when 
King Hussein and Nasser signed a mutual defense treaty on May 30, 1967. The negotiations 
of the treaty were done simply by replacing the word Syria with the word Jordan in the 
existing Egypt-Syria defense treaty.
492
 The treaty was negotiated, signed and announced 
within a few hours in Cairo. Jordan did not have any credible assurance of American support, 
and paired with his suspicions about Israel’s expansionist ambitions on the West Bank, an 
alliance with Egypt was a logical solution for King Hussein.
493
 Even though the treaty 
reassigned control over the army from Hussein to an Egyptian general, and committed Jordan 
to open a front against Israel in the event of an attack, it also provided Hussein with a 
guarantee that Egypt would support his position on the West Bank. Nasser had given a 
promise that the US had failed to deliver. Moreover, King Hussein’s new course turned the 
public unrest after Samu into widespread popular support.
494
  
In Israel, the Jordanian-Egyptian treaty represented another justification for preemptive 
action.
495
 Eshkol declared to Washington that “a point is being approached at which counsels 
to Israel will lack any moral or logical basis.”496 With yet another threat to its existence, 
Eshkol and Israel could no longer be dissuaded from launching an attack. Eshkol declared that 
the “time is ripe for confronting Nasser with a more intense and effective policy of 
resistance.”497 
For the time being Israel reluctantly abided by the American request to let the naval task force 
take shape. Although Burns nearly two weeks earlier had reported Jordan’s intention to side 
with Egypt in case of war, it seems it was the Jordanian-Egyptian treaty which finally brought 
the unification of the Arab world to the attention of the highest levels of the administration. 
The NSC suddenly questioned the wisdom of aiming to reopen the strait, because challenging 
Nasser directly opposed a unified Arab world wherein economic and geopolitical interests 
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rested. The NSC cautioned that the persistent US push to open the strait would demonstrate 
Israel’s preeminence over the demands of a now united Arab world.498 The NSC warned that 
“[i]nstead of staking our bets on an evenhanded relationship with the Arabs—moderate and 
radical alike—and the Israelis, we are now committed to a course that will more likely than 
not lead us into a head-on clash with a temporarily united Arab world.”499 The NSC did, 
however, present an option that could salvage the image of impartiality:  
The other choice is still to let the Israelis do this job themselves. Eshkol himself says he’ll 
have to go this route within a week or two if we can’t produce. He’s correct that we don’t 
have any right to hold him back longer while his enemy gets stronger unless we’re willing to 
take on the Arabs ourselves … We ought to consider admitting that we have failed and allow 
fighting to ensue.
500
 
Reports from the American embassies in the Middle East supported that the US should at 
least change course. A joint communiqué from the Middle East ambassadors, including Burns 
in Amman, claimed that “field assessments have played no role in policy formulation,” and 
that in spite of the “consensus [of the] most knowledgeable area experts” the current US 
policy “directly opposed short and especially long term US national interests in the area.”501 
The ambassadors, far away from domestic considerations, were definitely more worried of 
US-Arab relations than with Israel’s security. In Washington, policymakers realized the 
American image of impartiality was on the line if the US did not change course. The question 
was what course to take. Eshkol had declared that he no longer could be persuaded from 
acting preemptively, and now the NSC informed Johnson that he no longer could support the 
strait’s opening without risking America’s access to the interests in the Arab world.502 What 
was certain was that any action aimed at only opening the strait would be “thinly veiled [as] 
direct US, UK intervention which destined [to] produce perilous confrontation” with the Arab 
states.
503
  
On June 4, 1967 Walt Rostow introduced a plan to “achieve our objectives in the Middle East 
without an Arab-Israeli war” and “should such …war come about, [it would] produce 
minimum damage to the U.S. position in the world and to our position in our own country, 
including continued support for the war in Viet Nam.”504 Since the naval task force had only 
found four signatories, and in any case demonstrated that the US sided with Israel, Rostow 
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suggested simply taking their hands off the problem and stepping back.
505
 The room for 
maneuver had diminished, but Rostow declared that the “moderate Arabs—and in fact, 
virtually all Arabs who fear the rise of Nasser as a result of the crisis—would prefer to have 
him cut down by the Israelis rather than by external forces.”506 Rostow never mentioned him, 
but King Hussein was one such moderate. Besides, all intelligence reports reassured Johnson 
that Israel would win a military confrontation.
507
 This did not mean that Israel was authorized 
to act unilaterally, but Rostow acknowledged it was “wiser for the Israelis to deal with the 
present situation than it would be for us.”508  
The Battle for the West Bank 
In the early hours on June 5, 1967, only one day after Rostow had recommended stepping 
back, Israel launched an air attack on Egyptian airfields and within hours devastated Egypt’s 
aerial capacity. Egypt falsely reported that it had counterattacked and forced Israel on the 
defensive, and asked its allies to follow suit. Israel had hoped to avoid a clash with Jordan, but 
in the weeks leading up to the Six-Day War neither Israel nor the US had enabled King 
Hussein to withstand the pressure. Besides, Jordan was captive to its alliance with Nasser, and 
Hussein knew all too well the dangerous consequences of not supporting the Arab cause upon 
Egypt’s request.509  
Moreover, Hussein was no longer in command of Jordan’s army. The Egypt-Jordan defense 
treaty had reassigned the chief command to an Egyptian general that was quick to order the 
Jordanian army into combat alongside his Egyptian countrymen. The Jordanian army 
answered Egypt’s call for intervention and from the West Bank launched an artillery 
bombardment against Israel’s positions.510 Israel responded by taking out Jordan’s air force 
before it could leave the runway. Israel’s consequent capture of the West Bank only days later 
took shape as Jordan’s forces were decisively driven on the defensive by the IDF. There was 
no pre-approved plan to capture the territory, and Eshkol only approved of it as the IDF 
advanced in response to the Jordanian artillery shelling.
511
 Most of the West Bank fell to 
Israel on the first day of fighting, but in Jerusalem the Jordanian forces dug in and enforced 
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their positions while King Hussein secretly requested a ceasefire which could secure 
Jordanian control over the West Bank. Hussein also asked the US to intervene against Israel’s 
“punitive” attacks on Jordanian forces.512 
The message from King Hussein was relayed to Tel Aviv later that day.
513
 Rusk asked Israel 
to accommodate Hussein’s request because the “presence of Jordan and the King has been a 
stabilizing influence which I do not believe the Israelis should lightly see go down the 
drain.”514 However, the US realized that Hussein would be put under heavy pressure from the 
other Arab states if he bailed out of the fight so soon after it had begun, and asked Israel to 
keep the his request secret “if [the] King is to maintain control.”515 Despite a UN ceasefire, 
fighting continued in and around Jerusalem.
516
 Both sides blamed the other for breaking it, 
and Israel suggested that had Jordan called for a ceasefire without intending to observe it.
517
 
In fact, the Jordanian units were ordered to dig in and accept any ceasefire while Jordan still 
had nominal control over parts of the West Bank.
518
 Burns reported from Amman that Israel’s 
“suggestion that King [is] deliberately following tactic of deception [is] hardly 
supportable.”519 Personally, however, Burns worried of the consequences of a premature 
ceasefire:  
[Jordan] could have more difficulty maintaining law and order after a cease fire than in the 
absence of one… What will happen when the shattered [army] returns and tells what really 
happened? And what if Nasser calls for Hussein’s overthrow so that Jordan can continue the 
battle?
520
  
In America’s eyes, there was a very real fear that King Hussein could be overthrown or forced 
to abandon his moderation forever. Rusk asked US Ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, 
to question Israel’s continued offensive: “[W]e believe [a] cease-fire must be entirely 
observed lest [the] Jordanian regime disintegrate immediately which we assume [is] not an 
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Israeli objective.”521 Israel was caught off-guard by Jordan’s participation in the war and felt 
betrayed by the king. Israel now had no qualms about his potential removal: “Politically they 
would like to see his disappearance and regard whatever alternative [which] may replace him 
with equanimity.” 522 Hussein was no longer necessary to ensure Israel’s security, but after 
American pressure it conceded that “as of now … it is in their interest for Jordan to remain an 
entity.”523 Nonetheless, Israeli officials had been quick to grasp the opportunities inherent in 
their advances against Jordan. Israel had pushed to gain as much territory as possible, forcing 
Hussein to witness the complete withdrawal of Jordanian forces from the West Bank on June 
8, 1967.
524
   
The Initial Optimism 
When the guns fell silent on all fronts two day later, Jordan had been overwhelmingly 
defeated and the West Bank was lost. The West Bank housed nearly half of Jordan’s industry 
and population and nearly a quarter of Jordan’s arable land.525 In total, the loss of the West 
Bank meant a loss of 40 percent of the Jordanian gross domestic product.
526
 Moreover, nearly 
300,000 Palestinian refugees had fled from the West Bank to the Jordan River’s East Bank.527 
The preliminary reports from the US Embassy in Amman, however, claimed the initial 
numbers to be closer to thirty thousand.
528
 The failure to realize the increased Palestinian 
pressure in Jordan led the US to only observe that King Hussein emerged with a peculiarly 
strengthened position in the Arab world. The king had faithfully fulfilled his duties toward 
Nasser, and he had supported Arab unity. In the vacuum of resignation and defeat which 
spread throughout the Arab world, the Arab rivalry, for a moment at least, no longer 
restrained Hussein’s room for maneuver. By a desire to regain the West Bank by any means 
other than war, Hussein’s moderation triumphed. Even Nasser found his position so severely 
shattered that he gave King Hussein his blessing for informal peace talks between Israel and 
the king.
529
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Rather than immediately pressuring Israel to return the West Bank American officials saw in 
King Hussein’s moderation and the lost prestige of Arab nationalism an opportunity to break 
the Arab-Israeli deadlock once and for all. In a peculiar assumption that the Arab states would 
be more inclined to negotiate with Israel after their humiliating defeat than they had been 
before the war, Johnson believed the Arab-Israeli conflict could be settled for good.
530
 The 
time was ripe for an end of belligerency in the Middle East. As Rostow declared, the US 
“must take full advantage of [the] situation in order to seek progress towards improved 
security both of Israel and the Arab states… certain Arab [governments] are privately not 
unhappy at what has happened to Nasser.”531 King Hussein’s domestic position was safe, he 
had done all he was asked and Jordan came to be viewed as the leverage the US needed to 
make the Arab states enter negotiations.
532
 The US was acutely aware that Israel would not 
give up its new-won security without firm guarantees that another war would not take place, 
but the State Department worried that Israel might seek to adjust its borders to ensure its 
security.
533
 The Israeli government had not yet stated its intentions regarding the future status 
of the occupied territories, and to bring the Arab states to the table the US believed Israel had 
to be willing to exchange land for peace.
534
  
However, the status quo of June 11, 1967 was unquestionably in Israel’s favor, and if the 
Arab leaders were not willing to reach a settlement, Israel could guarantee its own security 
without it. When Barbour replied to the State Department’s inquiry as to what Israel was 
willing to do about the coming “violent and determined effort in the Security Council to 
require Israeli troop withdrawals to previous boundary lines,” the US learned that the only 
way Israel would redeem the conquests was after Arab recognition.
535
 A simple return to the 
explosive situation before the war was in any case unattractive in America’s eyes and 
completely out of question in Israel. The Israeli decision to temporarily hold the occupied 
territories as a bargaining card was accepted in Washington.
536
 Accordingly, the 
administration undertook to work out a formula that made sure Arab recognition would 
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precede Israeli withdrawal.
537
 Johnson was in effect willing to sacrifice the American 
assurances of Jordan’s territorial integrity in the hopes that the Arab-Israeli conflict could be 
settled for good.
538
  
King Hussein’s moderation was the most promising stepping stone on the road to a lasting 
peace, but the king declared, “I cannot begin unless I have public assurances from [the United 
States] that whatever settlement is to be reached through negotiations will not involve 
surrender of the West Bank.”539 On June 12, 1967 King Hussein asked if the US could 
guarantee a return of the West Bank, but Burns replied, “I can promise you nothing 
specific.”540 Still, for Hussein’s interest in a return of the West Bank, Burns furthered the 
Jordan track in Arab-Israeli negotiations: “Hussein … offer[s] interesting possibilities.”541 
However, Burns believed Hussein desperately needed American support to enter negotiations, 
and he therefore recommended Washington to demand Israeli withdrawal only to strengthen 
the king’s position because “Arab moderates are the only actors on the Arab side of the stage 
with whom we can effectively work.”542 
On June 15, 1967 Barbour reported that Israel’s position regarding the occupied territories 
had hardened: “Their primary purpose will be to seek the removal of the restrictions on their 
sovereignty and existence as heretofore demonstrated by the armistice regime which never 
moved forward … to peace treaties.”543 Moreover, Israel was not willing to return the entire 
West Bank even for Jordanian recognition. Israel could only offer some land in exchange for 
full peace.
544
 This was bad news for King Hussein, but it emphasized that if Jordan was 
unwilling to talk along those lines, Israel would hold the West Bank indefinitely.
545
 The 
American consulate in Jerusalem saw little hope in forcing Israel back to the prewar 
boundaries: “while [we are] fully conscious of [the] urgent need to bolster [the] Arab 
moderates, and of US policy re territorial integrity, we must respectfully say that we feel [the] 
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proposals along [the] lines suggested [by] Amman … are wholly unrealistic at this time.”546 
In the consulate’s view it was difficult “to see any power (aside from Soviet armed power, 
which we all hope will not be applied) that could force them out in the foreseeable future.”547 
King Hussein on the Moderate Path 
King Hussein was invited to meet with President Johnson in Washington, where he arrived on 
June 28, 1967.
548
 The King clearly understood that the Arab world was at a turning point. It 
could reach a settlement with Israel and hope to see the occupied territories returned, or it 
could rearm and face Israel another time. The State Department hoped Hussein could be 
persuaded to enter direct negotiations with Israel on his own, but the king was for the moment 
unwilling to risk dissociation from the Palestinians and regional isolation by dealing with 
Israel alone. The king said the “first thing I must do is to try to convince all the Arab leaders 
to adopt a moderate solution. Only if this fails could I consider whether it would be feasible to 
pursue a solution on my own.”549 Hussein did not give any reasons for his need to have 
support from his fellow statesmen, but the increased influence from Palestinians in Jordan 
must have made him cautious.
550
  
Nasser had suffered a humiliating defeat which had drastically reduced his popularity as the 
leading figure of Arab nationalism.
551
 King Hussein’s moderation thrived without the 
Egyptian challenge. However, the Soviet Union resumed arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria, 
thus alleviating the domestic frustration against the radical regimes and reigniting the Arab 
rivalry.
552
 Although Nasser still expressed moderation, Hussein had always been suspicious of 
his motives, and the king was unwilling to risk isolation if Nasser recuperated from Soviet 
support and suddenly revoked his acceptance of Jordan-Israel peace talks. The king’s solution 
was to recruit moderate followers. Time was of the essence, and the US was keenly aware that 
Israel’s position would become increasingly immobile the longer Hussein waited.553  
On July 12, 1967 the State Department declared that the American position now was focused 
on creating a new peaceful status in the Middle East. In so doing it supported that Israel had 
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to withdraw from the occupied territories, but only after establishing a guarantee for the future 
security of all states.
554
 On the best way to proceed in making peace, Secretary of State Rusk 
stated,  
We are not wedded to any particular words or procedures in order to move toward 
achievement of a just and durable peace. The essential assurances can be given publicly or 
privately, through mediators, or through agreements. In the last analysis, a solution cannot be 
imposed from outside: The basic responsibility for achieving peace lies with the governments 
and peoples of the area. We, with other members of the United Nations, stand ready to help 
in any way our friends in the Near East deem helpful.
555
 
Rusk’s statement declared that the Middle East was not an American problem and that the 
hands-off approach was still in effect. Israel was in such a strong position and so widely 
popular on the domestic scene that the US found it best to remain on the sidelines.
556
 On July 
13, 1967 King Hussein was reported to be “prepared to conclude some sort of arrangement 
with the Government of Israel.”557 Although Rusk wanted to avoid becoming too entangled in 
the delicate issues involved, he praised Hussein’s courage in talking with Israel alone and said 
this was the “first important breakthrough toward peace” and that it was “an opportunity … 
not to be lost, offering as it does a chance to embark on a course in the Arab world which 
could lead to an acceptance of Israel by its neighbors and to steps which could well change 
the course of history in the Middle East.”558  
Rusk asked Israel to enter negotiations with an open mind. He had repeatedly tried to alleviate 
the Arab states’ fear of Israeli expansionism, Jordan in particular, and now feared that Israel’s 
interest in the occupied territories would turn him into a “liar.”559 He wanted to exert greater 
pressure on Israel and believed that “[t]he more moderate and generous the position of Israel 
tomorrow, the greater the chance that there can be a good result from Hussein’s new 
readiness.”560 The CIA cautioned that Rusk’s fears might be rightly founded and informed the 
administration that Israel’s willingness to trade away the occupied territory in return for 
recognition depended on more than simply King Hussein’s attitude:  
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The Israelis may hope that the Arabs (and the Soviets) will draw the “correct” conclusion 
from the recent war, and that a new order will emerge in the area which will involve 
acceptance of the Israeli state and assurances for its security. But so far there are few 
indications that any such new order is emerging, and unless it does, Israel must sooner or 
later face the problem of how to assure its security.
561
 
The CIA warned that if the Soviet campaign to recuperate its partners in Egypt and Syria 
turned out successful, the Arab world would return to its rivalries and moderation would 
quickly vanish.
562
 The Israeli reply to Rusk’s suggestion for talks with King Hussein was far 
from the optimism Rusk had hoped for. Foreign Minister Eban did not share Rusk’s 
enthusiasm for Hussein’s peace-feeler.563 Hussein’s inclination to talk with Israel on his own 
was welcomed, but Prime Minister Eshkol had doubts about its prospects for success. The two 
sides were far apart, and Eshkol wanted Hussein to present a more specific framework for the 
talks.
564
  
Intermediary without Influence 
In light of Israel’s cold response to Jordan’s peace-feeler, Ambassador Burns wanted to know 
before advising King Hussein to proceed, if there was real reason to believe that Israel in fact 
was willing to give concessions on the West Bank.
565
 The reply from the administration was 
that Israel was too ambivalent. The Israeli position was marred by suspicion of King Hussein, 
Nasser’s intentions and Israel’s own interests in Jerusalem and the West Bank.566 
Nonetheless, Hussein reiterated his interest in peace some days later by presenting specific 
conditions for his talks with Israel. The king wanted a return of the West Bank and the Old 
City of Jerusalem to Jordan, and in exchange he could offer minor border adjustments.
567
 
Rostow said Israel had “a duty to come to grips with the Hussein offer promptly.”568  
Israel’s response was non-committal, and Hussein was “deeply disappointed” when Burns 
reported of Israel’s reservations.569 At a meeting in Amman on July 27, 1967 Burns said the 
US could not guarantee that neither a return of Jerusalem nor the West Bank would emerge 
from Jordan-Israel talks. Hussein stated his belief that the US would make good on its 
assurances that forced border alterations would be opposed. In the king’s assessment, Burns’ 
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reports signaled diminishing American support for his regime. Moreover, King Hussein 
suspected that Nasser might try to exploit the opportunity to scapegoat him if he started 
negotiations and betrayed Arab unity, and he acknowledged that the grueling differences with 
Israel on the question of Jerusalem could mean risking his domestic position. He hoped that 
firm American support would enable him to take these risks, but when presented with Burns’ 
reports, Hussein declared that his position was “too weak to undertake bilateral negotiations 
with the Israelis at this moment.”570  
The first real move toward peace had slipped, and the American focus shifted back to Israel. 
While Israel was never subjected to substantial pressure, there was increasing frustration in 
the State Department over Israel’s lack of interest in a settlement with Jordan, a settlement 
which was so much in Israeli and American interest. Rusk asked Israel to demonstrate its 
declared intention to search for peace rather than territorial gains.
571
 However, the chance for 
a change in Israel’s policy was even more illusory than before the outbreak of the war. 
Whereas the State Department, the Department of Defense and the White House had called 
for a peaceful solution before the outbreak of war, the White House was now highly sensitive 
to reports that carried evidence of Israel’s immense popularity on the domestic scene.572 Even 
if the White House had coordinated with the interests of the State Department, it seems 
unlikely to have brought about a change in Israel’s position. As Rostow informed, at “the 
present time the criterion of security was overriding in Israeli government discussions—
security in the literal short-run sense. From that perspective, holding the West Bank was quite 
attractive, although, in the long run, it might well be judged less attractive.”573 Barbour 
agreed, and reported that Israel seemed to be more “interested in holding real estate than in 
solving basic problems.”574 
Israel believed King Hussein had called for an Arab summit meeting in order to gain Arab 
and international support for a “pro-Jordanian settlement.”575 The US had come to accept that 
Hussein was not “free to settle with Israel entirely by himself” and supported the king’s 
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attempt to obtain such support from other Arab states.
576
 Moreover, Hussein’s moderation 
was under pressure from the resurfacing Arab rivalry, and while Nasser and the king were still 
on the same side, the PLO and Syria had taken leadership in the radical camp.
577
 Faced with 
an increasing population of Palestinians, Hussein was desperate to present negotiations with 
Israel as a collective Arab decision and not one of his own. Nasser’s battered prestige put him 
in a similar position and together they tried to make a moderate position prevail.
578
 The US 
hoped the moderate position would triumph at the planned Arab Summit in Khartoum and 
that a multilateral moderate Arab position could force Israel into a more accommodative 
position.
579
 Rusk tried to reinforce the moderate Arab states: 
[The United States is] hopeful that at the Khartoum meetings the full range of possibilities 
can be explored in a constructive atmosphere. We are confident a start can be made if a 
sufficient number of states determine not to be deterred from this purpose. It may be a long 
time before all the issues which lie at the heart of the Arab-Israel problem can be fully and 
justly resolved. In the meantime there is no reason for the Arab states to place unnatural 
obstacles in the path of their own progress and growth.
580
 
On September 1, 1967 the Arab Summit in Khartoum declared that the Arab states would not 
end their belligerence with Israel, there would be no direct negotiations and no peace with 
Israel.
581
 The official US interpretation was that the Khartoum Declaration was in the interest 
of peace. It did not call for another round of fighting, but it only addressed what the Arab 
states not were willing to do, there was no mention of how the Arab states could embark on 
the road to peace.
582
 King Hussein read the declaration to mean no direct negotiations and not 
a formal peace treaty, but in King Hussein’s view at least, neither negotiations nor an 
agreement was ruled out.
583
  
However, the three noes from Khartoum were heavily propagated in Israel as a continued 
state of war between Israel and the Arab states, and it opted for perfect cover to avoid 
negotiations.
584
 Partly to show the US it was less interested in territory than in peace, Israel 
secretly kept the door open to negotiations with Jordan. Israel made it clear that a return to the 
prewar status was out of question but nonetheless expressed interest in a settlement with King 
                                                 
576
 Ibid. 
577
 Meital, "The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 War." 72. 
578
 Ibid. 76-77. 
579
 State Department to Certain Posts, August 24, 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 19, Document 426. 
580
 Ibid. 
581
 The Khartoum Declaration, September 1, 1967, accessed April 8, 2015. 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1FF0BF3DDEB703A785257110007719E7.  
582
 President Johnson to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, September 25, 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 19, 
Document 447. 
583
 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan. 268. 
584
 Shlaim, The Iron Wall. 258–259. 
   
100 
Hussein.
585
 However, by October 1, 1967 Hussein was the one who stalled. In his view, time 
was not ripe for peace talks. Hussein’s accommodative attitude and desire to reach an 
agreement with Israel was “ahead of [his] people in appreciating the implications of [his] 
recent defeat.”586 Hussein could not disregard the opinion of his large Palestinian population 
which after the Six-Day War nearly comprised the majority of Jordan’s population. The tables 
had turned again. The US was well aware of the limitations of Israel’s willingness to concede 
control of the West Bank, and of its own inability and unwillingness to change Israel’s 
position. Therefore, the administration did not pressure Hussein to start negotiations that most 
observers now realized had slim chances of success.
587
  
Peace Process Theater 
The last remaining hope for Johnson’s administration to withdraw from the Middle East 
without revealing the image of impartiality and concentrate on Vietnam was if the UN 
adopted a formula both sides could accept. There were several drafts competing for the UN 
Security Council’s adoption, and most only called for a simple withdrawal and made no 
mention of Arab recognition of Israel. Such resolutions were unacceptable to Israel but widely 
popular among the Arab states. The Arab states wanted Israeli withdrawal to precede 
negotiations, but Israel refused to retreat to the prewar boundaries without recognition.
588
 The 
US was well aware of that fact but equally aware that a resolution that only addressed 
withdrawal would be discarded by Israel, thus bringing the potential peace process to a 
premature end. Moreover, the Arab states claimed they were justified in expecting the US to 
honor its pledge to support the territorial integrity of the Middle East. President Johnson 
acknowledged that his pledge was still a principle but stated that its implementation was 
easier said than done. In contrast to the Arab states’ expectations, Johnson’s administration, 
according to the President himself, simply did not have a lot of influence on Israel.
589
  
While different resolutions were drafted in the UN corridors, King Hussein’s moderation was 
waning. He felt betrayed and unjustly discriminated by what he saw as US double standards. 
The king claimed that the American position demonstrated unwavering support for Israel. 
Hussein wanted the West Bank returned to Jordan, and he wanted the US to guarantee that to 
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him. He wanted Johnson to make good on his pledge for Jordan’s territorial integrity, but he 
was still willing to negotiate with Israel to achieve his objective.
590
 Johnson was not willing to 
make such a guarantee. The US only observed that Hussein’s moderation was crumbling in 
the face of Israel’s continued occupation but made no significant effort to change Israel’s 
position.
591
  
When Palestinians attacked Israeli positions on the occupied West Bank, all hopes of 
Jordanian-Israeli reconciliation vanished. Rostow informed Johnson that the Israelis “have 
nothing more to say to Hussein.”592 The frustrated State Department’s patience had run out, 
and Rusk wanted to enforce a much tougher line on Israel. The arguments in favor of a tough 
line were compelling: Oil revenues from the Arab states would be secured, and the US could 
honor its commitment of territorial integrity, keep the Arab world out of Moscow’s hands and 
make the US-Israel relationship a two way street again. The arguments in favor of continuing 
the US-Israeli relations, troubled as they were, also had significant political appeal: First of all 
it would be nearly impossible to force Israel to return to the prewar armistice lines, even if 
they could be negotiated into permanent boundaries. Second, any hard line on Israel would 
likely destroy Johnson’s and the Democratic Party’s chances for reelection in 1968, and it 
would accelerate the opposition’s criticism of Johnson’s campaign in Vietnam. The State 
Department and Department of Defense pulled in the same direction. Rusk even supported 
forcing Israel back to the prewar lines, and McNamara suggested resuming arms deliveries to 
Jordan, which had been cancelled at the outbreak of war, in spite of Israeli objections.
593
  
The discussion remained a thought experiment, and once more domestic considerations 
outweighed strategic interests. Such interests were after all still safeguarded, the Soviet 
Union’s prestige in the region had taken a hit with the Arab defeat, and the Arab states 
continued to export oil to the west. As a result, Johnson continued to keep the Israel pillar 
disproportionally strong against the wishes of the State Department and Department of 
Defense. Even Rostow warned that “Israel will take such a hard position that it will kill [the] 
chances for a settlement”, but Johnson did not change the nature of the US-Israel relationship; 
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he accepted Israel’s position and never entertained the option to pressure Israel to 
withdraw.
594
  
In a last effort to find a basis for a UN formula that would enable the Johnson administration 
to retreat from the painful situation without damaging the image of impartiality, Rusk decided 
to hold Eban to his word that Israel indeed sought a deal with King Hussein. Eban reluctantly 
agreed.
595
 To secure Hussein’s acceptance of the proposed resolution to the UN Security 
Council, Rusk informed the king that the US in effect was willing to “make a maximum effort 
to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of [a] settlement with Israel.”596 Hussein 
was more inclined to accept a resolution that only called for Israeli withdrawal, but reassured 
of American support he stated he would accept the carefully negotiated resolution in the event 
of its adoption.
597
  
When the UN Security Council convened on November 15, 1967, Britain tabled a proposal 
incorporating the essence of the American draft resolution. Jordanian support and Israel’s 
reluctant approval had been secured before the vote was cast. The UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 was unanimously passed on November 22, 1967. The resolution called for 
“withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” an end of 
belligerence, and a UN mediator in working for a lasting settlement.
598
 However, the precise 
language of the resolution was so ambiguous and so vague that Israel could easily dispute it. 
Still, Resolution 242 was enough to enable the Johnson administration to retreat from the 
Middle East, and for the coming year it worked only symbolically to pin Israel to concrete 
interpretations of the resolution.
599
 
UN Resolution 242 was the blueprint for negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. The 
Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring was assigned the role as UN mediator. However, Israel had 
in secrecy declared to the US that it had no interest in a peace treaty with Egypt or Syria. 
Jordan was the only country Israel might be interested in striking a deal with. Moreover, 
Jarring’s mission had no support in the Israeli government, and Israel used the ambiguity of 
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Resolution 242 to make sure Jarring remained busy sorting out both Arab and Israeli 
interpretations of it. The Jarring Mission opted for a cover under which Israel could hide its 
true intentions, or lack thereof. By signaling willingness to negotiate, Israel prevented the 
matter from being returned to the UN, where the country would be blamed for the failed peace 
process. The Jarring Mission was effectively reduced to a mere peace process theater, 
precisely what Israel had hoped for.
600
 
President Johnson’s Last Year in the Middle East 
Even though President Johnson did nothing to effect negotiations or to make Israel withdraw, 
his administration tried to make Israel release its grip on the West Bank. When Eshkol arrived 
in Texas in January 1968 to request thirty F-4 Phantom fighters, Johnson declared he could 
not support “an Israel that sits tight.”601 Rusk too, was tired of Israel’s lack of interest in a 
settlement and said there would be no more arms sales until Israel clarified its interpretation 
of Resolution 242 and accepted the necessity of returning the occupied territories in exchange 
for settlements.
602
  
After it had proven unwilling or unable to offer significant help in securing a return of the 
West Bank, King Hussein had lost faith in the US. To effect a change in America’s perception 
of Jordan, the king again threatened with turning to the Soviet Union, this time to make Israel 
rethink the wisdom of holding the West Bank under the threat of a closed circle of Soviet-
sponsored regimes.
603
 The Cold War game succeeded once more. To show the king he had 
not been completely deserted, the Johnson administration lifted the arms embargo and 
resumed the delivery of arms that were under contract.
604
  
By March 1968, the President’s campaign in Vietnam, where the North Vietnamese Tet-
offensive had taken its toll in human life and public opinion, had become so unpopular that 
Johnson declared that he would not run for reelection.
605
  
Israel secretly tried to show the US it was serious about seeking peace and in April 1968 the 
Israeli government authorized Foreign Minister Abba Eban to present King Hussein with a 
concrete plan for a settlement with Jordan. King Hussein was naturally still interested in 
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having the West Bank returned, and to achieve his objective he was still willing to make 
territorial and diplomatic concessions. The Israeli proposal for a settlement implied that Israel 
would cede parts of the West Bank to Jordan. However, Israeli policymakers were unwilling 
to cede control over Jerusalem, even if Jordanian recognition would result from it. The 
proposal was in effect an ultimatum. If Hussein did not want to talk along those lines, Israel 
would continue the occupation. After informal hearings between Hussein and the Israeli 
government, the two sides met in late September 1968 for the first time in two years. King 
Hussein, always cautious of public unrest and now forced to take into account the large 
Palestinian population, rejected Israel’s ultimatum. Rather than being scapegoated for having 
authorized Israel’s control over the West Bank, the king preferred to see Israel criticized for 
its occupation.
606
  
In a last attempt to persuade Israel to proceed with Jarring’s peace process Johnson on 
November 7, 1968 authorized the sale of Phantom fighters to Israel.
607
 King Hussein had been 
eager to start negotiations with Israel but he was acutely aware that he needed support before 
he could proceed. As a result of the reemerged Arab rivalry, Arab support was scarce, and 
when Johnson authorized the Phantom deal, King Hussein realized that the US and Israel 
indeed had developed a special relationship.
608
 Jordan left the Jarring Mission shortly after. 
Although the Jarring Mission continued under heavy pressure before it eventually collapsed in 
1971, the relationship between Israel and Jordan returned to its near-normal character.
609
  
The reemergence of the secret channels and the decency of the Jordan-Israel relationship 
cannot be credited to President Johnson. In terms of leverage on Washington Israel was by 
1968 stronger than ever during Johnson’s presidency, and Israel was unquestionably the most 
senior and strongest party in its relationship with Jordan.
610
 Nevertheless, the continuation of 
the American relationships with Jordan and with Israel was a key factor in preserving the 
relationship between the two. The relationship between Israel and King Hussein suffered 
several setbacks, but it always recovered. It eventually developed into the Jordan-Israel Peace 
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Treaty which was signed in 1994.
611
 Israel and Jordan spent nearly twenty-five years to reach 
an agreement, and President Johnson’s ineffectiveness in 1967–1968 did little to speed up the 
process.
612
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
King Hussein of Jordan was a master at playing the Cold War game. From his peripheral 
position, geographically and of significance in US foreign policy, King Hussein became 
skilled in manipulating the center in Washington D.C.
613
 In search of a strong partner to 
protect him from his own opposition, the king used the Americans’ fear of Soviet influence to 
persuade the Johnson administration to accept Jordan as a bastion of regional stability in the 
Middle East. The relationship had been supported and held together by Israel’s interest in the 
king, but when Israel no longer shared this interest, the US-Jordan relationship took on a 
dynamic of its own. American policymakers came to appreciate that the relationship with 
King Hussein enabled the United States to preserve US-Arab relations and strategic interests 
in the Arab world, while at the same time developing a special relationship with Israel. 
In spite of King Hussein’s many successes in playing one superpower against another, he was 
unsuccessful in making the Johnson administration reevaluate its perception of the Middle 
East. Whatever arguments King Hussein presented, the US continued to assess the Middle 
East from an Israel-centered frame of reference. This adaption of Israel’s point of view had 
implications for the American understanding of Jordan and King Hussein, but why and how 
was the US-Jordan relationship affected by the Americans’ sympathy for Israel during 1964–
1968? Why did the Johnson administration not strengthen Hussein to withstand the Arab 
nationalism’s calls for war in June 1967? And which political concerns influenced the nature 
of the US-Jordan relationship? 
Israel’s Part in Shaping Johnson’s Understanding of Jordan  
Israel had a prominent position in the minds of both American policymakers and the general 
public. American presidents had long since viewed Israel as a source for domestic support, 
and the Johnson administration was no different than its predecessors. Moreover, the Johnson 
administration had only a limited understanding of Arabs and Palestinians. Thus, Israel’s 
views and recommendations were widely accepted as the best course of action, and Johnson 
willingly lent his ears to advice from pro-Israel friends and advisors. Originally, Jordan’s 
significance in American Middle East policy rested largely on geopolitical concerns. 
Preventing Soviet influence was one step to ensure stability in the region, but as that stability 
came under pressure by the Arab realignment in 1964 Jordan became a platform from where 
Johnson could launch an impression of evenhandedness in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Through 
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such evenhandedness the US could promote stability and thus ensure its national interests in 
the Middle East. Jordan, Israel and the US shared a mutual interest in a stable status quo in 
the Middle East, and the Johnson administration had from the very beginning managed to 
camouflage its sympathy toward Israel under a strategic image of impartiality.  
Jordan had always been in a critical position in the Arab world, and without foreign support 
King Hussein’s regime was destined to collapse. It was only when Nasser, the leading figure 
of Arab nationalism, accepted the king as an equal that Hussein managed to find a middle 
ground between the increasing popular appeal of Arab nationalism and Jordan’s critical 
dependency on foreign aid. Once the king had found this middle ground, he did everything in 
his power to retain it. Moreover, Israel had after years of contemplating action against Jordan 
if King Hussein’s regime should collapse, realized that Hussein in fact benefitted Israel’s 
security. The triangular meeting of minds between Israel, Jordan and the US rested on a 
common interest in regional stability. 
American Middle East policy was carefully balanced between the commitment to Israel on 
the one side, and the strategic necessity of US-Arab relations on the other. The two diverging 
considerations were bridged by the fact that good relations with the Arab states also kept the 
tensions in the region to a minimum and thus ensured Israel’s security. It gave the Arab states 
an incentive not to swing too far into Moscow’s orbit, which would gravely increase the 
combined Arab arsenal and the threat to Israel, and it ensured access to the Middle East’s 
economic assets in the Arab states. Moreover, it also allowed Johnson to develop closer ties to 
Israel, while appreciating that adopting an openly pro-Israel policy would forge a tighter Arab 
alignment with Moscow. Therefore, the administration preferred to keep a safe minimum 
distance from Israel. The policy of strategic impartiality had taken shape.  
To preserve its national interests in the Arab world the Johnson administration had to disguise 
that it more often than not aimed to ensure Israel’s security. Nevertheless, Israel’s 
preeminence in Johnson’s Middle East policy became increasingly evident during the arms 
sales negotiations with Jordan in 1965 and1966: If Israel did not accept American arms sales 
to Jordan the Johnson administration bluntly said it would not accommodate King Hussein’s 
requests. Johnson was seemingly willing to see Jordan being overrun by Soviet influence even 
though he realized it would unveil the lack of impartiality of his administration’s Middle East 
policy. The reason lay in part that, in comparison with Israel, Jordan’s mouthpiece to the US 
was insignificant. Jordan never had the potential to threaten any American interests in the 
   
109 
Middle East. It never had oil it could threaten to withhold from the US, and it could never 
make a difference on the domestic scene in America.  
The only threat Jordan could make, and did make, was turning to the Soviet Union for 
support. However, the king saw Soviet influence as fuel to the opposition and he only made 
such threats to highlight the need for close ties with the US. Since Israel had nearly all rights 
reserved in formulating the Johnson administration’s perception of the Middle East, and 
approved of tying Jordan closer to the US, Israel was essential in shaping, maintaining and 
strengthening King Hussein’s importance in the Johnson’s Middle East policy. For as long as 
Israel’s security concerns could be reconciled with American interests in the Arab world, the 
US tried its best to continue the balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Nonetheless, 
there was always a veil covering the American image of impartiality that Johnson tried to 
forward. Depending on the events in in the Middle East during Johnson’s presidency, this 
image could be strengthened, but also threatened. 
Johnson, Jordan and Israel  
The first chance to strengthen the image of impartiality came with King Hussein’s arms 
request shortly after the Cairo Summit in 1964. The close unification of the Arab world hiked 
the tensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and compelled Johnson to take a more direct approach 
to the region’s issues. Johnson had little understanding of either Palestinian or Arab 
nationalism and simply believed that King Hussein was responding to pressure from other 
Arab states when he requested direct arms sales from the US. And although the king did 
respond to such pressures, the pressure from the domestic opposition had already proven to be 
even more threatening. Israel, however, claimed that Hussein’s adherence to the Cairo summit 
signaled his departure from the de facto peace, and questioned whether its security would be 
better served by tying the US closer to Israel, either via direct arms sales or by a security 
guarantee.  
The Johnson administration was already fully aware that accommodating such Israeli requests 
would thrust the Arab states into Moscow’s arms, and it gradually dawned upon the 
administration that King Hussein not only prevented Soviet influence. The moderation of 
Hussein’s regime also insulated Israel’s longest frontier from radical Arab nationalism. As a 
result, Johnson agreed to consider Jordan’s arms request. After all, it would strengthen his 
image of impartiality. A moderate Jordan became the Johnson administration’s best excuse to 
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maintain the necessary distance from Israel. Essentially, the American image of impartiality 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict depended largely on King Hussein’s regime.  
If America turned Jordan’s arms request down, the king declared that he would turn to the 
Soviet Union, if only to protect his newfound position in the Arab world and the domestic 
popularity he suddenly enjoyed. The moderation of the king’s regime was evidently at stake. 
The Soviet Union was already closely tied to the so-called radical regimes in Syria and Egypt 
and if Jordan too became radicalized, American policymakers judged that Israel would have a 
much stronger case for closer alignment, arms sales, and for developing nuclear deterrents. 
Consequently, strategy-minded advisors in America came to fear that the king would be 
unable to withstand the Soviet pressure, which would arrive along with Soviet weaponry, and 
therefore, the Johnson administration in 1965 agreed to supply tanks to Jordan. 
The decision to accommodate Jordan’s arms request was made because it would strengthen 
King Hussein’s moderation, and a moderate Jordan would ensure low tensions in the Arab-
Israeli conflict and thus obviate Israel’s need for advanced weaponry. The American image of 
impartiality had been strengthened, but it was soon challenged. Johnson was tied down in 
Vietnam, and the troubling situation in Southeast Asia made him desperately responsive to 
domestic support from the pro-Israel electorate. Domestic concerns were suddenly applied to 
the American relationship with Jordan. To offset domestic complaints of selling arms to 
Israel’s enemy and to make sure Israel was able to handle its own problems without American 
help, Johnson authorized arms sales to Israel as well. He argued that such moves were in 
accord with a balanced approach to the Middle East, and his image of impartiality survived its 
first challenge. 
When the disputes between Israel and Jordan intensified during 1966, the Johnson 
administration realized that Israeli reprisals were the real threat to the status quo Johnson 
desperately tried to preserve. The downward spiral of infiltrations and retaliations led Johnson 
to conclude that Israeli unilateralism was the most pressing threat to regional stability. Israeli 
raids against Jordan destabilized the king’s moderate position, and the Johnson administration 
saw a clear political case for selling aircraft to Jordan when King Hussein in 1966 approached 
the US for jet fighters. The loss of a moderate regime in the worsening atmosphere of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would strengthen Israel’s arguments for a formal security guarantee and 
accelerate its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent. Already by 1966 it was evident that a moderate 
Jordan was America’s key to absolving Israel’s needs for advanced weaponry, a security 
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guarantee and nuclear weapons. However, selling fighters to Jordan would be interpreted in 
Israel and domestically in America as a departure from Johnson’s commitment to Israel’s 
security.  
The Art of Balance 
Israel accepted the American relationship with King Hussein, but it was far more interested in 
arms and a security guarantee than in a moderate neighbor. Israel always had the potential to 
upset Johnson’s domestic popularity, and since Johnson’s campaign in Vietnam deprived him 
of domestic popularity, he agreed to sell advanced weaponry to Israel as well. Johnson did not 
want to strain Israel’s patience beyond comfortable bounds and authorized the arms sale 
without any formal concessions from Israel. In yet another attempt to offset domestic 
complaints of selling arms to Israel’s enemy, and hopefully to remove the nuclear option from 
Israel’s inventory, the Johnson administration sold Israel larger quantities and advanced 
fighters in the hope that it would preserve the image of impartiality and what the Americans 
regarded as the status quo.  
A stable Jordan not under hostile domination was in Washington perceived to be in Israel’s 
best interest. Problems arose as it became evident that Israel did not share that understanding. 
Completely unchecked by the US, Israeli unilateralism was allowed to develop. It reached its 
temporary culmination with the attack on Samu in November 1966. Johnson had then pursued 
a less veiled character of impartiality, and maintained a cautious non-confrontational policy 
toward Israel for nearly two years. He had twice tried using arms sales to Israel in an effort to 
force through a change in its handling of Palestinian infiltrations, but not once pressured for 
Israeli concessions and never entertained using effective measures to make it desist from the 
disruptive policy. The less veiled impartiality was increasingly evident: As a result of 
Johnson’s non-confrontational approach to Israel, Jordan had never been strengthened to 
withstand the increasing domestic unrest and foreign pressure that followed in the retaliations’ 
wake. The attack on Samu seriously shook King Hussein, dissociated him from his population 
and the rest of the Arab world, and led him to question American interest in his regime. The 
king’s moderation was in immediate jeopardy and he appealed for renewed arms sales from 
America. 
The Johnson administration never entertained to accommodate the full extent of King 
Hussein’s arms request after the raid on Samu. After all, two arms sales to Jordan had already 
resulted in equivalent sales to Israel. Another arms sale to Jordan would in all likelihood 
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necessitate similar arms sales to Israel, thus demonstrating to the Arab states, and Jordan in 
particular, that Israel was always at the core of America’s Middle East policy. Johnson’s 
image of impartiality would be revealed as not impartial at all. In such an event the Arab 
states would abandon the US, accept Soviet support and challenge America’s national 
interests in the Middle East. Moreover, constraining Israel and strengthening Jordan could 
only amount to increased domestic opposition against Johnson.  
It was a difficult dilemma, but foremost among the domestic-minded advisors in the 
administration was President Johnson himself. Against the recommendations of the State 
Department and pragmatic advisors of the National Security Council, Johnson did not 
threaten Israel with repercussions. His domestic popularity was already worn thin by the ever-
deteriorating campaign in Vietnam, and he did not want to risk facing greater domestic 
opposition. However, he also wanted to avoid thrusting the Arab states into Moscow’s arms. 
Johnson’s relationship with Jordan, the very assurance of King Hussein’s moderation and a 
key element in his commitment to Israel’s security, was caught in limbo. It was worth neither 
strengthening nor sacrificing. The solution was to reinforce King Hussein’s moderation with a 
minimal arms package that did not justify a compensatory sale to Israel. Yet it did not enable 
the king to remain moderate for long.  
Johnson’s Retreat from the Middle East  
By the beginning of 1967, the internal dynamic of the US-Jordan relationship had come into 
full fruition. A moderate Jordan prevented Soviet influence, ensured Israel’s security, 
absolved Israel’s needs for advanced weaponry, and most importantly by 1967, isolated 
Israel’s requests for tighter alignment with America. However, it never led US policymakers 
to reassess the significance of their relationship with Jordan. The US made no serious effort to 
strengthen King Hussein against the mounting pressure from Arab nationalism during the 
spring of 1967. Instead, it worked with great effort to help Israel find a favorable solution to 
the May crisis. In constant fear of domestic repercussions Johnson did nothing to sober 
Israel’s reaction to Nasser’s closing of the Strait of Tiran, nor did Johnson, when clinging to 
the sidelines, enable Hussein to detach from the Arab rivalry during its peak intensity late in 
May 1967.  
In early June 1967, when it became evident that the US could not support Israel without 
revealing that Israel’s interests mattered more to the administration than the Arab states’, 
Johnson decided to withdraw from the region’s problems, but he only made that decision 
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when he was reassured that Israel in all likelihood would win a military confrontation. 
Consequently King Hussein felt forced to go along with foreign and domestic nationalists. In 
King Hussein’s eyes, isolation was far worse, and the US never presented any viable 
alternatives to it. Hussein may have never been persuaded to stay out of Nasser’s inadvertent 
warmongering during 1967, but the fact that the Johnson administration barely asked him to 
stay his hand and did nothing to strengthen him against Nasser, demonstrates that Johnson 
was far more worried of having to come to Israel’s aid if tensions exploded. Instead of 
calming Israel’s reaction to the ongoing crisis, Johnson took the view that Israel had to be 
strong enough to defend its security without American intervention. With domestic sentiment 
in mind, Johnson’s interest in a stable status quo and the balanced approach to the Arab-
Israeli conflict was replaced with the interest in preventing Israel from dragging the US into a 
conflict area.  
When war came about on June 5, 1967 President Johnson did nothing to prevent Israel from 
honing in on the West Bank. Johnson allowed Israel to create a status quo wherein Israel’s 
security could be satisfactorily assured, even if no moves toward peace were taken after the 
war’s end. Johnson was urged to pressure Israel to show more interest in peace, but he was 
highly receptive to Israel’s popularity in America. In fear of upsetting the limited support he 
still had at home, and because of his peculiar belief that the Arab states somehow would be 
more willing to negotiate with Israel after their humiliating defeat than they had been before 
the war, Johnson defied advice to ask Israel to return to the prewar lines. After the Six-Day 
War, Israel viewed King Hussein with indifference, but the American idea that Hussein opted 
for the necessary distance between Israel and the US had taken deep roots. In fact, after 
Israel’s success in the war, a moderate Jordan was the administration’s best excuse to 
continue keeping Israel at arms’ length. Although Israel seemed willing to see the king’s 
replacement, Washington was not.  
Instead, Jordan was once more used to ensure Israel’s security but this time by forcing an end 
of fighting in the Middle East. King Hussein’s moderation seemed to triumph in the war’s 
aftermath, and in America’s eyes Hussein offered interesting opportunities to settle the Arab-
Israeli conflict once and for all. Nonetheless, domestic concerns once more trumped 
geopolitical interest in Jordan. Israel’s popularity in America was sky-high after the Six-Day 
War, and public opinion gave Johnson no more leeway to force Israel to begin negotiations. 
Moreover, the President had only a limited understanding of Palestinians and Arabs, and he 
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allowed Israel to sit tight when it proved uninterested in ceding the West Bank in return for a 
settlement with Jordan. Shortly after, the Johnson administration made its final retreat from 
the Middle East. Johnson never publically criticized Israel for not entering negotiations with 
Jordan. He hardly raised his voice over Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. He made no 
substantial efforts to jump-start negotiations, and he made no effort to support King Hussein’s 
moderation as it became pressured when the Arab rivalry resurfaced. President Johnson 
abandoned the strategic impartiality because trying to continue it would in all likelihood 
reveal the lack of impartiality in his administration’s Middle East policy. 
Whereas Israel had supported America’s relationship with Jordan in 1964, Israel no longer 
needed King Hussein to safeguard its security in 1968. Israel preferred advanced American 
weaponry over moderate neighbors, and its security had been reassured by force in the Six-
Day War. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, the Arab states continued to export oil to the 
West, and no Arab state which was not already under the Soviet Union’s wings was willing to 
go there, least of all Jordan. The increased number of Palestinians in Jordan had the potential 
to easily destabilize the king’s regime even without Soviet support. Paired with Israel’s 
popularity in America, and Johnson’s lack thereof, Johnson settled without explicit 
agreements of the road to peace when he in November 1968 authorized Israel’s purchase of 
Phantom fighters.  
Johnson and Jordan  
King Hussein was so worried of the opposition’s potential animosity toward him after the war 
that accepting Soviet support was far from his preferred option. It was, however, the only 
option he had when it came to manipulating his partner in Washington. However dismayed 
the king may have been with Johnson’s lack of interest in him after the Six-Day War, Jordan 
was still in desperate need of foreign support. King Hussein was so tired of Israel’s 
preeminence in Johnson’s Middle East policy that he once more threatened to turn to the 
Soviet Union. Although America now found a new status quo in the Middle East, and even 
though Israel disapproved of continued close ties between the US and Jordan, the US was 
determined to preserve its national interests in the Arab world. The US had come to realize 
that, in order to preserve its strategic interests in the Arab world, it had to keep Israel at a safe 
minimum distance. The United States had to reinvent its strategic impartiality, albeit in a less 
veiled version. As a result, the Johnson administration listened carefully to King Hussein’s 
complaints and released the arms that were under contract. 
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Israel’s constant interest in nuclear weapons, a security guarantee, advanced weaponry, and its 
aggressive handling of retaliations had inadvertently nurtured the separate importance of King 
Hussein in the Johnson administration’s thinking. Although Jordan never compared to Israel 
in American policymakers’ minds, or in the minds of the general public in America, Israel 
had to a very high degree participated in changing the nature of the American relationship 
with Jordan. Before Johnson’s departure from the White House, the US continued to develop 
the special character of its relationship with Israel, but it also continued to value the 
relationship with the Jordan, although evidently less than that with Israel. Still, it was enough 
to allow King Hussein to retain his troubled position. King Hussein resumed the dialogue 
with Israel, and the two sides eventually reached an understanding that culminated in the 
Jordan-Israel Peace treaty in 1994.  
President Johnson’s balanced approach to Jordan and Israel faced constant threats of being 
unveiled as not balanced at all. The resulting changes that befell Jordan’s relationship with the 
United States during Johnson’s presidency kept King Hussein’s relationship with Israel alive. 
Although Johnson’s steadfast position at Israel’s side in 1964–1968 contributed to the long 
peace process between Israel and Jordan, his administration facilitated the survival of the 
processes that eventually led to the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. 
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Map 2: Israel 2014 615 
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Map 3: The West Bank 2014 616 
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Map 4: Strait of Tiran 1983 617 
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